Football violence in Europe

A report to the Amsterdam Group

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Executive summary

ES.1 Introduction
The report contains an up-to-date review of research and theoretical approaches to football violence in Europe. The historical development of the problems in various countries is outlined. Specific attention is given to the role of the media, the emergence of overt racism at football matches and the alleged influence of alcohol consumption on violent behaviour. The content of each section of the report is summarised below.

ES.2 History
The game of football has been associated with violence since its beginnings in 13th century England. Medieval football matches involved hundreds of players, and were essentially pitched battles between the young men of rival villages and towns – often used as opportunities to settle old feuds, personal arguments and land disputes.

Forms of ‘folk-football’ existed in other European countries (such as the German Knappen and Florentine calcio in costume), but the roots of modern football are in these violent English rituals.

The much more disciplined game introduced to continental Europe in 1900s was the reformed pastime of the British aristocracy. Other European countries adopted this form of the game, associated with Victorian values of fair-play and retrained enthusiasm. Only two periods in British history have been relatively free of football-related violence: the inter-war years and the decade following the Second World War.

The behaviour now known as ‘football hooliganism’ originated in England in the early 1960s, and has been linked with the televising of matches (and of pitch-invasions, riots etc.) and with the ‘reclaiming’ of the game by the working classes.

In other European countries, similar patterns of behaviour emerged about 10 years later, in the early 1970s. Some researchers argue that a similar ‘proletarianisation’ of the game was involved, but there is little consensus on this issue, and much disagreement on the extent to which continental youth were influenced by British hooligans.

ES.3 Theory and research perspectives
The major research and theoretical perspectives on football hooliganism derive mainly from British work conducted since the late 1960s. The principal sociological, psychological and anthropological approaches are critically reviewed – including those of Ian Taylor, John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Peter Marsh, John Williams and his colleagues, Gary Armstrong, Richard Giulianotti etc.
There are deep divisions within social science circles concerning explanations of football hooliganism, with often vitriolic debate between Marxist sociologists, so-called ‘figurationalists’, social psychologists and more empirically oriented researchers. This atmosphere has hindered the emergence of truly multi-disciplinary perspectives.

It is generally agreed that British football hooliganism has probably been over-researched. Despite a general decline in violence at British football matches, the phenomenon still attracts a disproportionate amount of research activity.

Research in other European countries has grown in scale since the early 1980s. The work of German, Dutch and Italian social scientists is reviewed. Much of this research has taken British theoretical perspectives as a starting point, although more ‘local’ approaches are now evident in some countries.

The increase in work in these countries has led to a more Europe-wide approach to the problems of football violence, with a number of collaborative programmes now underway. The level of cross-cultural variation in the patterns of behaviour of football fans, however, presents a number of problems for this kind of research.

It is suggested that the focus purely on behaviour at football games in Europe may be too limiting. The subject might be better considered in the context of the more general rise in juvenile crime and delinquency in many countries and the emergence of new deviant sub-cultures.

**ES.4 Cross-national variations**

There has been no systematic recording of football-related violent incidents in any European country. The lack of quantitative or reliable empirical data on football-related violence, and particularly the lack of comparable data, makes assessment of the variations and similarities between European countries very difficult, but some general conclusions can be drawn from the available evidence.

It is clear that some form of disorderly behaviour has occurred in virtually every country in which football is played. Disorder of some kind appears to be a near-universal and seemingly inevitable accompaniment to the game.

Football-related disorder is not, however, necessarily of the same nature, or influenced by the same causal factors, in all of the cultures in which it occurs. Even the most dogmatic academics have come to admit that ‘universal’ explanations cannot accommodate all cross-cultural variations.

Both the extent and the nature of football-related violence are influenced by different historical, social, economic, political and cultural factors in different European countries. Social class has been a significant factor in England, for example, religious sectarianism in Scotland and Northern Ireland, sub-nationalist politics in Spain, historical regional antagonisms in Italy, etc.
There are, however, significant cross-national similarities in the ‘stages of development’ of the problem. Most countries experience an initial stage of sporadic violence directed mainly at referees and players, followed by a second stage involving violence between opposing groups of fans and against police/security officers inside the stadium, and a third stage involving an increase in violent encounters between these groups outside the stadium.

In most European countries, football-related violence is currently a predominantly internal problem, with the majority of incidents occurring at club-level matches, while supporters of the national team abroad are generally better-behaved. The English are an obvious exception to this rule, and rivalries between some other nations (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands) have led to violence, but these incidents seem recently to have diminished.

Internally, however, fans tend to cause more trouble at ‘away’ matches than when supporting their team at home. This is a common pattern across Europe.

Apart from Britain, the nations currently experiencing the most significant problems of football-related violence are: Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. The available data indicate that levels of football-related violence in these countries are roughly similar, with incidents occurring at around 10% of matches (or around 10% of supporters classifiable as ‘violent’).

Austria, Sweden and Denmark also experience some problems with football-related violence, although these appear to be on a smaller scale. In Denmark, a new style of non-violent, carnivalesque fan-culture, promoted by the ‘Roligans’ (a pun on ‘hooligans’, from ‘rolig’ meaning ‘peaceful’), is gaining popularity.

France, Spain, Portugal and Switzerland have also experienced episodes of violence - although football hooliganism cannot be said to be a major problem in these countries. In France and Switzerland, the theatrical, flamboyant Italian style of support (but largely without the passionate hostilities) has superseded the dour, and more violent, English style.

Sporadic violence has also been reported in Greece, the Czech Republic, Albania and Turkey. Some of these may be isolated incidents, but there is no room for complacency, as these countries may currently be in the early ‘stages’ of the development pattern outlined above.

Football hooliganism is clearly not an exclusively ‘British Disease’. Nor can the British hooligans be held entirely responsible for ‘spreading’ the disease in Europe. Research findings show that while some of the more violent European fans regard the English hooligans as role-models, others - including the Scottish ‘Tartan Army’ and the Danish Roligans have quite deliberately adopted a very different style of behaviour.
ES.5  Media coverage

Football hooliganism is a highly visible phenomenon, as journalists and TV cameras are present at virtually every match. Since the 1960s, journalists have been sent to football matches to report on crowd behaviour as much as on the game itself.

As a result, media coverage of football-related disorder and violence is extensive, and the British tabloid press in particular devote apparently unlimited column inches to any incident that occurs, complete with sensationalist headlines.

Many researchers, and many non-academic observers, have argued that this sensationalism, together with a ‘predictive’ approach whereby violence at certain matches is anticipated by the media, has actually contributed to the problem. (In Britain, at least one academic ‘school’ regards ‘media amplification’ as the principal cause of the problem.)

The British press have also been criticised for their xenophobic approach to the coverage of international matches and tournaments. (It may be no coincidence that English fans tend to be the most belligerent in these contexts.) This tendency was particularly apparent during the Euro 96 championships, when at least one tabloid newspaper represented the England-Germany match as a resumption of the Second World War.

Although there is no direct equivalent of the British tabloid extremes in other European nations, most researchers have identified problems relating to media coverage of football hooliganism. In all of the countries with significant levels of football-related disorder, researchers have found that hooligans relish the media coverage they receive, and often positively seek it - with rival groups actively competing for column inches and mentions in sensational headlines.

The publicity-seeking tendencies of football fans can, however, be turned to beneficial effect. The extensive and highly positive coverage of the new, non-violent, ‘carnival’ groups such as Scotland’s ‘Tartan Army’ and the Danish ‘Roligans’ has clearly been seen by them as a ‘victory’ over their badly-behaved rivals, and has helped to reinforce and perpetuate their exemplary behaviour.

The influence of the media was highlighted in a recent European Parliament report on football hooliganism, which recommended that the media avoid sensationalism and promote fair-play and sporting values.

We would go further, and recommend a systematic, pan-European media campaign to promote the non-violent ‘carnival’ groups while ruthlessly cutting off the oxygen-of-publicity supply to the ‘hooligan’ groups.
ES.6 Racism

The true extent of racism among football supporters is almost impossible to quantify. Extensive speculation and debate on the subject is not supported by much reliable empirical data.

For the media and public opinion, however, racism among football fans is a serious problem, and often blamed for outbreaks of violence, particularly at international matches.

Among academics and professionals involved with football, the role of racism and far-right groups in football violence is a hotly debated issue. Some agencies, such as the British National Criminal Intelligence Service, regard their influence as minimal, while others have directly blamed them for violent incidents.

In Britain, racist chanting at matches still occurs, but at nowhere near the levels it reached in the 1970s and 80s, when black players were often greeted with monkey-noises and bananas. The recent decline may be due in part to campaigns designed to combat racism, such as the ‘Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football’ campaign.

Elsewhere in Europe - particularly in Germany and Austria - there are some indications that the problem may be more persistent. In one survey, 20% of German fans reported sympathies with the neo-Nazi movement. In many cases, however, Nazi symbols and slogans may be used purely to shock and provoke, without any underlying political conviction.

The problem is certainly being taken seriously across Europe, and a number of initiatives have been launched, including the ‘When Racism Wins, The Sport Loses’ campaign in the Netherlands, ‘No al Razzismo’ in Italy and the Europe-wide initiative, ‘All Different - All Equal’.

The success of these initiatives is difficult to measure, but the UK has certainly seen a recent decrease in racist behaviour at football grounds. While the existing campaigns in different countries may prove effective, there have also been calls for a more systematic, pan-European approach. A recent report to the European Parliament outlines recommendations for Europe-wide co-operation to combat racism.

ES.7 Alcohol and football violence

Football violence in Britain is often reported in the media as resulting from excessive alcohol consumption. This view, however, is not shared by the large majority of social scientists who have conducted research on hooliganism. Neither is it the view popularly held in many other European countries.

Little research has focused specifically on the role of alcohol in football hooliganism. This is because it has been considered, at best, a peripheral issue in most studies. Some investigators, however, have recently claimed that drinking can ‘aggravate’ football violence and have supported calls for further restrictions at football grounds. Little evidence has been provided to support their claims.
Proposals for Europe-wide restrictions on the availability of alcohol at football games have recently been made by the European Parliament, although the legal status of such proposals is currently unclear. Such an approach, however, ignores the wide cross-national variations in the consumption of alcohol by football fans and its apparent effects.

The case of Scottish fans, whose behaviour has changed markedly for the better over the past 10 years, despite continuing patterns of ‘heavy’ drinking, is considered in some detail. It is clear that alcohol-related behaviours are not immutable and can change in relatively short periods of time.

The example of the Danish Roligans is also considered. These have drinking patterns very similar to those of English fans, put present few problems to the authorities. Drunkenness among the Danish fans is typically accompanied by good humour and positive sociability.

Other groups of fans, such as the Italian Ultras, rarely drink to excess when attending football matches and the role of alcohol in football violence in that country is thought to be completely insignificant.

Attention is given to a study in the United States which suggests that restrictions on the availability of alcohol at certain times may lead to increased problems due to ‘compensatory’ drinking at higher levels in the periods immediately before and after the restricted period.

It is concluded that restrictions on fans’ drinking will have little impact on levels of hooliganism and, in some cases, may be counter-productive. Future research should be directed towards the modification of alcohol-related behaviours.

The approach taken by the British authorities to reducing football hooliganism has been largely reactive – increasingly sophisticated policing, surveillance and monitoring techniques, segregation of fans, restrictions on alcohol etc. The British Government has also introduced specific legislation to cover acts of ‘hooliganism’.

While such measures are evident elsewhere in Europe, the German, Dutch and Belgian authorities, in particular, have been more proactive in their approach to the problem. The development of ‘fan coaching’ schemes appears to have had an impact on levels of violence in certain areas. Such schemes, which involve social workers deployed with groups of fans, provide useful models for other countries.
There is, however, a general lack of initiative from the major football clubs in Europe. While German clubs are involved to an extent in the fan coaching schemes, elsewhere there is little contact between club officials and the fan groups. It is suggested that local ‘fan’s forums’, which allow genuine dialogue between officials and supporters, may help to reduce some of the problems.

**Future directions**

Football hooliganism continues to be the subject of disproportionate research activity. Little is to be gained from simply adding to this often unfocused ‘industry’. There are, however, two specific areas where fresh approaches could be of benefit:

1. Research on the development of effective measures to reduce fan violence in European countries. This would include detailed examination of current proactive schemes and isolation of the key features associated with success.

2. Detailed research on alcohol-related behaviour at football matches and the ways in which this can best be modified. While drinking has been shown to be a rather peripheral issue, even in English hooliganism, there remains a common perception that much of fan violence in Northern Europe is alcohol-related. This ‘myth’ needs to be more firmly challenged. In the few areas where alcohol-related problems may exist, attention needs to be given to the most effective ways of overcoming them.
1 Introduction

Football hooliganism, once known as the ‘British Disease’, has been for many years a major cause for concern throughout Europe – particularly in Germany, Holland, Italy and Belgium, as well as in the UK. Substantial disturbances at football matches have also been witnessed in Greece, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Austria. Recent debates in the European Parliament and at national government level in many EC countries have highlighted a growing sense of frustration about our apparent inability to curb or redirect the anti-social behaviour of a minority of football supporters which constitutes the problem. And the spectre of 38 dead Juventus fans in the Heysel Stadium continues to haunt any debate about the causes and the cure of football violence.

The popular media in Britain, with their unique penchant for hysteria and sensationalisation, have waged a war of words on the ‘mindless thugs’ and ‘scum’ who populate the soccer terraces since the mid 1960s – reserving their most extreme vitriol for the reporting of events involving English fans abroad. When no more ‘obvious’ cause of football violence is evident, it is typically reported as being ‘drunken’ – a simple consequence of alcohol consumption – a common ‘reach me down’ explanation for almost any social ill.

Social scientists, of course, have also been offering explanations of football hooliganism since the late 1960s, ranging from a concern with macro socio-political changes to the role of lead pollution and zinc deficiencies. This field was, once again, monopolised by the British, with most Universities having a least one post-graduate student writing a thesis in this area. Leicester University devoted an entire Centre to research on football fans, with De Montfort and Manchester quickly following their lead. Academics in other European countries joined the debate at a theoretical level in the late 1970s – particularly the Italians and the Dutch. With the gradual spread of football sub-culture style, and its sometimes aggressive patterns of behaviour, throughout most of Europe in the late 1970s, their interest became more focused on the behaviour of fans in their own countries than with purely theoretical perspectives.
Contemporary research on football violence is now largely European in scope, as reflected in a number of recent conferences in the UK and Italy and in major publications over the last few years. Despite the continuing popularity of the subject, however, a genuine consensus concerning the origins of the problem, in whatever country, and the most effective means of tackling the phenomenon, have yet to emerge. In some instances one has a distinct sense of *déjà vu*, with perspectives once applied to English football matches in the 1960s now being reworked to serve as explanations for events in, say, Genoa in the 1990s. The manifest failure of some theoretical approaches has also led some researchers to return to more simplistic explanations – some suggesting further bans on alcohol as a way of stemming the problems, particularly in the UK, even though their earlier research had failed to find that drinking was a significant factor.

To some extent, of course, football violence itself has declined in frequency in most European countries over the past 5 years, most noticeably in the UK. The return of English clubs to European competition was marked by some outbursts of fighting between English fans and their opponents, but there has been little to match the ugly scenes of the 1980s. Even the recent Euro ‘96 championships, despite the apocalyptic predictions in the media prior to the games, passed off with little incident, apart from a confrontation between English fans and the police in Trafalgar Square following their team’s exit from the competition at the hand of Germany.

This decline in the phenomenon, however, has done little to dent the amount of research focusing upon it. Judging by the number of recent articles, books and conference proceedings, the subject is as popular as ever, even though many ‘old timers’ in the field may think that there is little more to discover or say about football hooliganism. The question of what, precisely, is meant by football hooliganism, on the other hand, remains to be fully answered. Steve Redhead of Manchester University commented in 1991:

“Discourses on football hooliganism seemed to have proliferated just as the phenomenon itself appears to have disappeared from public view; at least in Britain, if not in other parts of Continental Europe. Part of the problem lies in the difficulty of defining accurately what we mean by the highly contentious phrase ‘hooliganism’, a term which has no specific meaning ... and whose boundaries ... are demarcated by these various discourses or ‘disciplines’ themselves ...”

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1 S. Redhead (1991d)
Despite all of this continued activity, there is still no single, universally adopted definition of football hooligans. Neither is there a definitive overview of the field – no comprehensive textbook providing a balanced analysis of the competing approaches and the evidence purporting to support them. The reason for this becomes apparent when one delves into the published literature. Here more time is devoted to demolishing the views of other ‘experts’ than to developing alternative explanations and, as we note in Section 3, the atmosphere is often more reminiscent of a rowdy conflict between rival football fans themselves than it is of calm, rational, academic debate.

When not being unkind to each other, many authors express themselves in a style of language which is riddled with academic jargon. In some cases the writing is not just incomprehensible but also pretentiously silly. Take, for example, this introduction by Richard Giulianotti in a paper on Scottish football fans.

“The discursive raison d’être of this paper must be recognised at the outset. Foucault’s (1977) identification of Individuation’s paradoxical cultivation (see Abercrombie et al., 1986), where individuals gain a sense of agency’s power only by the societal application of scientific knowledge for their surveillance and control (Panopticism) is implicitly accepted here. Indeed, this paper is itself caught in the ‘bad faith’ trap of reproducing this discursive arrangement of scientific power-knowledge.”

### 1.1 Aims of the report

A principal aim of this report has been to present a clear, unbiased, but critical review of the literature on football violence in Europe. This we have attempted to do by standing back from the vested interests, academic or otherwise, of the individuals and research groups from whom the literature emanates and by judging the work in terms of available evidence and relevance to contemporary problems in Europe. This detachment has been difficult at times because one of the authors of this report established a fairly significant theoretical perspective on football hooliganism in the late 1970s. In keeping with the traditions of this field, he has also been soundly attacked by a number of other authors whose work is reviewed here. Nonetheless, this report is a collective effort and we would claim that a high degree of balance has been maintained. The input of a number of consultants and colleagues throughout Europe has added significantly to this objectivity.

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2 R. Giulianotti (1991)
3 Despite his Italian name, Giulianotti is, in fact, Scottish
A second aim of this report has been to examine and evaluate current approaches to tackling the problems of football hooliganism. To this end we have considered governmental and police initiatives, the guidelines and recommendations of football lead bodies, the proposals of organisations representing supporters and the various schemes run by football clubs. We have also looked closely at recent proposals stemming from the European Parliament. It has to be said, however, that preparing this section of the report has not been without difficulty. Many of the extant initiatives are modest in scope and not widely reported. Some are purely reactive control measures, such as bans on travel and the availability of alcohol etc.

These, while temporarily curbing some of the violence, do little to tackle the root causes of football hooliganism and, in some cases, lead to tragic consequences. The deaths of fans at Hillsborough, for example, were a direct consequence of the introduction of fences in the UK to prevent pitch invasions and other disorderly behaviour. Following the Taylor Report (See Section 8) these have now been removed, with no apparent increase in disturbances at matches.

A final section of the report deals specifically with the role of alcohol in football violence. This has been the most difficult aspect of the research since there is little in the way of scientific work in this area. The British media have consistently attributed much of football violence to excessive drinking – a view echoed by a number of official reports on the problem – but there has been little systematic study of alcohol use by fans at football matches or prior to the game. Elsewhere in Europe of course, and in Italy in particular, this concern with alcohol is seen as quite incomprehensible, as evidenced by our own research in that country four years ago. Despite a clear lack of both evidence and unanimity of opinions across Europe, recent resolutions in the European Parliament, driven principally by German and British MEPs, have called for widespread bans on the availability of alcohol at football games. Researchers in the field (e.g. John Williams and his colleagues) have supported such moves, even though their own work has either not focused on the issue of alcohol at all or has provided no evidence concerning the causal role of alcohol.

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4 See P. Marsh and K. Fox, 1992
As we suggest in Section 8, there appears to be a distinct sense of frustration among those seeking to change or control the behaviour of football fans. Despite the decline of football hooliganism in recent years, the phenomenon refuses to go away. In this atmosphere, where various initiatives appear to have failed, there is a clear temptation to return to more ‘populist’ approaches. While in Holland, Belgium and Germany there are a few quite progressive, ‘liberal’ schemes to redirect the energies of young football fans, elsewhere in Europe policies of increased police presence, restriction of movement and harsh penalties for offenders remain the standard approach. We will suggest that, in this context, the banning of alcohol seems to be just one facet of a ‘let’s be seen to be doing something’ philosophy.

In preparing this report we have undertaken extensive library research, using on-line databases, electronic access to university libraries throughout Europe and relevant Internet sites. The Bodleian Library in Oxford has been the source of full text journal articles and reprints. We have also obtained valuable material directly from social scientists in a number of different countries and sought the views of football associations, supporters associations, European Parliament groups and many others with a clear interest in the field. Two major conferences just prior to the Euro ‘96 championships were particularly valuable in allowing us to bring our review completely up-to-date, with as yet unpublished material being presented.

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Jean-Pierre Georges, Directeur - Federation Française de Football
The authors of the report are listed, for convenience, in alphabetical order on the cover.
2 Football violence in history

“I protest unto you that it may rather be called a friendly kind of fyghte than a play or recreation – a bloody and murthering practice than a fellowly sport or pastime. For dooth not everyone lye in waigt for his adversarie, seeking to overthrowe him and picke him on his nose, though it be uppon hard stones? In ditch or dale, in valley or hill, or whatever place it be hee careth not so he have him down. And he that can serve the most of this fashion, he is counted the only felow, and who but he?”

Phillip Stubbs. The Anatomy of Abuses 1583

2.1 Medieval origins

Football has been associated with violence ever since its early beginnings in 13th century England. The original ‘folk’ form of the game, most often played on Shrove Tuesdays and other Holy Days, involved only slightly structured battles between the youth of neighbouring villages and towns. The presence of a ball, in the form of a leather-bound inflated pig’s bladder, was almost incidental to this semi-legitimised opportunity for settling old scores, land disputes, and engaging in ‘manly’, tribal aggression. Parallels existed in other European countries, such as the German Knappen and the Florentine calcio in costume, but the roots of the modern game are to be found firmly in these ancient English traditions.

These calendrical rituals, often accompanied by extended bouts of drinking, quite regularly resulted in serious injuries and even death to the participants. To a large extent, however, they constituted what Elias and Dunning\(^1\) have described as “an equilibrating type of leisure activity deeply woven into the warp and woof of society”. While the sporadic outbursts of violence at contemporary football matches in Europe give rise to almost hysterical sanction, our ancestors found nothing particularly strange or sinister in these far bloodier origins of the modern game.

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1. N. Elias and E. Dunning. 1986
This sanguine tolerance of football violence was not, however, universal and as early as the 14th century there were calls for controls on the game. These stemmed not so much from moral disquiet about the violent consequences of football but from the fact that, by driving ordinary citizens away from the market towns on match days, it was bad for business. When the game spread to London, played out by rival groups of apprentices, orders forbidding the sport were swift. Nicholas Farndon, the Mayor of London, was the first to issue such a proclamation in 1314:

“And whereas there is a great uproar in the City through certain tumults arising from the striking of great footballs in the field of the public – from which many evils perchance may arise – which may God forbid – we do command and do forbid, on the King’s behalf, upon pain of imprisonment, that such games shall not be practised henceforth within this city.”

The effect of this proclamation, however, was limited and, despite numerous arrests, the games continued. Fifteen further attempts to control the sport were made by 1660 and elsewhere in England and Scotland similar, largely ineffective, bans were issued. The Scots were no less passionate about their warring game. At the turn of the 17th century Scottish football was characterised by:

“... its association with border raids and forays and with violence generally. Often a football match was the prelude to a raid across the Border, for the same hot-headed young men were game for both, and the English authorities learnt to keep their eyes on the footballers.”

Throughout the 17th century we find reports of several hundred football players destroying drainage ditches and causing mayhem in the towns. By the 18th century the game took on a more overt political significance. A match in Kettering, for example, consisting of 500 men per side, was a scarcely disguised food riot in which the object was to loot a local grain store. The authorities became, not unnaturally, rather nervous.

The transformation of the game itself from an unregulated battle on an ill-defined field of play to the modern rule-governed sport came largely as a result of urbanisation and industrialisation which corralled the traditional battlefield game into smaller and smaller arenas.

Soon, the disorder of the game itself aroused harsh judgement. “In 1829, a Frenchman who saw a football match in Derby asked ‘If this is what they call football, what do they call fighting?’”

2.2 Taming the game

It was in the arena of the public schools that the unruliness of the pastime became a cause for alarm among the educators of England’s

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2 M. Marples, 1954
3 J. Walvin, 1975
privileged sons. The older boys exercised complete power over the younger ‘fags’ and would enlist them into the game on their behalf whereupon:

“...the enemy tripped, shinned, charged with the shoulder, got you down and sat upon you...in fact might do anything short of murder to get the ball from you.”

Where countless other masters had been terrorised by their pupils, Dr Thomas Arnold, the headmaster at Rugby from 1828 succeeded in tempering the wild and brutal football so avidly played by the boys. First he ensured the masters’ control over the barbaric ‘prefect-fagging’ system by formalising the older boys’ right to power through appointments. Then, rather than attempting to ban football as other masters had done, he legitimised the game and encouraged the pupils to formalise a set of rules to govern it. As the fight for dominance among the pupils was pacified through delegation of power, the real violence on the football field was ritualised by regulation. Much of the emphasis on the gentlemanly qualities of the game and the evangelical promotion of the sport as an alternative to idle evils such as alcohol can be traced to this period when the game flourished in the public schools.

Gradually, the newly refined and ‘respectable’ game permeated the rest of society. It was in this form that football was exported to the continent.

2.3 Export of the new game

In France, Germany, and Italy, the unrestrained character of English team sports came to be regarded as superior to the regimented exercises of gymnastics for, as one of the founders of the Ecole des Roches said the “gradual emancipation and self-revelation of youth.” The French aristocracy in particular, sought to exemplify the ideals of the great Imperial power by adopting the sporting values of the British gentleman.

To the North, the Scandinavians also modelled their behaviour on the ‘ideal British gentleman.’ In Denmark, for example, football matches in the early 1900’s were attended by large but well mannered crowds, often including royalty. Betting was absent as were police. Unruly spectator behaviour was considered to be a Southern Continental problem.

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4 E. Dunning, 1970
5 P. Lanfranchi, 1994
In Sweden, local rivalries were more pronounced as were class distinctions in this era. Spectators were largely segregated into the decorous upper classes and the more boisterous working class sections. The press positively encouraged their extroverted behaviour (so long as it stayed within the bounds of decency) as it added atmosphere to the game. Official cheer squads debuted during the 1912 Olympics in imitation of the Americans. It was during competition between Sweden & Denmark that outdoing the other team’s cheer or banner squad became a kind of sport in itself. Combined with drinking, these “organised expressions of feeling” gave some cause for concern. The cause of unruly spectator behaviour invariably was traced to incidents on the field itself such as poor refereeing or fights between players which “inflamed” the public. While the justification for such behaviour was not contested, by 1914 the propriety of these excessive verbal displays of support began to be questioned.

In France, the noble nature of the British import was soon sold out for reinterpretation by the masses. By the early 1900s, the number of aristocratic players diminished as the sport gained popularity among the middle class. The liberating nature of football once praised by the elite now came to symbolise middle class, working industrial values antagonistic to the aristocracy and the church. Thus football became “an allegory of liberalism.” The new French clubs set themselves squarely at odds with the elitist, exclusive shooting and gymnastics clubs. At the turn of the century English style football clubs were springing up all over Europe. But, as Pierre Lanfranchi points out, the founding members of these clubs were largely members of white-collar practical professions – engineers, technicians, traders, doctors – or university students.

The inter-war period saw a rise in nationalist sentiment on the continent and, tangentially, an amplification of public enthusiasm for football. Thus in 1938, an Italian newspaper reported Bologna’s victory over Chelsea as “a brilliant victory for Fascist Italy.”

In this twenty year inter-war period, continental football teams distinguished themselves with their own style, technique, and strong national allegiances ready to challenge the British dominance of the sport.

2.4 Return to the working class

In England, the spectator passion of the new century began to perturb the defenders of Victorian standards. For despite the middle-class administration and refinement of the game, football in the early 1900s remained a working-class pastime with most of the new grounds built close to the heart of working-class communities. Descriptions of crowd behaviour at these urban matches varied greatly depending on the background of the writer. Thus:

“... the old-guard defenders of an upper-class amateur, Corinthian ideal of the game could vent their spleen at the take-over of football by the industrial workers of the north by depicting crowds as dirty, fickle and degenerate.”
Certainly, the new rule-centred football was not free from violence. However limited the number of actual players, the commonly held feeling that football was a participatory game had not been dispelled. While the upper classes continued their tradition of polite disassociation from the jousting rivalries on the fields of sport, the working man merged his heart and soul with the effort and staked his reputation on the outcome of the game.

2.5 A new disorder

Invasion of the pitches in Britain occurred even in the 1880s, but were more often caused by simple overcrowding than organised assaults. And while other violent disturbances in the terraces were not uncommon they were usually regarded as understandable outbursts of collective feeling. This Scandinavian lenience soon hardened to anxious castigation as the crowds and ‘incidents’ multiplied.

In 1909 a riot that even today would merit bold headlines, broke out after officials declined the fans’ demand for extra-play time to settle a draw between Glasgow and Celtic. The ensuing riot involved 6000 spectators and resulted in injury to fifty-four policemen, serious damage to the grounds, emergency equipment, and “the destruction of virtually every street-lamp around Hampden”.

Although no accurate figures are available on the frequency of such episodes, the reported levels of violence and mayhem should be enough to dissolve any romantic nostalgia for the gentlemanly behaviour of pre-war football fans. A survey of the reports led Hutchinson to the conclusion that:

“Riots, unruly behaviour, violence, assault and vandalism, appear to have been a well-established, but not necessarily dominant pattern of crowd behaviour at football matches at least from the 1870s.”

The disturbances mostly revolved around the activity on the field and perceived injustices to either the players or the crowd as in the Hampden case above. Reports of fighting between fans in the terraces are relatively few. Some historians suspect that the relative paucity of crowd misbehaviour reports, relative to the abundance of reported assaults on players and officials, points not to the absence of such violence but rather to the lenient attitude toward crowd disturbances that did not actually interfere with the game. This may be explained by the fact that, within the stadium, it was the referee who reported incidents to the FA. If violence tipped onto the field he would consider it a problem; if it spilled onto the streets it became the problem of the town police; but if it was contained within the stands it largely went unreported. Television, of course would turn the spotlight on these inconsequential scuffles.

6 R. Taylor, 1992
7 J. Hutchinson, 1975
2.6 Calm between the wars
While no period in the history of English football has been completely free of incident, the inter-war years saw a decline in the intensity of the occurrences. Official rebukes harped on tamer misdemeanours such as “ungentlemanly conduct.” Moral degeneration was a favourite topic of editorials. This discontent about deteriorating standards of behaviour in the terraces was precipitated by dismay at “un-English” and excessively violent play on the field. In 1936 the Football Association issued a stern memorandum regarding “rough play” to the players. A Reynolds Times report sardonically called for the FA to issue another to the fans, stigmatised in the Times as “... altogether too vocal and biased in their opinions on the conduct of the referee.”

While a few street-battle style clashes were reported in the inter-war years, most incidents of crowd misbehaviour involved vocal protests against administrative rulings insensitive to the fans such as the sale of top players, or abuse of the referee, an offence considered so monstrous that Bradford Park closed its boys’ section for three months after the referee had been “pelted with rubbish”.

Not only was there a decline in football-related violence in these post-war years, several newspapers even saw fit to report on the good behaviour that distinguished the crowds attending cup finals. The number of women attending football matches increased significantly during this period, some even considering the environment wholesome enough to bring infants.

Even the Scots ritualised the Border raids of old by way of the tamer, albeit no less high-spirited, biannual trip to Wembley.

2.7 The new hooligans
High levels of national solidarity may have helped to continue this pacific trend after the Second World War and into the 1950s, but by 1960 a new form of zealous patriotism became violently directed at immigrants – an attitude also reflected by many hard-core football hooligans. (See also Section 6)

Many sociologists place television at the graph intersection of the decline in match attendance from the 1950s onwards and the rise in spectator violence. Television not only allowed fans to watch games at home, it graphically publicised fan violence. One such pioneering broadcast televised a major riot after an equalising goal during a Sunderland versus Tottenham game in 1961. That the hooligans were seen on television, the Guardian later said “provided... encouragement to others.”

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8 G. Pearson, 1983
9 E. Danning et al., 1982
The rise of counter-culture youth protest movements seemed to need no encouragement. The Teddy Boys, Mods, Rockers, Skinheads and the Bovver Boys all added to the increasingly stereotyped Football Hooligan. The term Hooligan was coined in the 1890s as an alternative to “street arab” or “ruffian.” Now readily applied to the ‘wild and unruly’ football fan of the 1960s, the term and the on-screen images of undisciplined ‘toughs’ rekindled a Victorian style ‘moral panic’ vocalised by the Conservative party and fanned by the press. According to the Chester report of 1966, incidences of football violence doubled in the first five years of the 1960s compared to the previous 25 years.

2.8 Hooliganism in Europe

The prevailing consensus that post-war permissiveness was precipitating the decline and fall of the ‘British way of life’, led to calls for the birch, the stocks, military service, and other such disciplines for the football rowdies.\textsuperscript{10} Nation-wide preparations for hosting the 1966 world cup highlighted the need to solve the ‘problem’ before such bad British behaviour was internationally broadcasted. Although in the next decade, football hooliganism would be dubbed “the British disease” that infected the civilised continental spectators, several reports may reveal earlier strains of the illness in Europe. In Yugoslavia for instance, a mid-50s wave of football disorder known as “Zusism” put terror into vogue. The origin of the word stems from ‘ZUS’ an acronym of the Serbo-Croat words for “slaughter, kill, annihilate.” The communist newspaper Borba carried reports of two incidents near Belgrade involving fans armed with “hammers, mallets and metal bars.” On one occasion knife-wielding spectators rushed onto the field seriously injuring the referee. And not long after in Turkey:

“... fans of the Kayseri and Sivas clubs fought with pistols, knives and broken bottles for days after the end of a match between the two sides. Before troops restored order, cars were burned out, 600 spectators injured and 42 of them killed, 25 by stab wounds.”\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} R. Taylor, 1992

\textsuperscript{11} E. Danning et al, 1981
Several reports contradict an Italian sociologist’s claim that hooliganism was an unknown problem before the 1970s when Italian youths began imitating the British. Dunning and his colleagues cite an incident at a match in Vialloggio in 1920 when police had to intervene to quell fighting between opposing fans. The referee in charge was killed. In 1955, 52 people were injured during a riot at a match between Naples and Bologna, and four years later 65 injuries resulted from a pitch invasion when Naples played Genoa. These contradictory reports may simply indicate a divergent definition of hooliganism. The Roversi report makes a clear distinction between ‘spectator disorderliness’ which may include unintentionally violent acts – ‘peaceful’ invasion of the pitch and the throwing of fire-crackers as being ‘simply the expression of joy’ – and intentional violence on the part of hooligans. He claims that the “intentional violence” is a new phenomenon at football matches.

Still, in England it was the increase in local television coverage of incidents which some historians claim precipitated the “amplification spiral” of violence (See also Section 5).

Whether due to television coverage or not, the 60s witnessed a colourful change in the style of fan support. Football supporters became more organised with carefully orchestrated waving displays, chants, and slogans; and more mobile. Regular support of away games helped to disperse the varying styles across the country. It also increased the incidences of vandalism to trains. Liverpool and Everton supporters held the record for the worst cases of train-wrecking to and from matches in the early 60s.

By 1964, the core of troublemakers was perceived to concentrate in groups with “no allegiance to either team,” and could no longer be characterised simply as overly ardent supporters. These groups identified and named themselves separately from the teams, and used matchdays as venues for confrontations with rival groups. By 1967 the sport of ‘taking ends’ emerged as the favourite pastime of young male supporters. The object was to charge at supporters of the rival team thus driving them away from their viewing area behind the goal, capture as much of their team gear as possible (flags, scarves etc.), and land a few good kicks and punches before police stepped in. Although on film these charges looked menacingly aggressive, in reality, serious injuries were rare. However intimidating the threats and waved fists, the blows inflicted were, according to commentators such as Peter Marsh, largely symbolic.

12 A. Roversi, 1991
13 E. Dunning, P. Morphy and J. Williams, 1981
14 J. Maguire, 1985
15 P. Morphy, 1988
By the 70s these groups became increasingly sophisticated in their cohesiveness, organisation and ‘scoring’ systems that among other means, used press coverage to determine which group was on top in the hierarchy of hooligan ‘firm’ rivalries.

In other European countries hooligan groups emerged that, while accused of mimicking the British fans, had distinct styles all of their own. These groups are discussed in Section 4.

From the 12th century to the present, the game of football has been claimed, defined, refined and reclaimed by every stratum of society. In the end, moral guardianship of the game has gone to those who shout, chant, clap and cheer the loudest for it – the supporters. How and why the current hooligan situation evolved, the sometimes violent battle for dominance on the terraces, is in itself a heated contest among social scientists. These views, and the modern phenomenon to which their perspectives relate, are considered in Section 3.

16 P. Marsh, 1978
2.9 Historical examples of violent incidents in Britain to 1960

1314, 1315  Edward II bans football.

1349, 1388, 1410  Football was banned from the city of London due to complaints from merchants.

1364  Synod of Ely bans clergy from playing football due to the violent nature of the game.

1477  Edward IV issues edict against football.

1496  Henry VII issues edict against football.

1539  Annual match in Chester abolished due to violence.

1555  Football banned in Liverpool due to mayhem.

1576  Middlesex County Records reports that 100 men assembled unlawfully to play football. There was a “great affray.”

1579  After the start of a match against the students of Cambridge, the townsman of Chesterton proceeded to assault their opponents with sticks, driving them into the river.

1581  Evanses Feld at Southemyms. One yoeman killed by two others during a football match.

1608  Football banned in Manchester due to the mayhem caused by “a company of lewd and disordered persons...”

1638  Football crowd destroys drainage ditches on Isle of Ely.

1694  Fenland drainage destroyed during football match

1740  Football match in Kettering turns into a food riot and local mill is destroyed and looted.

1768  Football matches held to tear down enclosure fences at Holland Fen and West Haddon.

1797  Kingston-upon-Thames. Traditional Shrove Tuesday match turned into a riot after three participants were arrested by magistrates.

1843  200 soldiers and 50 policemen were needed to patrol the ropes at a Preston North End v Sunderland match.

1846  A match was stopped in Derby, the riot act was read, and two troops of dragoons called in. The Mayor was injured by the crowd.

1881  At Wigan station two railway officials were knocked unconscious by a group travelling to a Newton Heath v Preston North End game.
1884  P.N.E fans attacked Bolton Wanderers players and spectators at the end of the game.

1885  Aston Villa v Preston. A mob of “roughs” attacked the visiting team with sticks stones and other missiles.

1886  A railway station battle occurred between Preston North End and Queens Park fans.

1888  Report of “a continuous hail of bottles” onto the pitch at an unspecified match.

1889  Small Heath v West Bromwich Albion. Small Heath fans molest strangers.

1889  At Middlewich station a fight broke out between Nantwich and Crewe fans. Nantwich men stormed the platform occupied by Crewe. Many sustained injuries.

1893  During a match between Nottingham Forest and West Bromwich Albion spectators invaded the field and fought with Albionite players.

1896  While returning from a football match, three young men attacked and murdered a police sergeant and injured a constable.

1899  After a match at Shepshed between Albion and Loughborough Corinthians the Loughborough players were stoned and struck.

1905  Preston North End v Blackburn. Several fans tried for hooliganism including a “drunk and disorderly” 70 year old woman.

1906  Tottenham v Aston Villa cup tie had to be abandoned after spectators swarmed onto the pitch at the interval.

1909  6000 spectators involved in a riot at Hampden Park, Glasgow. The pitch was destroyed, 54 police constables were injured, and much damage done to the town.

1920  Birmingham City football fans use bottles as clubs and missiles.

1921  Bradford park closes the boy’s section for three months after the referee was pelted with rubbish.

1924  After a match in Brighton the pitch was invaded, the referee chased by the crowd and a policeman knocked unconscious.

1930  Rangers ground closed after unruly conduct of spectators during match against Northampton town. Clapton Orient v Queens Park Rangers. Police called in to stop fighting between rival spectators behind the Rangers’ goal.

1934  Leicester City fans vandalised a train returning from a match in Birmingham.
1935 Police lead a baton charge against stone-throwing fans during a match between Linfield and Belfast Celtic.

1936 During a match at Wolverhampton Wanderers spectators attacked visiting Chelsea players. Later the crowd protested outside officials’ entrance over the sale of top players.

1949 Millwall v Exeter City. Referee and linesmen attacked with blows and projectiles from the crowd.

1951 At the Queens Park Rangers ground missiles were thrown at the Sheffield Wednesday goalkeeper.

1954 Several hundred spectators came onto the field during a match between Everton Reserves and Bolton Wanderers Reserves. Fireworks were thrown and a linesman was kicked.

1955-56 Liverpool and Everton fans involved in several train-wrecking exploits.

1946-1960 An average of 13 incidents of disorderly behaviour by spectators per season reported to the FA.

1961-1968 An average of 25 such incidents per season reported.

2.10 Historical examples of violent incidents in Europe

1908 Hungary. After a Manchester United v named Hungarian team the Manchester players were attacked by Hungarian fans as they left the grounds.

1933 France. Gendarmes were needed to quell a disturbance in the crowd during a match between Nice and the Wolves. The Wolves were taken off the field by their manager.

1931 Germany. Hertha Berlin v Fuerth. A pitch invasion by the Hertha fans resulted in severe injury to a Fuerth player.

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3 Theoretical and research perspectives

Research on football violence has been a growth industry since the late 1960s in Britain, and academics in other European countries have steadily been catching up since the mid 1980s. To many observers, ourselves included, the subject is now probably over-researched and little in the way of new, original insights have been forthcoming in the past decade.

This ‘overpopulation’ of social scientists in a relatively small research niche is undoubtedly responsible for the distinctly unfriendly nature of much of the continuing debate. The various schools of thought often divide into openly hostile factions and the level of vitriolic discussion in the literature and at conferences is reminiscent of the ritual aggression which once characterised the earliest forms of football itself. Even some of the groups, such as the ‘Leicester School’, have now fallen out amongst themselves and those who were once co-authors of major studies are now openly critical of each other.

Amid all of this bad-tempered discourse, however, are a number of quite clearly delineated theoretical perspectives which, in reality, can easily be accommodated in a broader framework for understanding the causes and patterns of contemporary football hooliganism in Europe. While some of the perspectives may be lacking in specific applicability, or even in basic evidence, most are loosely compatible with each other, despite strenuous attempts by their authors to deny the salience of rival explanations.

The easiest way of charting a path through the literature is to take an historical route, beginning in the late 1960s when football hooliganism became, quite suddenly, a cause for major concern in Britain. It should be noted, however, that many of the early studies in this area saw hooliganism not as a novel phenomenon at all but simply a continuation of patterns of youth behaviour which had previously been the preserve of such visible groups as Teddy Boys, Mods and Rockers and Skinheads. For others, football hooliganism was largely a fiction generated by hysterical journalists – it was the agenda of the media, rather than the behaviour of football fans, which required an explanation.
We will be concerned in most of this section with British theoretical and research perspectives. This is not due to simple chauvinism on our part but to the fact that the vast bulk of the literature has been generated by British authors. Even research elsewhere in Europe has tended to draw on work in this country for its theoretical and, in some cases, methodological direction. Increasingly, however, nationally distinctive approaches to the subject are developing, particularly in Italy, Holland and Germany. These are considered towards the end of this section. More detailed consideration to patterns of football violence in other European countries is given in Section 4.

3.1 Harrington report

Among the earliest publications concerning ‘modern’ football violence was that by the British psychiatrist, John Harrington (1968) and is generally recognised as the first serious attempt to probe what was then a new social phenomenon. His report was based on questionnaire data and from direct observation at football matches, with additional evidence being obtained from interested groups including the police, the St. John Ambulance Brigade and transport operators. In addition, a sample of public opinion was obtained through the unlikely medium of the Sun newspaper – a poll that indicated that 90% of respondents thought that football hooliganism was increasing and constituted a ‘serious’ problem. This stood in distinct contrast to the views of the police authorities. Almost 50% of these reported no increase in football-related violence and two indicated a decrease.

The emphasis in the Harrington report was principally on individual pathology and reactions to the immediate stimuli provided by the setting in which fans were placed. Terms such as ‘immaturity’ and ‘loss of control’ were frequently used, with little attention paid to wider social forces of group dynamics. Harrington justified his position by saying:

“Whilst the significance of these deeper and more remote influences on hooliganism should not be ignored, we feel the importance of immediate ‘here and now’ factors both individual, social and connected with the game must be considered.”

It was, of course, expedient – as somewhat cynical sociologists were quick to point out – to put the blame on a small number of individuals rather than on social or political forces, since Harrington’s report was commissioned by the then Minister of Sport, Denis Howell. Ian Taylor was quick to highlight the report’s shortcomings:

“... the content of the report, while interesting, is not as important as the social function it performed. Simply to employ a

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1 As noted in Section 2, the phenomenon of ‘modern’ football hooliganism is generally credited as beginning in Britain in 1961. It was not, however, until 1968 that the full force of media concern came to be expressed.

2 J. Harrington, 1968
psychiatrist for a national government report is to legitimize the idea in the popular mind that 'hooliganism' is explicable in terms of the existence of essentially unstable and abnormal temperament, individuals who happen, for some inexplicable reason to have taken soccer as the arena in which to act out their instabilities. The psychological label adds credibility and strength to the idea that the hooligans are not really true supporters, that they may legitimately be segregated from the true supporter (who does not intervene), and that they can be dealt with by the full force of the law and (on occasions) by psychiatrists.  

Further rejection of Harrington’s report was made in a joint report by the Sports Council and the government funded Social Science Research Council. This criticised both the lack of explanatory theory and the ad hoc sampling procedures used in the main study.

The failings of the Harrington report were such that it is now rarely mentioned in the text books and the British government quickly commissioned a further, more wide-ranging report in the following year.

### 3.2 Lang report

This working party was chaired by Sir John Lang, Vice Chairman of the Sports Council and the report was published in 1969. It consisted of representatives of the Football Associations and Leagues, Home Office, police forces, Scottish Office and representatives of football players and managers – no psychiatrists, sociologists or academics at all. The group was left to define its own terms of reference and, not surprisingly given its composition, was solely concerned with actual events at football matches. Wider social issues were not considered and even journeys to and from football grounds were excluded from the terms of reference.

The Working Party made a total of 23 recommendations, of which 3 were given special emphasis:

1. Maximum cooperation between a football club and the police.
2. Absolute acceptance of the decision of the referee by everybody.
3. The provision of seats in place of standing accommodation.

In dealing with offenders at football matches it was recommended that:

“... a form of punishment for spectators who misbehave themselves, involving the necessity of such offenders having to report on subsequent match days at a place and time away from the ground, should be strongly supported.”

It was also felt that:

“... it is desirable that the punishment of convicted offenders should match the seriousness of the offence.”

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3  I. Taylor, 1971a
These same, somewhat anodyne, conclusions presaged the conclusions of numerous other reports which have stemmed from quasi-governmental investigations in the intervening 27 years. What was remarkable about the Lang report was that it was the first to seek solutions to a problem which, at that time, had not been clearly defined – even less understood. There were no data to indicate the scale of the problem and even basic statistics concerning arrests and injuries were absent from the report. No distinction was made between criminal behaviour and simple misbehaviour and many people commented on examples of received opinion being reworked to give the appearance of hard facts. We find, for example, the statement: “There can be no doubt that the consumption of alcohol is an important factor in crowd misbehaviour” without any evidence being presented concerning the frequency or extent of drinking behaviour among football fans.

3.3 Ian Taylor

The critics of both the Harrington and Lang Reports were themselves developing alternative theoretical perspectives on football hooliganism, with Ian Taylor being among the first to publish sociological analyses. From a Marxist standpoint he argued that the emergence of football hooliganism reflected the changing nature of the sport itself and, in particular, the changing role of the local club as a working class, neighbourhood institution. As professional football became increasingly organised after the Second World War, the role of the local club became less part of the community and more a commercial sports arena aimed at paying spectators.

This process of embourgeoisement of football, Taylor argued⁴, was part of a more general ‘collapse’ of the traditional working-class weekend, which previously incorporated traditional leisure pursuits developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century. These included not only football but brass bands, whippet racing and even archery. The violence on the terraces, therefore, could be seen as an attempt by disaffected working class adolescents to re-establish the traditional weekend, with its distinctly manly, tribal features.

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⁴ I. Taylor, 1971a, 1971b etc.
Throughout Taylor’s writings in the early 1970s there is great emphasis on erosion of democracy in football clubs. Not only were clubs now increasingly run by wealthy business men, the increase in players’ wages, and their promotion to the status of superstars, made them remote from the local communities which supported their teams. This sense of alienation experienced by fans was further exacerbated, according to Taylor, by a more general alienation of fractions of the working class which resulted from changes in the labour market and the decomposition of many working class communities. Violence erupted at football matches, therefore, partly because of the decline of working class traditional values and, specifically, as an attempt to retrieve control over the game from a *nouveau riche* elite.

Taylor’s analysis of the phenomenon was, and still remains, rather speculative. There is certainly evidence from 1980 onwards to show that a significant number of those involved in violence at football matches do not come from stereotyped working class backgrounds but from the recently expanding middle class sectors. The implied underlying motivation of football hooliganism has also been absent from the accounts of football fans themselves, few seeing themselves as part of a proletarian vanguard seeking to erase the inequalities so evident in their national sport. But Taylor’s historical perspective, and his emphasis on the need to consider the impact of dramatic changes in the ordinary lives of working class adolescents, provides a reasonable context for the more narrowly focused approaches which were to follow. His concern with the ‘democratisation’ of football also continues to be relevant in discussions about how the problems of football violence can be reduced and, in particular, the role that clubs themselves can play in fostering a more responsible and orderly following. Taylor himself, however, is pessimistic about the impact that such arguments may have:

“Calls for the ‘democratisation’ of football clubs ... have not met with an active response from professional football clubs as a whole, despite token schemes for participation of youngsters in club training and related activities. Professional football is part of the local economy and, perhaps more importantly, local civic power: and is no easier a target for real democratisation than the political economy and structure of power at the level of the state itself.”

### 3.4 Sub-culture theories

Approaches to understanding football fan behaviour in terms of sub-cultural styles was promoted principally by sociologists at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University. John Clarke and Stuart Hall⁶, in particular, argued that

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5 John Taylor, 1982:169

6 See Clarke, Hall, Jefferson and Roberts, 1975
specific sub-cultural styles enabled young working class people, and males in particular, to resolve essential conflicts in their lives – specifically those of subordination to adults and the subordination implicit in being a member of the working class itself. Post-war sub-cultures, such as those of the Teddy Boys, Mods and Rockers, Skinheads and, in more recent years, Glamrock, Punk, House etc., have all been examples of these symbolic attempts to resolve structural and material problems.

For Clarke et al, the style of the Skinheads – among the earliest exponents of football hooliganism in Britain – reflected almost a parody of working-class traditions, with its emphasis on workmen’s jeans and boots and on self-reliance, toughness and racism. It was, according to Clarke, an attempt at the ‘magical recovery of community’ through adherence to a highly symbolic style and pattern of behaviour – which included violence. Other sub-cultures, such as the Mods, adopted a very different style as a means of resolving their collective social identity – the carefully manicured and smart appearance associated with upward mobility and escape from the working class values so explicitly championed by the Skinheads.

There is little in Clarke’s work at this level, however, to enable us to understand why some individuals choose one particular ‘solution’ rather than another. To account for the Skinheads, and subsequently for football hooligans, he was forced to include a socio-political analysis not dissimilar to that presented by Ian Taylor, with emphasis on working class alienation from an increasingly commercial game. For Clarke, however, while new generations of working class youth had inherited the traditional ties to football, and the pattern of ‘supportership’ characteristic of a previous generation, they had failed to inherit the tacit social controls which went with that behaviour. Violence became their way of doing what their fathers had done – demonstrating loyalty and commitment to their local team and all it stood for. The problems arose from inter-generational changes reflecting much wider shifts in the class structure of British and, in particular, English society.

As football increasingly became a focus for sub-culture style and activity, the patterns of behaviour on the terraces came to mirror, in many ways, aspects of the game itself:

“They own collective organisation and activities have created a form of analogy with the match itself. But in their case, it becomes a contest which takes place not on the fields but on the terraces. They have created a parallel between the physical challenge and combat on the field in their own forms of challenge and combat between the opposing ends. Thus, while the points are being won or lost on the field, territory is won or lost on the terraces. The ‘ends’ away record (how good it is at taking territory where the home supporters usually stand) is as important, if not more, than their team’s away record. Similarly the chants, slogans and songs demonstrate support for the team and involve an effort to
intervene in the game itself, by lifting and encouraging their team, and putting off the opposition ... The violence between the sets of fans is part of this participation in the game – part of the extension of the game on the field to include the terraces too." 7

This emphasis by Clarke on the close relationship between football fans and their teams was important. There were many commentators at the time who claimed that violence at football games was caused principally by ‘infiltrators’ – by young men who were not true supporters at all but who were simply using the football grounds as a convenient arena for their aggressive lifestyles. Clarke’s attention to some of the details of football fan behaviour and talk also represented a significant step forward from the more speculative theorising of Ian Taylor. In this sense he provided a stepping stone between broad sociological perspectives more fine-grained analyses, conducted by, among others, Peter Marsh and what became known as the “Oxford School” or “Ethogenic Approach”. (See Section 3.6)

3.5 Media Amplification

The treatment of football hooliganism in the media became a subject of enquiry in mid 1970s, following the work by Stan Cohen (1972) and others on the ‘distortion’ of the behaviour of the Mods and Rockers and other youth groups. Stuart Hall and his colleagues noted that despite all of the press coverage given to football hooliganism, relatively few people in Britain had any direct experience of the phenomenon. The media, therefore, rather than factual evidence, directly guided public concern about football hooliganism. It constructed impressions of ‘thuggery’, ‘riots’ and ‘chaos’, provided definitions of why such acts constituted a major social problem and provided ‘quasi-explanations’ of the patterns of behaviour. Much of the public debate about hooliganism was conducted in the absence of any other perspective or source of evidence.

Hall was at pains to stress that he did not see the press as causing football hooliganism in any direct sense: However:

“I do think that there is a major problem about the way the press has selected, presented and defined football hooliganism over the years ... I don’t think that the problem of hooliganism would all go away if only the press would keep its collective mouth shut or look the other way. I do however ... believe that the phenomenon know as ‘football hooliganism’ is not the simple ‘SAVAGES! ANIMALS!’ story that has substantially been presented by the press.” 8

7 J. Clarke, 1978:54
8 S. Hall, 1978
Hall went on to argue that not only was press reporting of this kind a problem in its own right, it also had the effect of increasing the problem it set out to remedy, principally by suppressing the true nature of the problem. In line with deviancy amplification theory, he argued that distortions of this kind, in generating inappropriate societal reactions to, initially, quite minor forms of deviance, effectively increase the scale of the problem. Reactions by fans to the increased controls upon their behaviour, such as caging and segregation, often produced scenes far worse than those prior to such attempts at control. Fans also started to act out some of the things that the press had accused them of doing. Manchester United fans, for example, used the chant “We are the famous hooligans, read all about us!” on entry into towns where away games were to be played. Other fans complained that since they had been treated as animals they may as well act like them, and bloody violence was often the result.

The ‘moral panics’ generated by the media are discussed more fully in Section 5. We should note here, however, that almost all research and theoretical approaches to football hooliganism have been obliged to take note of the very significant impact of media reporting and its clear effect on patterns of behaviour on the terraces.

3.6 Ethogenic approach

In contrast to sociological theories, with their heavy emphasis on class and macro political changes, Peter Marsh’s work focused much more directly on observed behaviour and on the accounts provided by fans themselves. The theoretical background to the work stemmed from Harré and Secord and the rather grandly labeled Ethogenic approach or ‘New Paradigm’ in social psychology. This approach, for all its philosophical ‘window dressing’ was, in essence, very simple. Instead of conducting laboratory experiments and treating people as ‘subjects’ of empirical enquiry to understand their behaviour, one should simply ask them. Thus, for three years, Marsh spent his time at football matches, on trains and buses full of football fans travelling to away games and in the pubs and other arenas where supporters spent the remainder of their leisure time. While there were some concessions to empirical methodology in the research, the principal aim was firstly to obtain an ‘insiders’ view of football hooliganism and secondly to use this to establish an explanatory model.
On the basis of this work, Marsh concluded that much of what passed for violent mayhem was, in fact, highly ritualised behaviour which was far less injurious, in physical terms, than it might seem. He suggested that the apparent disorder was, in fact, highly orderly, and social action on the terraces was guided and constrained by tacit social rules. These enabled the display of ‘manly’ virtues but, through ritualising aggression, enabled the ‘game’ to be played in relative safety. Being a ‘football hooligan’ enabled young males, with little prospects of success in school or work, to achieve a sense of personal worth and identity through recognition from their peers. The football terraces provided, in his terms, for an alternative career structure – one in which success and promotion were attainable. While violence, in the sense of causing physical injury, was part of the route to success, it was an infrequent activity. There was far more talk about violence than actual fighting.

Marsh was accused of saying that football hooliganism was harmless and of ‘whitewashing’ the unacceptable behaviour of football fans. This, in turn, provoked widespread outrage in the media and even in some academic circles. The empirical evidence, however, clearly indicated that the scale of football violence in the 1970s had been seriously over-estimated. Relying on statistics from police forces, health workers and official government reports, together with direct observation at football grounds, Marsh claimed that there was about as much violence at football games as one would expect, given the characteristics of the population who attended matches. If there was no violence, he argued, that would be truly remarkable – so much so that it would motivate dozens of research projects to explain this oasis of passivity in an otherwise moderately violent society.

The methodology employed in Marsh’s study has been, with some justification, criticised by more traditional social psychologists. The lack of overt concern with such issues as social class has also been the subject of negative review by many sociologists, especially Williams et al. (See 3.7). Marsh was also obliged to revise some of his conclusions in the light of more lethal football violence which occurred in the 1980s. He continues to argue, however, that football hooliganism shifted, in part, from a ritual to a more dangerous pattern of behaviour principally because of the inappropriate measures which were introduced to combat the problem and because of the extensive media distortion of true events at football matches.

### 3.7 The Leicester School

The work of Taylor, Clarke, Hall, Marsh etc. constituted in the late 1970s what John Williams and his colleagues at Leicester University have called an ‘orthodoxy’ of approaches to football hooliganism. While these perspectives differed considerably from

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each other, they were the ones which were most frequently referred to in debates on fan behaviour. The ‘Leicester School’ sought to change this state of affairs by introducing what they claimed was a more powerful explanation of hooliganism based on the sociology of Norbert Elias and his emphasis on the ‘civilization process’.

This approach, most usually referred to as ‘figurational’ sociology, is difficult to summarise briefly. One of its major assumptions, however, is that throughout recent history public expectations of a more ‘civilised’ world, and more civilised behaviour, have gradually ‘percolated’ through the social classes in Europe. Such values, however, have not fully penetrated areas of the lower working class – what Dunning and his colleagues refer to as the ‘rough’ working class.11 Social behaviour in this section of society is largely mediated by sub-cultural values of masculinity and aggression. In order to account for contemporary football violence, therefore, we need to pay attention to the structural aspects of this section of society and the traditional relationship between members of this strata and the game itself.

“A useful way of expressing it would be to say that such sections of lower-working-class communities are characterised by a ‘positive feedback cycle’ which tends to encourage the resort to aggression in many areas of social life, especially on the part of males ... In fact, along with gambling, street ‘smartness’, an exploitative form of sex and heavy drinking – the capacity to consume alcohol in large quantities is another highly valued attribute among males from the ‘rougher’ sections of the working class – fighting is one of the few sources of excitement, meaning and status available to males from this section of society and accorded a degree of social toleration. That is because they are typically denied status, meaning and gratification in the educational and occupational spheres, the major sources of identity, meaning and status available to men from the middle classes.” 12

The approach of the Leicester School, with its emphasis on the dynamics of the lower working class, has much in common with the perspectives taken by Taylor and Clarke. The issue of sources of meaning and identity among working class youth had also been treated explicitly by Marsh. In the work of Dunning et al there were, however, some subtle differences. On the issue of class the focus was not on the relative deprivations of the lower working class, with violence being a consequence of alienation and embitterment, but on specific subcultural properties which provide a legitimation of violent behaviour.

11 E. Dunning et al. 1985
12 Williams, Dunning and Murphy. 1984
The extent to which such differences of emphasis constituted a radically new approach, however, is the subject of some doubt. Perhaps, for this reason, and in order to more fully assert its own identity, the Leicester School has been renowned for the amount of time and effort that it has devoted to criticising the work of other social scientists in the field. It is difficult to find a single author outside of this group who has escaped their wrath at one time or another.

Setting aside the internecine squabble in this area of academia, the Leicester group, with substantial funding from the Football Trust, has conducted the bulk of field research on British football fans in recent years, both in the UK and abroad, and is largely responsible for bringing together research workers in other European countries. This voluminous output has resulted in more being known about the behaviour of British football hooligans than any other ‘deviant’ group in history.

The implications and utility of all of this research, however, are unclear. The applicability of the work to problems in other European countries, which lack the highly specific social class structures found in England, is also very limited, despite protestations by John Williams to the contrary. There is further doubt about the accuracy and credibility of some of the research methods employed, particularly in the early years of the Leicester Centre. Much of the evidence provided by Williams and his colleagues comes from participant observation studies. The book *Hooligans Abroad*, for example, was based on three such studies and much of it is impressionistic and anecdotal.

In the book’s preface we are assured that John Williams “... is young enough and sufficiently ‘street-wise’ and interested in football to pass himself off as an ‘ordinary’ English football fan”. Such assertions, however, vouch little for scientific rigour and credibility. (There are also some minor ethical issues here concerning the research role of social scientists and the issue of deception.) While Williams is quick to challenge the results of other field studies on the basis that the authors had been talking to the ‘wrong people’, the justification of his own ‘sampling’ is weak and, inevitably, on the practicalities of conducting this kind of research – you spend time with ‘subjects’ to whom you have access.

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13 See, for example, J. Williams, 1991

14 See, for example, his criticism of Zani and Kirchler in Williams (1991). Here he takes issues with their conclusions (See Section 3.10.1) based on discussions with ‘fanatical’ groups in Bologna. He claims, on the basis of a brief visit to Bologna and discussions with Ultras, that the real hooligan groups had detached themselves from these ‘fanatical’ groups and that Zani’s research was based, therefore, on inappropriate sampling. He is silent, however, on the reliability of his own single source of information.
Williams’ concern with drinking behaviour among working class football fans, while implicit in the theoretical background, has become more prominent in recent years. He clearly sees alcohol as being an ‘aggravating’ factor in much of football violence, even though he stops short of suggesting causal connections. (See Section 7). It is also the case that Williams has parted company from his colleagues Dunning and Murphy over the relevance of the ‘figurational’ approach, particularly in the light of growing research on football violence in other European countries. He now argues, for example:

“... the high level of generality at which the theory operates, its apparently universalistic applicability, and the sometimes fractious and defensive relationships between ‘Eliasians’ and their critics, also give the theory an aura of ‘irrefutability’ and arguably leads, in the case of violence at football, to the underplaying of important national and cultural differences in patterns and forms of hooliganism.” 15

In reply to this philosophical ‘desertion’ by Williams, Eric Dunning – perhaps the most senior member of the Leicester School – comments testily:

“... I shall try to show in detail why John Williams’ arguments, along with those of authors who have argued along similar lines, are wrong.” 16

Most recently Williams, together with Rogan Taylor and other members of the Leicester Centre, has turned his attention to developing and evaluating various attempts to control the behaviour of football fans, whilst not losing sight of the need to tackle the more fundamental roots of football violence. The group is also increasingly involved in Europe-wide initiatives. These are summarised in Section 8.

3.8 Ethnographic approaches

Detailed ethnographic work has been conducted by Gary Armstrong and Rosemary Harris, focusing principally on groups of Sheffield United Supporters. These authors, as we have come to expect, are highly critical of both the ‘structural-Marxist’ approaches of Taylor, Hall etc. and the ‘figurational’ school of Dunning, Williams etc. Their view was, firstly, that violence was not a central activity for football fans:

“... it is asserted here that the hooligans among Sheffield United fans were not particularly violent people; that there was amongst them no core of men from a violent, deprived sub-culture; that much of the hostility to football hooliganism in Sheffield was based on exaggerated fears led by the media and the police ... we shall argue that the evidence provided by participant observation shows clearly that the basic data regarding football hooliganism

15 J. Williams. 1991b:177
16 E. Dunning. 1994:128
is significantly different from that previously assumed and, therefore, much theorizing on the subject has been misapplied effort.” 17

This rather grand assertion made by Armstrong and Harris might have had more credibility had the study not been concerned solely with a relatively small group of fans (40 – 50) in one town in northern England. There are also some striking inconsistencies in their reporting of the evidence. In contrast to the assertion that Sheffield fans were not particularly violent they go on to say:

“The menace of Sheffield football hooligans is not a fiction concocted by the police ... The violence, when it occurs, is real and cannot be explained away, as Marsh tried to do, as mere ritualized aggression which would seldom be really violent if only the group’s control of events was not thwarted by the intervention of the authorities.” 18

Despite the inherent weaknesses in this study the authors did, at least demonstrate that not all football hooligans were from what Dunning and Williams refer to as the ‘rough’ working class. But this is a fairly obvious point made by many other field researchers and even Dunning himself. Rather naively, Armstrong and Harris comment that many of the fans in their study were “... intelligent, amusing and often good company” – something which they appear to view implicitly as being inconsistent with a ‘tough’ working class background. While the authors offer little in the way of empirical data themselves, they criticise the reliability of statistics offered by other researchers, including Dunning. They note that in one survey by the Leicester School of the social class composition of West Ham’s ‘Inter City Firm’, the occupations of two of the members were listed as being ‘bank manager’ and ‘insurance underwriter’ – occupations about which they are, quite reasonably, skeptical. Their objection to such ‘facts’ masquerading as empirical data is well-founded. What is less acceptable, however, is their rejection of large-scale empirical methodologies in favour of only semi-structured qualitative and ethnographic methods.

The data yielded by small-scale ethnographies are localised and, by necessity, selective. While Armstrong and Harris accept this point they argue that, given sufficient detail, such data provide the basis for objective testing. There is little in their published work, however, which is sufficiently detailed or clear, apart from the fact that many of their informants were middle class types, to provide any basis for such testing.

17 G. Armstrong and R. Harris, 1991:432
18 G. Armstrong and R. Harris, 1991:434
Armstrong has more recently turned his attention to examination of police surveillance of football fans and official information gathering procedures. Here he notes that one by-product of football hooliganism has been the legitimisation of covert tactics by the British police and the introduction of surveillance tactics which previously might have aroused concerns about infringement of civil liberties. This issue is dealt with in Section 8.

In contrast to the study by Armstrong and Harris, the work of Richard Giulianotti on Scottish fans is far more theory-based and substantially more detailed. His research with Scottish football fans, at home and in other countries such as Sweden, has highlighted the inapplicability of much of the research conducted in England, and the theoretical perspectives associated with it. Rather than football violence stemming from social structural factors, Giulianotti argues that Scottish football fan behaviour derives from specific cultural and historical forces. This, in turn, distinguishes the ‘friendly’ Scottish fans quite sharply from their English ‘hooligan’ peers. In a recent paper he notes the fact that 5,000 fans, known as ‘The Tartan Army’, won the UEFA ‘Fair Play’ award in 1992 for their friendly and sporting conduct. This appeared to represent a distinct cultural change in the activities of Scottish fans since their pitch invasion after a match against England at Wembley in 1977 and the removal of the goalposts.

While much of Giulianotti’s work is in the form of traditional ethnography, much emphasis is placed on a conceptual framework provided by Foucault and concern for the treatment of ‘discourse’. The work of the sociologist Erving Goffman, with its emphasis on astute observation and understanding, also provides a methodological framework for Giulianotti. Armed with this sometimes obfuscating intellectual kit, and having conducted fieldwork studies with Scottish fans in Italy and Sweden, he provides an analysis of the changes in Scottish fan temperament over the past two decades.

Prior to 1980 Scottish fans were seen as exemplars of the heavy drinking, macho style of hooligans whose pitched battles were amongst the bloodiest in Britain. Alcohol, rather than divisive social issues, was generally viewed by the authorities and some social scientists as being the primary ingredient for transforming relatively ordinary supporters into mindless thugs. Many of these fans also relied for part of their identity on being ‘harder’ than the English fans, and clashes between the two groups were common. This image of Scottish fans, or ‘sub-discourse’ in Giulianotti’s terms – detracted from more meaningful examination of the roots of hooligan behaviour, to be found partly in religious sectarianism.

19 G. Armstrong and D. Hobbs, 1994
20 R. Giulianotti, 1995
After 1980 a distinct change occurred – a new sub-discourse. Increasingly, Scottish fans sought to distance themselves from the ‘British hooligan’ label and particularly from the unruly behaviour of English fans abroad. Having been prevented from playing their biennial matches against England at Wembley, following the small problem with the demolition of the goal posts, they constructed a quite novel way of maintaining a sense of dominance over them. 

“Spurred on by the popular stereotypification of the antithetical English fan as instrumental soccer hooligan, and the international debate on subsequently penalizing English soccer which tended to conflate English and British fans, Scottish fans coated themselves, with the brush of the authorities and the media, in a friendly and internationalist patina ...” ²¹

In other words, Scottish fans sought to beat their historical foes by being nice! In this they certainly succeeded, partly aided by a distinctly anti-English tone in many Scottish newspapers and the now positive line adopted with respect to their own fans. (See also Section 5). Finding considerable satisfaction in this new image, the role of heavy drinking among Scottish fans now took on a new twist. Alcohol consumption did not decline with the rise of the ‘friendly’ image. Rather, the meaning of drinking was radically transformed. Instead of it being a precursor of violence it was held to predispose friendly interaction and sociability, particularly towards strangers abroad, but possibly with the exception of the English.

We deal with this issue in more detail in Section 7 on Alcohol and football violence. We should note here, however, that Giulianotti’s insightful work has provided evidence for the mutability of football hooligan behaviour over a relatively short period of time. The overt, antagonistic reporting of English fans in the Scottish press, which sponsored much of the change in the conduct of ‘The Tartan Army’, remains a problem which will, eventually, need to be resolved, and already there are signs that the press are turning their attention to other, local moral panics, such as the use of ecstasy etc.

²¹ R. Giulianotti, 1995
Ethnographic work on the behaviour of Scottish fans has also been conducted by Moorhouse who questions the applicability of ‘English’ theoretical perspectives to problems in Scotland. His review of such perspectives, however, was limited to the approaches of Ian Taylor and Eric Dunning, with reference to John Clarke. Moorhouse highlights the differences between England and Scotland in terms of the relationship between fans and their clubs. The large supporters clubs and associations in Scotland, particularly in the case of Glasgow Celtic and Rangers, enable a much stronger sense of involvement and, in some ways, are more akin to the situation in pre-war Britain. The relevance of Taylor’s concern with the disenfranchisement of fans is, therefore, very limited in Scotland.

Moorhouse also questions media reporting of Scottish fan behaviour, claiming that many of the events in which these supporters were involved had been distorted and sensationalised. Rather than seeing a dramatic change in the activities of these fans after 1980 he suggests that “... the behaviour of Scottish fans crossing the border does not appear to have altered that much over, say, ninety years. He goes further to assert that the previous patterns of behaviour which gave rise to so much concern largely consisted of minor rowdyism and ‘bad manners’. It was the ‘moral panic’ about their conduct which gave rise to distorted perceptions and fears.

3.9 Empirical approaches?

This problem faced by all researchers on football hooliganism is that of the interpretation and labelling of the patterns of behaviour under study. For one investigator, a specific incident involving rival fans might be classed as ‘serious violence’. A second observer may describe the same behaviour as ‘relatively harmless display’. A journalist at the same event might use terms such as ‘mindless thuggery’ or ‘savagery’. And there is no objective way of choosing between these descriptions. Even video recordings of events at football matches are of little help here since the action in question still has to be interpreted and placed within some conceptual framework which renders it intelligible and meaningful.

This lack of objective facts in theory and research on football hooliganism has bedevilled the debate since the 1960s. Until the mid 1980s there were no national statistics concerning frequencies and levels of football hooliganism in Britain. Such data as did exist had to be obtained from local police forces, individual football clubs or from sources such as the St. John Ambulance Brigade who attend to injuries at football matches. Even here, however, problems of comparability arose since there was no specific offence of football hooliganism. Arrests of fans were usually made for ‘behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace’ and later under the Public Order Act (1986). From these figures it was impossible to glean any indication of the seriousness of violence involved, in terms of physical injury etc.

With the advent of specific offences under the Football (Offences) Act 1991 in Britain it became easier to determine levels of problem in different areas. Here, however, the scope of the Act included not just violence but chanting in an ‘indecent’ or ‘racist’ manner. Police forces also varied, and continue to do so, in terms of the rigour with which the act was enforced. The recent introduction of the National Criminal Intelligence Service in the UK has, however, provided a little more consistency in the ways in which statistics are collated and analysed. On the basis of their figures it is generally agreed that hooliganism, however defined, has been declining in recent years in the UK. The Head of the Football Unit of the NCIS has recently commented:

“Figures for the 1994/95 season suggest that the number of arrests in league games has been reduced where stewarding has replaced policing at grounds. However, the overall situation has also been improved through the increasing use of intelligence which shows that pockets of organised hooligans, who are often involved in a wide range of criminal activities, chose to cause trouble at predetermined locations away from grounds. Nevertheless the arrest figures confirm that closed circuit television, all-seater grounds and improvements in the stewarding and policing of games are all helping to effectively combat (sic) the hooligan problem.”

It is not surprising that a senior police officer should wish to reinforce the continuing need for his own unit, even in the light of a significant reduction in the problems with which this unit is designed to tackle. We must also wonder how much has really changed on the football terraces – what do the figures actually reflect. It is interesting to compare this use of statistics with a study conducted back in 1976 in Scotland by the Strathclyde police – a time when football hooliganism is generally thought to have been at its peak throughout the UK. The report in which the study published included a strong comment about the way in which arrests at football matches were often reported:

“We would like ... to comment on reports in some sections of the press about arrests made during or after the match. There is
on these occasions seldom any reference made to the nature of these arrests – we understand many are unconnected with hooliganism as such. If there are only a few arrests e.g., there were only five arrests out of a 50,000 crowd at a Celtic Rangers match in January 1997 (or one for every 10,000 spectators present) too little credit is given to the efforts of the clubs, stewards, the police and above all else the crowd themselves for their good behaviour. We recognise that much depends on the way in which this information is relayed to the press by the police. We think that if arrests were categorised the media would co-operate in presenting a true picture of events at matches.”

This wish expressed by McElhone nearly twenty years ago was clearly never fulfilled. Detailed arrest statistics of the kind he proposed have rarely been available from the police, and the press, by and large, have tended not to let the facts, on the few occasions on which they have been available, get in the way of a good story. This was the case in 1977 with the figures provided by the Strathclyde police. Their study was the most obvious one to conduct – a comparison of arrests for various offences at football matches with levels of such offences throughout the country. In other words, were levels of crime and violence at matches significantly higher than throughout the ‘normal’ population. Their calculations indicated that: “... the incidence of Breaches of the Peace and Assaults can be calculated as ... 7.32 per 100 hours per 100,000 spectators”. (Less detailed figures obtained by Peter Marsh from local police forces in England in the same year produced a result of similar magnitude.) Comparing these figures with the country as a whole, taking into account the locations and times of football games, the Strathclyde police showed that the level of offences at football matches was only marginally higher than would be predicted. They commented:

“The fact that there are 1.67% more crimes committed when football matches are played than when they are not hardly seems a cause for concern ... concern about hooliganism should be aimed at activities on Friday and Saturday evenings rather than at football matches ... The conclusion to be drawn from this report is that concern expressed by the media about hooliganism is out of proportion to the level of hooliganism which actually occurs at these matches”

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23 The McElhone Report – Football Crowd Behaviour; Report by a Working Group appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland, 1977
We deal in some detail with the McElhone report here, despite the fact that it was produced nearly twenty years ago and is rarely considered in contemporary discussion of football hooliganism, for three reasons. Firstly, it is the kind of calm, objective analysis which has not been repeated since 1979 but for which there is a clear need in the present. The only study which comes close to the scale and objectivity of the Strathclyde police analysis is that of Eugene Trivisas in 1980. Using Home Office data for England and Wales he came to significantly the same conclusion:

“According to the findings of this study, the commonly held stereotypes concerning ‘football hooliganism’ and ‘football hooligans’ (i.e. the popular image of the football hooligan as a juvenile vandal) do not coincide with police statistics. That means that either: (a) The stereotypes are wrong or (b) arrests for the typical offence and of the typical offender are not made by the police.”

Secondly, the Strathclyde study highlights with great clarity the fact that the fear of football hooliganism was, and probably still is, a more significant phenomenon than football hooliganism itself. Thirdly, it is a reminder that in place of endless theorising, much of it undoubtedly misplaced as Armstrong and Harris have argued, we need to focus much more closely on the facts of hooliganism.

Contemporary social scientists with an interest in the subject will, of course, argue, that much has changed since the late 1970s. While some will concede that in its early years football hooliganism in Britain had a more benign, ritual quality, the nature of the phenomenon has now changed. This is, at least in part, true. The implicit social rules which might once have constrained the activities of fringe members of the football fan culture are now less in evidence. But we still have all too little information about what is actually happening apart from the relative small-scale ethnographic studies discussed above. Even here the processes of selective focus and interpretation make generalisations very difficult. If this is true for the United Kingdom then the lack of empirical data about football violence in other European countries is even greater, despite the fact that social scientists in these countries tend to be more empirically oriented than their British colleagues.

3.10 European approaches

The cross-national differences in patterns of football hooliganism are summarised in Section 4. In this section we review some of the major approaches being taken in Continental Europe to understanding the origins of these collective behaviours. The scope and time scale of the current project has, however, necessarily limited the depth of these reviews. It is also the case that much of this work is relatively recent, as is the emergence of football hooliganism in countries such as Italy, Holland, Germany and

24 E. Trivisas, 1980:287
elsewhere. Many of the theoretical approaches and research methodologies have also taken, in the main, work in Britain as their starting point.

3.10.1 Italy

Work by Italian social scientists on the tifosi of Italian calcio has developed in the last six years, led by the sociologists Alessandro dal Lago of Milan University and Antonio Roversi of Modena University and the social psychologist Alessandro Salvini from Padova. Their approaches to the phenomenon, however, are quite different and stem from quite different theoretical backgrounds.

Dal Lago views football fan behaviour as essentially ritualistic and much of his approach stems directly from the work of Peter Marsh and his colleagues in England. He hypothesises three main factors which underlie the expressive behaviour of football fan groups. Firstly, football allows for identification by fans with a specific set of symbols and linguistic terms. These enable and encourage the division of the social world, and other supporters or tifosi in particular, into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’:

“È necessario distinguere, a questo proposito, tra due modalità essenziali di «vivere» il calcio da tifosi: quella linguistica del «commento» (le conversazioni da «bar Sport» che scandalizzano gli spiriti raffinati) e quella «attiva» del pubblico presente a una partita di calcio. Ritengo che la prima modalità costituisca una forma estremamente blanda di ritualizzazione dell’opposizione simbolica amico/nemico.”

Dal Lago’s second, rather unremarkable, point is that the football match in Italy is not simply a meeting between the two teams. For the fans it is an opportunity for an “amico/nemico” ritual confrontation. Such rituals can, in specific and foreseeable circumstances, be transformed into physical clashes. Here, like Marsh, he recognises historical parallels with the role played by the hippodromes in Ancient Rome and Byzantium, which were hosts to the tightly knit groups of Circus Factions – the supporters of the chariot racing teams. Such comparisons, however, dal Lago sees as irrelevant and possibly misleading. He advises against presuming a continuity in reality on the basis of superficial similarities with historical groups and patterns of behaviour:

“Ritengo che in sociologia sia possibile operare analogie tra tipi ideali, ma sia sconsigliabile postulare o presupporre una continuità tra realtà più o meno empiriche separate da due millenni.”

25 A. dal Lago, 1990:31
26 P. Marsh, 1978a. For a fuller discussion of historical events in Rome see the excellent book by Alan Cameron, Circus Factions: The Blues and Greens in Ancient Rome and Byzantium. Marsh has argued that the parallels between such groups and contemporary football fans are so striking that they constitute a much more direct continuity in the ritualisation of aggression than suggested by dal Lago.

27 A. dal Lago, 1990:34
Finally, dal Lago sees the stadium in which football is played as being much more than a physical environment. For fans it is the symbolic stage on which the ritual of friend/enemy is enacted. Over the last fifteen years, since the ultras have occupied specific territories within the stadiums, there have been two types of performance at football matches, with the ultras’ ritual constituting a play within a play.

While dal Lago emphasises that much of the social behaviour of the ultras within the stadiums is ritualised to the extent that symbolic gestures, insults and chants substitute for physical aggression, there are circumstances in which ‘real’ fights can occur. This depends on two factors: firstly a “storico”, or tradition of rivalry between the two groups; and secondly on situational factors, such as the development of the other ‘play’ the football game itself.

Contrasting football fans with medieval knights, he argues that the ‘wars’ in which they engage cannot be too violent or too bloody. Like the knights, the fans share a common code of ‘chivalry’. They use the same medium of chants and songs to express their hostilities, rather than weapons or fists, simply changing the words to proclaim their own identity, and the culture of ‘fighting’ which they share concerns essentially symbolic behaviour.

Dal Lago admits, however, that when ‘fighting’ takes place outside of the stadiums it can more readily result in ‘real’ violence:

“In order to defeat the enemies [outside of the ground] ultra groups try to adopt urban guerilla tactics (particularly setting ambushes near to stations and involving the police). But the violence is restricted to the throwing of stones and to sudden attacks. Usually every group is satisfied by the escape of the enemies from the sacred territory and by a short resistance against the police.”

Alessandro Roversi sees the violence of the ultras as being much less ritualised (and therefore relatively non-injurious) than does dal Lago. He argues that hooligan violence is related to, and is a direct continuation of, fighting between older supporters. He refers, for example, to the rivalry between Bologna and Fiorentina and quotes an old Bologna fan as saying:

“The Tuscans are terrible. It is in their blood. We used to turn up in a friendly mood, not wanting to say anything. But we always had to fight”
For Roversi, contemporary ultras simply take as their adversaries the previous rivals of their fathers and continue long-standing traditions of feuding and, on occasions, violent encounter. The Bolognesi continue to hate the Toscani in just the same way as their predecessors, and football provides an arena for the expression of these historical enmities. The new ultras now use a more ‘colourful’ and ‘lively’ style of expression – not only of rivalry but of passion for the game itself as well.

A second aspect stressed by Roversi is the “Bedouin Syndrome”. New alliances, new ‘twinnings’ and new hostilities started to develop between ultras of a number of cities. These alliances and enmities overlapped with political ideologies. Extreme right- and left-wing political stances were an important element of in-group cohesion and out-group hostility:

“... it is certainly the case that political extremism was definitely a glamorous example for the young hooligans, not only because its symbolism coincided with the hard line image they wanted to create for themselves, but also because the organizational and behavioural model fitted their aims like a glove.”

Groups which Roversi sees as adopting such political extremism include the left wing Bologna, Milano, Torino and Roma ultras, with Lazio, Inter, Verona and Ascoli adopting neo-Nazi right-wing styles.

Finally, Roversi concludes that although ultras may exaggerate their active participation in violence at football matches (See Section 4) for the purposes of presenting a hard, tough image, the violence in which they participate is not just rhetorical. Experience of fights and clashes with rival fans forms, in his terms, a common heritage of many young ultras and is a more general part of an experience of violence expressed outside of the football grounds as well.

The principal difference between Roversi and Dal Lago seems to be not so much about whether the social activities of Italian fans in and around football stadiums forms a ritual, in the sense that it relies on symbols and implicit social rules, but the extent to which such a framework minimises physical injury. Roversi has the gloomier view in this context.

The work of Alessandro Salvini is very wide in terms of theoretical and empirical approaches. His starting point for work on football fans in Italy draws extensively from the work of Marsh et al but is placed in a more strictly psychological context:

“After taking into consideration the aggressive behaviour of the violent supporters ... the model suggested by Marsh and Harré is considered appropriate. It considers the deviating fanaticism like a particular ritual manifestation of symbolic aggressiveness. The
observation and empirical research carried out by the authors [in Italy] arrive at similar conclusions, though giving particular importance to the lowering of the responsibility level and the self-achievement process to be found in this type of fanatic.”  32

In his later work Salvini examines the limitations of the ritual model and, in particular, the circumstances under which ‘de-ritualization’ can occur – i.e. the change from largely symbolic to more seriously injurious violence:

“L’elaborazione rituale del conflitto si orienta così verso una progressiva de-ritualizzazione slittando verso soluzioni di scontro, di trasgressione e di atti violenti.”  33

Salvini’s theoretical model to explain more general aspects of football fan aggression is based on cognitive social learning theory, which he uses to explain the phenomena of ‘dominance and aggression’, ‘self-identity and group affiliation’ and acceptance of group norms with the ultras. He also examines the role of situational variables and the impact these have on transforming ritual behaviours.

His interview and questionnaire studies in Italy have focused on the beliefs and attitudes of ‘moderate’ tifosi and the fans most likely to be classed as ultras. The results of these are complex but, in brief, it is clear that ultras reject some of the common assumptions made in Italy about the origins of hooliganism. They fail, for example, to see the problems in the stadiums as being the result of a new kind of ‘terrorism’ or infiltration by gangs of delinquents. Equally, they dismiss simplistic theories about the decline in family and educational values. They do agree, however, that violence at football matches is reflective of increased violence throughout Italian society and that the roots of the problem do not lie with the game or even its supporters.

Less substantial psychological research in Italy has been conducted by Bruna Zani 34 who rejects sociological analyses in favour of empirical study of the immediate precipitating factors in football violence. On the basis of interview and questionnaire data she concludes that participation in violence depends on a high level of identification with the football club, low educational attainment, the level of similarity with other supporters etc.:

“... these results suggest a rather ‘classic’ picture of the violent fans in the stadium: those who participate in disturbances are, in general, young, unemployed, poorly educated people who are members of a fanatic club and attribute responsibility for their behaviour to external rather than internal factors.”

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32 A. Salvini, R. Biondo and G.P. Turchi, 1988
33 A. Salvini, 1994
34 B. Zani and E. Kirchler, 1990
Zani and Kirchler, unlike some sociologists, see violence at football matches as quite independent of what happens on the pitch. In this sense they side with Dal Lago:

“There may actually be two matches going on in the football stadium: the first match concerns the football teams on the pitch, the second involves fanatic fans who are not interested in football as such, but in the opportunities that football offers to meet with club-mates and to give vent to the emotions and energies in battles with others.”

The psychologist Christine Fontana, using the same data as that of Zani and Kirchler above, outlines additional explanations of the violence in football stadiums offered by fans themselves. Most fans see football violence as being closely linked to violence in society and a third of all fans attribute hooliganism to lack of parental education.

Fontana also notes the fans’ view that, contrary to the view of Zani, there are direct links between violence at matches and the game itself. Bad decisions by referees, for example, can increase tension among fans which can lead to aggression.

3.10.2 Germany

Work in Germany has, in the main, been more solution-oriented than theoretical. Since the 1980s, for example, the major effort has been invested in the development of special ‘fan projects’ and other interventions aimed at reducing the problems (See section 8). Hahn, however, uses a combination of sub-cultural and identity-seeking approaches to explain the emergence and persistence of football violence in Germany. 35

He argues that it has become increasingly difficult for young Germans to realise their personal identity. The development of subcultures – many of them with extreme right-wing overtones – allows them to: “... find solidarity and to test strategies helping them to cope with life”.

In many of these of these sub-cultures the aim is to shock through provocative actions – a protest against conventions, norms, regulations and even aesthetic standards. In this context football offers a convenient, visible platform for such intentional behaviour, specifically because it enables confrontations with perceived rivals – not only opposing fans but also the police. Thus, according to Hahn, attempts by the police to control the behaviour of fans are often counter productive since they increase the significance of the ‘game’ for the fans:

“The stadium and its environment become more and more interesting for the youth, who feel incited to enlarge their elbowroom and to defend it in an aggressive way. Violent

35 E. Hahn, 1987
non-regulated behaviour increases, which is more and more often aimed at stewards, opposing fans and objects."

More recent work by Gunter Pilz takes a similar line but uses a rather different theoretical framework. On the basis of interview data he concludes that football violence is a ‘cry for help’ by many young people who have failed to find meaning in mainstream society and have little hope for the future. What he sees as the ‘bizarre’ violence of football fans is an indication of the underlying forms of inequalities, forms of coercion and ‘exaggerated’ discipline in German society.

Like Hahn, Pilz argues against football hooliganism being treated as purely a ‘law and order’ problem. His view is that repressive as well as socio-pedagogical measures do not solve the problem of the hooligans unless they are embedded in structural measures which effectively improve the everyday lives of young people:

“... hooligan behaviour can be interpreted as ‘normal’ and hooligans as the ‘avant-garde’ of a new type of identity. As long as there are no real changes at the structural level, the possibilities for reducing violence are limited. Hooliganism seems to be the risk of modernisation, commercialisation and professionalisation of sport and society.”

Pilz’s line of argument is strongly reminiscent of that of Ian Taylor (see 3.3 above), although more ‘liberal’ than explicitly Marxist in its elaboration and conclusions.

Most other commentary from social scientists in Germany has focused on the neo-Nazi image of many hooligan groups and on outbreaks of racist activity at football matches. Many claim that this image, fostered very much by the German media, does not accurately reflect the reality of most groups of football fans. Volker Ritner, for example, argues:

“Nazi symbols have a provocative role; they break down taboos. But the point is not political – it is to get noticed and mentioned in Monday’s newspapers”

Neither do many German Hools fit the ‘disenfranchised, oppressed lumpenproletariat’ image of Hahn and Pilz. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, for example, suggests that there are three types of German football fan: the consumer-oriented fan who picks and chooses which matches to watch; the football-oriented fan who attends every match and the ‘experience-oriented’ fans who seek violent ‘adventures’ inside and outside the stadiums. Such categories do not divide along social class or political lines.

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36 G.A. Pilz, 1996
37 Interview with V. Ritner, Professor at the Spots Sociology Institute of Cologne. Guardian 1996
While the issue of right-wing extremism among German fans may have been exaggerated in media reporting, there have been some quite notable groups, such as the now banned Dortmund Borussenfront, whose Nazi symbols and racist chants were more than just ‘provocative’. Recent surveys of football fans in Germany also show that over 20% sympathise with neo-Nazis and share similar political views.

3.10.3 Netherlands

Empirical work in the Netherlands has been limited, primarily, to that of van der Brug\textsuperscript{38}, although van de Sande\textsuperscript{39} has provided rather more speculative analyses based on van der Brug’s data. Much of van der Brug’s research has been on the social composition and demographic features of various groups of Dutch fans. He does, however, offer some insights into the cause of hooliganism in Holland.

Firstly he challenges Veugelers\textsuperscript{40} for assuming that the rise of Dutch hooliganism was predicated on similar social and class factors that Ian Taylor saw as the root of the English problem. According to van der Brug both the style of play and the roots of fan behaviour are quite different in the two countries:

“... Veugelers overlooks the differences between the two national football cultures. English soccer still has ... a number of characteristics that ... are closely linked to male working class values: rather uncomplicated, attacking football on the pitch. Proportionally, there is a lot of standing room off the pitch. Unlike continental football, English football is characterised by ‘man-to-man combat’ and physical struggle. Moreover, in Holland the gap between working-class and middle-class culture is much smaller.”

Van der Brug takes a fairly orthodox psychological approach to explaining both the rise of football hooliganism and the increase in certain types of crime, such as vandalism, in Holland. The two key factors, which he claims account for 60% of the variation in hooliganism, are absence of effective parental control and a ‘problematic’ school career. The social background of Dutch ‘Siders’, as measured in terms of fathers’ occupation, is in line with the normal distribution for that country, unlike the case in England where there is a greater dominance of fans from working class backgrounds. Van der Brug, however, identifies a clear ‘downward mobility’ among fans engaged in hooligansim and criminal acts. These tend to have lower educational and occupational levels than their fathers:

“It seems that in Holland there is a relationship between individual downward mobility and participation in football.”

\textsuperscript{38} H. van der Brug. 1989. 1994
\textsuperscript{39} J.Van de Sande. 1987
\textsuperscript{40} W. Veugelers. 1981
hooliganism, a situation which is quite different from the pattern in Britain, where the explanatory factors are much more collectivistic and highly related to social class."

A study conducted by Russell and Goldstein in Holland is one of the few to compare so-called hooligans with ‘nonfans’ – the aim being to identify the specific psychological features which distinguish between the two. With rather limited sampling (60 fans and 43 nonfans) they found that Utrecht supporters were higher than nonfans in terms of ‘psychopathic and anti-social tendencies’. On the basis of this the authors conclude:

“In addition to being impulsive and exhibiting weak behavioural controls, [Dutch football fans] also seek excitement. Action is sought out as a means of avoiding dull, repetitive activities that they generally find boring ... It may be just this element in the syndrome that makes the potential for fan violence at football matches an attractive prospect.”

Russell and Goldstein concede that their study contained major methodological weaknesses, not least the sampling procedures employed. The differences in levels of ‘psychopathy’ between the two groups, whilst significant, are also relatively small (a mean difference of 1.29). It would be unwise, therefore, to rely too heavily on their conclusions.

3.11 Other European research

Research in other European countries has tended to be descriptive and rather atheoretical. The work of Horak in Austria, for example, traces the emergence of football hooliganism in that country without offering too much in the way of explanation for shifts in fan behaviour. The research by Eichberg in Denmark is similarly descriptive, but with a rather confusing ‘gloss’ which includes reference to psychoanalytic concepts and to the issue of matriarchy in Danish society. Material from both of these authors is included in the section on cross-national differences in football violence (see Section 5).

Other work in Europe has focused principally on single events, such as the tragedy in the Heysel stadium in 1985. Because of the narrow focus of the research, and the singularly exceptional nature of the Heysel incident, there is little in the way of generalisable findings in this work.

3.12 Conclusions

We have seen that the bulk of theory and research on football violence has developed within British academic circles. It is clear that while many of the perspectives provided by social scientists in

41 H. Van der Brug, 1994:180
42 G. W. Russell and J. H. Goldstein, 1995
43 G. W. Russell and J. H. Goldstein, 1995:201
44 See, for example, R. Horak, 1990, 1991, 1994
45 H. Eichberg, 1992
46 See, for example, M. Dunand, 1986
the UK are largely compatible with each other, there are major ideological rifts between the various research groups. This ‘in-fighting’ has delayed the development of a more productive, multi-disciplinary approach to the phenomenon. It is also the case that many of the more sociologically-oriented approaches to explaining football hooliganism have little utility outside of Britain, or even England, because of major differences in national class and social structures.

Some perspectives which are relatively free of class-based analyses (e.g. Marsh, Armstrong etc) provide for easier ‘translation’ to fan groups in other countries. Thus, the ethogenic approach of Marsh and his colleagues has been used as a basis for analysing the behaviour of fans in Italy and for the development of theoretical perspectives in that country by Salvini and Dal Lago. It is clear, however, that no Europe-wide explanatory framework has yet been developed. It may be the case, given the distinctive nature of ultras, hools, roligans etc. that such a framework may be unachievable or inappropriate. The sociological and psychological factors which lie at the root of football violence in, say, Italy may be quite different from those which obtain in Germany or Holland. The football stadium provides a very convenient arena for all kinds of collective behaviour. There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that the young men who use such arenas in different countries are all playing the same game.

Increasingly, research of a purely ‘domestic’ kind is emerging in Italy, Germany, Holland and elsewhere which does not rely so heavily on British theoretical models. Increasing contact between research groups will enable more genuine cross-cultural perspectives to emerge and for the salience of alleged causal factors to be identified more clearly. The role of alcohol, for example, which is discussed in more detail in Section 7, has already been shown to be ambiguous when comparing the behaviour of English and Scottish fans. Its role will be seen as even more culturally dependent when examining the activity of Danish fans - see next section.

The degree to which individual, personality variables are predictive of football violence in different countries is relatively unexplored at the moment. It is unlikely, however, that specific factors common to fan groups throughout Europe will emerge. Again, there is no reason to suppose that the individual motivations and psychological profiles of an Italian *tifoso* will necessarily be in line with that of the English football hooligan. The variations between the two are likely to be more significant than any revealed commonalities.
Finally, it may well be that relative demise of football hooligansim in the UK will be followed by a similar decline in continental Europe. There has, after all, been a degree of imitative behaviour on the part of other European fans who themselves acknowledge the English as being the leaders in this particular pattern of behaviour. It could be that despite increased pan-European research on football violence, social scientists will soon discover that there are more serious social issues with which to be concerned in their home countries. Rising levels of youth crime, delinquency, alienation and the spread of right-wing extremism in many European countries may come to be seen as a more significant threat to European social stability than the anti-social behaviour of a relatively small number of highly visible football hooligans.
4 Cross-national variations in football violence in Europe

4.1 Introduction

Despite the extensive research literature on the subject, empirical information on cross-cultural variations in the scale and nature of football-related violence is hard to come by.

In their introduction to Football, violence and social identity (1994), Giulianotti et al ask: “What commonalities or differences exist between...supporters in different cultural contexts?”, immediately followed by: “Are the bases for these overlaps and distinctions found in actual behaviour or secondary interpretation?”

In accordance with academic etiquette, the contributors to this edited volume of essays do not feel obliged to answer the questions raised in the introduction. Yet the need for the second question indicates that the most striking ‘commonality’ between football supporters of different European nations is the number of social scientists engaged in interpreting, analysing and explaining their behaviour.

These academics are themselves divided into mutually hostile factions supporting rival explanations of the nature and causes of football violence. The divisions are along theoretical, rather than national lines, such that an Italian or Dutch sociologist may be a supporter of, for example, the British ‘Leicester School’ or the French ‘Post-modernist’ approach – resulting in very different interpretations of his own nation’s football culture.

In addition to the inevitable distortions of ‘secondary interpretation’, the ritual chanting and aggressive displays of the rival theoretical schools often obscure our view of the behaviour that is the subject of their debate.

The participants in the debate all accept that cross-national differences in the behaviour of football fans in Europe exist – and the contributors to Giulianotti’s “cross-cultural, interdisciplinary, pluralist” volume reach the unremarkable conclusion that a nation’s football culture is “…indicative of a given society’s cognition of existential, moral and political fundamentals”. Yet none of the many writers on this subject has provided any clear indication of exactly what the differences are.
At the 1987 European Conference on Football Violence, the Dutch researcher Dr J. P Van de Sande commented that in terms of research on hooliganism, “In Holland the situation is very much like that in other countries, many opinions but few facts”. Nearly ten years later, we must sadly report that while opinions are still plentiful, facts remain scarce.

As the British element of the so-called ‘British Disease’ is covered in some depth elsewhere in this report (see Section 2) we will focus in this section on the scale and nature of football hooliganism in other European countries.

4.2 Levels of violence

The available literature does not include any quantitative comparisons of levels of football-related violence in European countries. This may be because there is very little quantitative data available on the incidence of football-related violence in individual countries.

Even in Britain, where the problems have been recognised and researched for over two decades, systematic recording of incidents has only been undertaken in the last few years. Empirical data on football-related violence in other European countries is sketchy, often out-of-date and difficult to compare as different sources do not define terms such as ‘violent incident’ or ‘serious incident’ in the same way – and in many cases do not define these terms at all. The lack of data, and specifically the lack of directly comparable data, clearly hinders any attempt to assess variations in the scale of the problem within Europe.

In addition to these difficulties, patterns of football-related violence in Europe are constantly changing, and levels of violence cannot be relied upon to remain stable for the convenience of researchers and publishers. Even newspapers, with the benefit of daily publication, cannot always keep up with the changing trends. On Saturday 5 May, 1990, for example, the Independent reported a significant improvement in crowd behaviour in England, going so far as to claim that “hooliganism is not fashionable any more”. Only hours after the paper reached the news-stands, 3000 Leeds United fans rioted in Bournemouth, and football-related disorder was reported in no less than nine other towns.

There is enough evidence, however, to show that football-related violence is by no means an exclusively ‘British Disease’, and that some European countries – the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy in particular – currently experience problems of football-related disorder comparable with those found in the UK.

4.2.1 Italy

According to official data, there were 123 arrests of football fans, 513 injuries and 2 deaths in the 1988/89 season. From unofficial data (newspaper reports), researchers found evidence of around 65 violent incidents during the 686 Serie A and B League matches in the 88/89 season – i.e. violent incidents occurred at around 9.5% of
matches in this category. Government sources gave a slightly higher estimate of 72 incidents – 10.5% – for this season. This compares with just two reported incidents during the 620 matches of the 1970/71 season (0.3%), indicating a significant increase in football-related violence over these two decades, although an increase in Press coverage of the problem during this period may be distorting the picture to some degree.

For more recent years, the figures available come from a different source – the police – and refer not to violent incidents *per se* but to cautions and arrests, which may be for a variety of offences, and injuries. The various sets of figures are therefore not directly comparable – and the numbers of cautions and arrests may tell us more about changes in policing methods than about actual variation in levels of violence – but these statistics may provide a rough indication of recent changes in levels of football-related ‘trouble’.

The number of football fans ‘cautioned’ by the police has risen from 636 in the 1988/89 season to 2922 in the 1994/95 season. The number actually ‘detained’ by the police has increased from 363 to 778. Data on injuries were only available for the 1990/91 season, when football related disorder was at its peak, probably due to the World Cup. In this season the records show 1089 injuries, compared to 513 during the 1988/89 season, but all other evidence indicates a decline in levels of violence during the following years. Nearly 2000 fans were ‘detained’ by the police during the 1990/91 season, for example, compared to 778 in 1994/95 – less than half the 1990/91 figure.

Even if we ignore the unrepresentative peak in 1990/91, these police data would appear to indicate an overall significant increase in levels of disorder since 1989. There was also a spread of fan problems to Southern Italy, including Sicily, and to the lower football divisions. On closer examination, however, we find that 1989 saw an increase in the powers given to the police and the judiciary regarding the control of football crowds. It is well known that changes in policing methods and policy can have a dramatic effect on crime figures of any kind. In particular, increases in police powers and activity may result in massive increases in numbers of cautions and arrests, not necessarily associated with equally significant increases in the number of offences committed.

In line with a common trend throughout Europe, the most significant change in patterns of violence in Italy has been the shift from violent incidents inside the stadia (during the 1970s) to more incidents occurring outside the stadia (from the early 1980s).

### 4.2.2 Belgium

A study conducted in 1987 reported ‘serious’ incidents (defined as those resulting in large numbers of arrests and people seriously injured) at 5% of football matches (8 out of 144 matches), with ‘less serious’ incidents (the term is not defined) at 15% of matches.
Four groups of supporters were identified as causing the most trouble: Anderlecht, Antwerp, Club Brugge and Standard Liege. These supporters were involved in all of the ‘serious’ incidents and in 4 out of 5 of the ‘less serious’ incidents. When two of these clubs met, there were always serious incidents (except when matches were played in Brugge, where drastic security measures had been introduced, including heavy police escorts to, from and during the match).

These four groups caused trouble considerably more often at away-matches than when playing at home – a pattern which seems to be common in most European countries. From the early 1980s violence has occurred more often outside the stadium, either before or after the match, rather than inside the stadium and during the match – again a common pattern throughout Europe. The list of key troublemakers has now expanded to include Beerschot, Charleroi, and RWDM, but the basic patterns of disorder remain unaltered.

The Belgian research project concluded that there are ‘distinct differences’ between what happens in the UK and on the European Continent, although the authors do not specify what these differences are. The researchers note that violence seems to be a traditional and now intrinsic element of football culture in the UK. They claim that this is not the case in Belgium, as football violence has only become a ‘systematic’ problem on the European Continent in the last 15 years, but express concern that “the acquired tradition for violence could lead to the same result”. 1

According to Interior Minister Johan Vande Lanotte, this prophecy has not been fulfilled, and there has recently been a significant decline in violence at Belgian League matches, with violent incidents down by about 25% in the 1994/95 season.

Post-Heysel panic initially led to some excessive precautions – such as a match against Scotland where 600 policemen were brought in to watch over just 300 Scottish supporters – and the Belgian authorities have occasionally been criticised for heavy-handedness in dealing with visiting fans.

Lanotte claims that the recent reduction in violent incidents is due to somewhat less extreme security measures such as the obligatory use of video cameras by all first-division clubs, a doubling in the number of bans on troublemakers from stadiums, better ticketing systems to keep rival fans apart and more stewards. Evidence from other countries, however, suggests that periodic fluctuations in levels of football-related violence can occur for a variety of reasons, and that premature complacency over ‘proven effective’ security measures may precede a re-escalation of violence.

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1 L. Walgrave, C. Colaers and K. Van Limbergen. 1987
4.2.3 The Netherlands

As with the other countries included in this review, no reliable data were available on levels of football-related violence in the Netherlands.

Our calculations from the available information indicate that out of approximately 540 matches in a football season, 100 are defined as ‘high risk’. The ‘risk’ is not defined, and may not refer specifically or exclusively to actual violence: other problems such as ‘damage to property’ and ‘general disorderliness’ are mentioned in the report from which these figures are drawn, which also states that “large-scale, riot-like incidents are scarce.”

Of the 80,000 people who attend professional football matches, only around 230-270 are defined as ‘hard-core’ hooligans, although a further 2000 are considered to be ‘potential’ hooligans. Taken together, these data suggest levels of football-related disorder similar to those found in the Italian and Belgian research, with aggressive or violent incidents – or at least the potential for some form of disorder – at around 10% of matches.

These figures are from 1987, since when there has, according to van de Brug, been a slight drop in football hooliganism, although he notes that:

“... events at a number of games played recently indicate that these outbreaks of football violence are far from being kept under control”.

Researchers have recently become more cautious in their assessments of apparent declines in football-related violence, having discovered that their confident explanations of downward trends tend to be followed by embarrassing re-escalations. Also, many are understandably reluctant to suggest that there may be no further need for their services.

As elsewhere, the consensus among researchers is that football violence in the Netherlands has steadily increased since the early 1970s, with the 1980s seeing a massive increase in violence outside the stadia. There is some evidence of a slight reduction in levels of violence in the 1990s.

Hooliganism is concentrated in the top division of the sport, and even here only some teams have violent supporters. Certain groups of fans (known as ‘Sides’) are responsible for a disproportionate amount of the football-related violence that occurs in the Netherlands, and the ‘high-risk’ matches mentioned above invariably involve one or more of the teams with violent ‘Siders’. Currently, the main troublemakers are: Ajax (F-Side), Den Bosch (Vak-P), Den Haag (North-Side), Feyenoord (Vak-S/Vak-R), Groningen (Z-Side), P.S.V. (L-Side) and Utrecht (Bunnik-Side).

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3 H.H. van de Brug. 1994
4.2.4 Germany

No quantitative data are available on levels of football-related violence in Germany, and there is very little empirical data on fans or their behaviour.

Some indication of levels of violence is provided by the German police, who expected a contingent of 1000 ‘category C’ (violent) fans to attend the Euro 96 championships, out of a total 10,000 supporters travelling to Britain (*The Times*, 21 May 1996). This suggests that around 10% of German fans are regularly involved in violent incidents – indicating levels of football-related violence roughly comparable with those in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

The main hooligan groups are: Bayern Munich (Munich Service Crew), Braunschweig (Braunschweiger Jungs), Bielefeld (Blue Army), Duisburg, Dusseldorf (First Class), Essen, Frankfurt (Alderfront), Hamburg, Hertha Berlin (Endsig/Wannsee Front), Karlsruhe (Karlsruhe Offensive/Blau-Weiss Brigaten), Koln, Rostock, St. Pauli, Schalke 04 (Gelsen Szene).

Internationally, the German fans’ arch enemy has traditionally been Holland, although predicted violent clashes between German and Dutch fans at Euro 96 did not occur, indicating that levels of violence at international matches may be in (possibly temporary) decline.

4.2.5 France

Again, factual data on levels of football-related violence were not available.

Mignon4 claims that the first ‘hooligan incidents’ (the term is not defined), excluding those provoked by English visitors, occurred during the 1978-79 season, and the first groups of ‘kops’ and ‘ultras’ were formed in the early 1980s. What he calls the ‘ultra phenomenon’ did not expand nationally until after the Heysel disaster in 1985, when the main supporters’ associations of Paris, Marseilles and Bordeaux were founded. Acts of vandalism, fights and ambushes became more frequent during the latter half of the 1980s, some of which were associated from the start with the use of fascist symbols and racist slogans.

Paris Saint-Germain supporters, in particular the group known as the ‘Boulogne kop’, and Marseilles Olympique supporters are the most numerous and powerful groups, and have the worst reputations. Others involved in disorder include Bordeaux, Metz, Nantes and St. Etienne.

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4 P. Mignon, 1994
Serious violence – i.e. incidents resulting in significant injuries – would seem, however, to be quite rare, even in skirmishes between ‘sworn enemies’, according to reports in the French fans’ own fanzines and Internet news-pages (rare sources of detailed, up-to-date information, and probably no more biased than the academic literature). All such encounters are described in some detail and with some pride in the fanzines, so it is unlikely that the authors are ‘playing down’ the level of violence. In a typical round-up report on the activities and achievements of a club’s supporters at, say, twelve to fifteen away-matches, only one or two aggressive incidents will be recorded, which may not involve actual violence or injuries.

This suggests that levels of football-related violence are generally lower in France than in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, although some serious incidents do occur, and further involvement of extreme-right groups may lead to an increase in violence.

4.2.6 Scandinavia

In Sweden, there were 25-30 ‘serious’ incidents recorded during the 1995 season – an average of one incident per seven games. As usual, the term ‘serious’ is not defined, but this would seem to indicate levels of disorder roughly similar to those in Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

Like many other European countries, Sweden has seen a significant increase in football-related disorder since the early 1980s. One source suggests a rise of 74% from 1984 to 1994.

No up-to-date figures were available for Norway or Denmark. Norway is known to be relatively trouble-free. Denmark has had some problems in recent years – following the publication in 1991 of a research paper explaining why football hooliganism did not exist in Denmark, and some sources suggest that football-related violence at club level is still increasing. Yet on the international scene the Danish fans – known as the roligens — are currently winning praise for their good behaviour, and even at club level the problems are marginal compared to Sweden.

4.2.7 Austria

Although numerical evidence is again lacking, most accounts suggest that football-related violence in Austria has followed a pattern familiar throughout Europe, with a significant increase in violence during the 1980s, followed by a slight decline in the 1990s.

5 P. Lådstrom and M. Olsson, 1995
6 B. Peiersen et al. 1991
7 T. Andersson and A. Radman, 1996
The more peaceful trend is evident among the majority of fans, but younger and more violent gangs of 13-15-year-old ‘Wiener Hooligans’ continue to form. The 1990s have also seen an increase in violent incidents involving extreme-right skinhead groups. These skinhead groups are small, but form alliances with larger groups of soccer hooligans to inflate their numbers.

4.2.8 Spain

Although there have been some ‘local’ clashes between fans of rival teams, and some violent incidents at international matches, most football rivalries in Spain are inextricably bound up with sub-nationalist politics. This may help to explain the lack of data on ‘football-related’ violence, as clashes between, say, Real Madrid and Athletico Bilbao supporters may be seen as having very little to do with football. Members of HNT – Athletico Bilbao’s largest supporters club – describe the club as “a militant anti-fascist fan-club”.

Supporting a football team is clearly a political gesture: Athletico Bilbao draws support from Basques and anti-fascists living in other parts of Spain, who “identify with the values represented by the club” and claim that “when Athletico play in a final, 50,000 fans are cheering in Madrid bars”.

4.2.9 Switzerland

According to a 1996 fanzine of the ‘Section Grenat’ (a Geneva supporters group), the word ‘ultra’ means nothing to most people in Switzerland. A few groups of active supporters appeared during the 1980s, although their impact was limited. Some groups developed a reputation as ‘fighters’ in the late 1980s, but incidents have declined and are now rare except between ‘sworn enemies’ such as Servette FC and FC Sion.

No official data on levels of violence are available, but in an internet news-page report of fan activity at 15 matches, only one aggressive incident is mentioned. This involved only a few ‘fisticuffs’, and had already calmed down by the time the police arrived.

4.2.10 Portugal

The formation of football fan clubs in Portugal is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating only from the early 1980s. At the 1987 European Conference on Football Violence, Portuguese researchers reported that “no violent action has been undertaken so far by the Juve Leo fan club [the largest fan club] or by any other national fan club”, although they mention that “some of the language they use in graffiti is quite aggressive and provocative.” It is interesting, and perhaps worrying, to note that the language in question is often English (e.g. “Juve Leo Areeio Zone – Keep Out Red Animals!”), despite the fact that few of their compatriots read or speak English. Marques et al see this as evidence of ‘mimetic behaviour’ – direct imitation of British fans.
The major clubs appear to be similar to the French and Swiss, in that each will usually have one sworn enemy (e.g. Juve Leo and Benfica), but be on friendly or at least neutral terms with the supporters of most other teams. Their stated aims of ‘joyful and festive’ support for their teams, with significant emphasis on spectacular, colourful displays also suggest that rivalry centres on these elements rather than on demonstrations of toughness. Among smaller, local clubs, however, traditional rivalries between villages or communities can result in violent incidents at football matches.

4.2.11 Czech Republic

Czech football has no history of widespread or serious violence, but there have been some reports of incidents during the 1980s and early 1990s, mainly involving Sparta Prague fans. Recent incidents have occurred within the stadium, and involved attacks on opposing players, although Sparta fans have also caused damage to trains en route to away-matches and been involved in street-fighting after derby matches.

The national sports authorities are concerned about the behaviour of what they call ‘the flag carriers’, and commissioned a documentary film on Sparta fans entitled Proc? (Why?). Officials admit that this initiative did more harm than good, resulting in more widespread imitation of the Sparta fans behaviour - which started among crowds leaving the cinema after watching the film!

Following a train-wrecking incident in 1985, 30 fans were arrested, and warnings were issued that the authorities would not tolerate “the manners of English fans” in Czech football. National division clubs were then obliged to provide separate sections for away fans, and given the right to search spectators at entrances to the grounds. Further measures have included the banning of club flags and scarves and serving a weaker variety of beer at football grounds.

4.2.12 Greece

No general statistics or empirical data on football-related violence are available for Greece, but isolated accounts of violent incidents suggest that hooliganism in this country is currently in the ‘second stage’ of development (see ‘Conclusions’, below), with violence moving from attacks on referees to conflicts between rival fans, but still largely within the confines of the stadium.

4.2.13 Albania

Very little information is available, but a 1995 Reuters report refers to a boycott by referees in protest against increased violence in football stadiums. Although referees seem to be the main target of violent attacks, the report also mentions fighting in bars outside the stadium following a first-division match, where police fired shots
into the air in an attempt to break up the fight. The issue of football violence was being taken seriously by the Albanian Soccer Association, who supported the referees’ boycott and planned to hold meetings with the Interior and Sports Ministries to discuss the problem.

4.3 Fan profiles and behaviour

4.3.1 Germany

According to a 1996 report to the European Parliament, German fans, unlike the British, tend to come from the middle strata of society, and can be divided into three broad ‘types’:

“the ‘consumer-oriented’ fan, who sits in the stand or seeks a quiet spot on the terraces and wants to see a good game; the ‘football-oriented’ fan decked out in his team’s colours and badges, is a member of the supporters’ club and stands on the terraces and supports his club through thick and thin; the ‘adventure-oriented’ fan who changes his spot on the terraces from game to game and wants to see something happen, whether it has anything to do with football or not.”

Roth’s classifications are based on the work of Heitmeyer, who notes that the ‘consumer-oriented’ fans pick and choose which matches they want to attend, while the ‘football-oriented’ attend every match and the ‘experience-oriented’ fans seek violent adventure both inside and outside the stadium.

The German police (in their annual report on football in 1993/4) use a rather more simplistic classification, based only on those aspects of fan behaviour which are of direct pragmatic interest to them. They classify fans as ‘non-violent’ (the peaceful fan), ‘prone to violence’ (the fan who will be violent given the right opportunity) and ‘actually violent’ (the fan who is determined to be violent). These last fans are known as ‘Category C’ fans, and in some cases occupy their own ‘block’ in the stadium (e.g. ‘Block 38’ at Cologne) every Saturday.

Many hard-core troublemakers have been banished from the established, official supporters’ clubs, but some have formed their own gangs. The encounters between these groups are described in the magazine Fan-Treff as pitched battles, in which fans “knocked each other’s faces in with their belts”, yet they are also reported to hold joint Christmas and anniversary parties, and hostilities are suspended for international games, when the rivals join forces. Fan-Treff reports that “In the German league they crack each other’s skulls. In the European championship you pitch in against the common enemy”.

11 C. Roth, 1996 - Report to the European Parliament
Reports of increasing involvement of extreme-Right, neo-Nazi organisations may be somewhat exaggerated. Although Nazi symbols and Hitler salutes have been observed during international matches, researchers do not regard these as evidence of significant neo-Nazi involvement in football hooliganism. (See Section 3.10.2)

An analysis of the political attitudes of German fans indicates that these symbols do have political meaning for around 20% of supporters, who reported sympathy with the neo-Nazi movement, and explicit links have been noted between some fan-groups and extreme-Right organisations. The majority of fans, however, either support one of the mainstream democratic parties (35%) or have no politics at all (24%).

Whatever the political motivations of some German fans, Thomas Schneider, co-ordinator of the ‘Fan Projects’ (see Section 8), asserted in the Times (21 May 1996) that the Euro 96 championship would “not be invaded by German Nazis. It is absurd and has been greatly exaggerated.” Indeed, despite the attempts by the British tabloids to revive memories of the Second World War during Euro 96, there was no evidence of any political element among the German supporters.

4.3.2 Italy

Dal Lago describes Italian football culture as “a form of extended municipalism”. The battle lines of the football ‘ultras’ are those of the ancient rivalries between regions and towns.

When supporting their national team abroad, Italian fans may, like other nations, temporarily suspend traditional city and regional antagonisms. When the World Cup Finals were held in Italy in 1990, however, the ‘ultra’ groups could not overcome their parochial hostilities to join forces against international rivals. The Napoli fans abandoned the Italian national team to support their local hero Maradona, who was playing for Argentina, while northern ‘ultras’ demonstrated their hostility towards Maradona, Napoli and the southern region by supporting any team playing against Argentina. This resulted in even skinhead/racist elements among the northern fans cheering in passionate support of Cameroon, rather than give any encouragement to their traditional regional enemies.

12 A. dal Lago and R. De Biasi, 1994
Various attempts have been made to establish demographic profiles of Italian ‘ultras’ (Roversi, 1994; Dal Lago, 1990; Zani and Kichler, 1991). There appears to be a wider range of social classes among ‘militant’ football fans than in Britain, although some researchers have found that the majority of hard-core ‘ultras’ are working-class, with a predominance of skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. In support of Dal Lago’s claim that it is not possible to identify the ‘ultras’ with a particular social class, however, some surveys have shown a fairly high proportion of students and professionals among the Italian ‘ultras’. There are also larger numbers of females among ‘ultra’ supporters. As in France, the demographic profile of a group of football fans will tend to vary according to the social composition of the area in which the club is located, with a stronger working-class presence in Bologna, for example, and higher numbers of unemployed fans in Naples. This may account for some apparent contradictions in the findings of different surveys.

In all cases, however, the average age of the most militant and violent supporters was considerably lower than that of the more moderate supporters. In Roversi’s study 64.7% of those involved in violent incidents were under 21 years old. Zani and Kirchler’s findings showed that the average age of ‘fanatic’ supporters was 21, compared to an average age of 28 (in Bologna) and 36 (in Naples) among ‘moderate’ supporters.

Both studies also found a higher proportion of blue-collar workers among the more violent or ‘fanatic’ supporters. Yet, according to Dal Lago:

“... the main difference between English and Italian football cultures does not lie in the social class distribution of the supporters, but in the presence or absence of a strongly structured form of association. Italian football culture is not only local and independent of social stratification, but is also firmly organised. Football in Italy is a national fever and, above all, for millions of citizens, workers, students and professionals, a structured way of life.”

In support of this view, he quotes a member of one of AC Milan’s ‘ultra’ groups, the Brigate Rossonere:

“As an ultra I identify myself with a particular way of life. We are different from ordinary supporters because of our enthusiasm and excitement. This means, obviously, rejoicing and suffering much more acutely than everybody else. So, being an ultra means exaggerating feelings, from a lot of points of view”.

13 A. Roversi, 1994
14 A. del Lago and R. De Biasi, 1994
The Italian ‘ultras’ pioneered the highly organised, ‘theatrical’ style of support that has since spread to other nations. This style has now become predominant in France, and could also be said to have influenced the Danish ‘Roligans’, a number of Dutch supporter-groups and even the Scottish ‘Tartan Army’.

This style is distinguished by its emphasis on spectacular displays involving co-ordinated costumes, flags, banners, coloured smoke and even laser-shows – and on choreographed singing and chanting, conducted by ultra leaders using megaphones to prompt their choruses at strategic points during the match.

These spectacular and expressive aspects of the ‘ultra phenomenon’ are not separate from the ‘hooligan’ aspects. As dal Lago explains:

“Journalists and chairmen of clubs call ultras wonderful spectators, when everything is going well, such as celebration, but they call them hooligans when there is trouble. But, in both cases, they are talking about the same people”.

Roversi’s findings would seem to confirm that a high percentage of ‘ultras’ are involved in violence as well as in theatrical displays: 49.2% of his subjects had been involved in fighting at the football ground, and 24.8% said that they fought whenever they got the chance to do so.

Today’s Italian ‘ultras’ are often seen as a continuation of the political extremists of the 60s and 70s. Similarities in their behaviour are cited as evidence of this connection. On closer examination, these similarities appear to consist of the singing of songs, chanting of chants and waving of flags and banners – along with passionate allegiance to a group and the formation of shifting alliances with other groups, and, of course, participation in disorder and violence amongst themselves and against the police.

It may be more helpful to regard today’s young ultras as the ‘spiritual’ descendants of the earlier youthful extremists – or rather to see both as manifestations of the same apparently innate desire among young Italians (and indeed the youth, particularly males, of most other nations) to shout, chant, wave flags, hold meetings and fight amongst themselves or against authority-figures. The fact that many of the ultras’ songs are adapted from, say, traditional communist songs is no more evidence of political sympathies than the extensive use of hymn-tunes among British fans is evidence of ecclesiastical affiliations.

What can be said is that all of the behaviours characterising current ‘football hooliganism’ have been present in Italy, in different guises, for some time. Although the British have often been accused of ‘exporting’ football hooliganism, today’s young Italian ‘ultras’ clearly also had plenty of native traditions and role-models to follow, and certainly had no need to look to Britain for inspiration.
4.3.3 France

Football in France has never attracted the numbers of live spectators, or inspired such passionate support, as in other European countries. Despite the current popularity of the sport, even major cities cannot sustain more than one team, and matches attract on average only a third of the spectators of their equivalents in Italy, England and Spain.

In terms of popular interest and enthusiasm for the sport, however, football has enjoyed a ‘renaissance’ in France during the 1980s and 1990s, following a distinct ‘slump’ during the 1960s and 1970s. Various explanations have been proposed for both the slump and the renaissance, the most convincing suggesting that interest has revived largely due to the successes of French teams in international competition and the accompanying large-scale investment in the ‘promotion’ of football (Mignon, 1994).

The revival of popular interest in football and the increase in attendance at football matches has been associated with the emergence of new types of supporters and new forms of fan-behaviour – including an element of ‘hooliganism’.

The demographic profile of the French football crowd differs markedly from the British, in that all social classes (apart from the aristocracy) are well represented. Some sources suggest that the majority of spectators are working-class (Bromberger, 1987), while others indicate that the middle classes predominate (Ministry of Culture, 1990). Patrick Mignon\(^\text{15}\) points out that the variation in the statistics may be due to the location of the clubs included in demographic surveys, and concludes that on a national basis: “with the exception of the upper classes, all of society is found in the stadium”. Bromberger\(^\text{16}\) has also noted that in France, all social groups can identify with some aspect of football.

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\(^{15}\) P. Mignon, 1994

\(^{16}\) C. Bromberger, 1987, 1988, 1992
The social background of ‘ultra’ or ‘hooligan’ supporters, as opposed to football spectators in general, is somewhat more difficult to determine, as no quantitative surveys have been undertaken on these groups, which emerged in the early 1980s. An analysis based on records of Paris Saint-Germain supporters detained for questioning by the police between 1988 and 1992 reveals that ‘hooligans’ are young, white males, predominantly working-class, employed in both skilled and unskilled jobs in more or less equal numbers. Some of the more powerful ‘skinhead’ members of the Paris Saint-Germain ‘kop’, however, come from the upper-middle classes – sons of lawyers and senior managers. According to Mignon, a number of these supporters, who in the late 1960s and early 70s might have expressed their dissociation from their bourgeois origins through a different form of solidarity with working people, are now involved in the ‘white French’, racist movement.

In line with recent developments in Britain, some skinhead elements among French football supporters no longer call themselves ‘skinheads’: they are now known as ‘casuals’ and a number have shed the traditional skinhead dress and hairstyle. There is still some overlap between the original skinheads and their ‘casual’ successors, and both groups have been involved in football-related racist attacks and other violent incidents associated with football matches. In addition to the skinheads and casuals, a number of less easily identifiable groups of football fans are also suspected of having extreme-right leanings, and in some cases these links are explicit.

Among the majority of supporters, however, there appears to be a move away from the English style of dress and behaviour – which is more strongly associated with extreme-right tendencies – towards the Italian style. Originally, the ‘kops’ groups, found in clubs north of the Loire, adopted a predominantly English style, while the ‘ultra’ groups, located in the south, favoured the Italian style. Currently, the national tendency is toward ‘Italianisation’ and this distinction no longer applies.

Mignon notes that the rather dour English style is characterised by a lack of ‘props’, orchestrated displays or other visible demonstrations of group identity, relying on an established ‘football culture’ to provide an innate sense of collective identity, in-group solidarity and opposition to other groups. The problem for the French fans attempting to emulate the English style is that there is no pre-existing ‘football-culture’ to provide the essential ideological unity and sense of belonging. The more organised and theatrical Italian model – with its badges, scarves, stickers, banners, videos, fanzines, choreographers and conductors – provides this sense of community and establishes a clear group identity.
More recent evidence from French fanzines indicates that the Italian style has been adopted with increasing enthusiasm. The stated objectives of the ‘Bordeaux Devils’, for example, are:

“... to create a good-humoured and joyous Ultra group” and “to support our team by livening up the terraces with our displays and chants, but also to create a real group with its own identity, to promote a convivial group where people know each other and enjoy meeting each other both in the stadium and outside”.

The ‘Devils’ internet news-pages also demonstrate an obsession with the theatrical and artistic elements of supporter activity such as ‘tifos’ (orchestrated displays) and ‘gadgets’ (brightly-coloured props and paraphernalia).

In fact, judging by their own fanzines, French ultras are considerably more interested in these creative elements than they are in any form of aggression. Rivalry between clubs seems to centre on who stages the most spectacular tifos (displays), performs the most original chants and demonstrates the greatest enthusiasm in support of their team – rather than who is the ‘toughest’.

Clubs tend to have one main enemy, and somewhat hostile relations with the supporters of one or two other teams. The rest are regarded merely as neutral ‘rivals’, and a club will often have positively friendly relations with the supporters of at least one other team. The most frequently cited example of a friendly relationship is that between Bordeaux and St. Etienne supporters. Such an alliance would be unheard-of in England, and highly unlikely in Germany and Holland, where rival fans only suspend hostilities when supporting their national team in international competitions.

Alliances and ‘twinning’ between supporter-groups used to be found in Italy, but have recently declined.

Thus, although the French ‘ultras’ are influenced by the Italians, there are some significant differences in their attitudes. It is no accident that the term ‘tifo’ in Italian means ‘football fanaticism’ in general, whereas in France ‘un tifo’ means ‘a display’ (specifically a choreographed display using coloured cards, banners, fireworks, etc. by fans at a football match) and nothing more. The concept seems to have lost something in translation, namely the Italians’ dominant concern with passionate loyalty, leaving only a passion for the aesthetics of loyalty. The adoption of an Italian word in itself indicates the importance of the Italian ‘ultra’ influence in France, but the re-definition of the term suggests that this influence is a matter of form rather than content: the French fans have adopted the flamboyant style of the Italians, but without the background of deep-seated traditional allegiances and rivalries.

17 URL=http://www.esiee.fr/~perreault/endeve.html
Football rivalries may provide French fans with a sense of belonging to a group, a stage for competitive artistic display, an excuse to ‘let off steam’ and, occasionally, to prove masculinity in aggressive or violent encounters. The references to ‘passion’, ‘hate’ and ‘enemies’ in the French fanzines are, however, somehow unconvincing. They recognise that these sentiments are expected, but their expression does not appear to come from the heart, which may perhaps account for the lower levels of actual violence among French ‘ultras’.

4.3.4 The Netherlands

Although football hooliganism in the Netherlands is said to have been heavily influenced by ‘the English Disease’, the Dutch followers of the national team appear to have adopted a more ‘Italian’, theatrical style in recent years, characterised by colourful costumes and displays, and a carnival atmosphere of singing, dancing and good-natured celebration. Hostilities between rival groups are suspended as they join forces to support their national team, and at Euro 96 no hostility was displayed towards international rivals either. The predicted battles between Dutch fans and their arch-enemies the Germans did not occur, nor did they take the opportunity to prove themselves against the ‘market-leaders’ of hooliganism in England.

At home, however, hostilities continue, both between rival groups of fans and between ‘hools’ and the police. These encounters are described with pride and illustrated with photographs in Dutch fanzines and Internet news-pages such as the Daily Hooligan.

Football hooliganism in the Netherlands has followed much the same pattern of development as other European countries (see Conclusions, below), with an initial stage of sporadic violence directed mainly at referees and players, followed by a phase of increasing aggressive encounters between rival fans, and between fans and police, inside the stadium, followed by an increase in violence occurring outside the stadium and less obviously related to the game itself.

Van der Brug\(^{18}\) claims that ‘Siders’ (the Dutch equivalent of ‘ultras’) are becoming increasingly detached from their football teams and clubs, and that disorder is now a primary objective in itself:

“The numbers of people that travel to away matches are a clear indication of this tendency. In contrast to matches which promise little excitement, high-risk matches when a team with a violent Side are playing are attended by far greater numbers of young people. It often turns out that young people take to supporting another team when things at their first club become a bit dull.”

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\(^{18}\) H. H. van der Brug, 1994
In terms of socio-demographic profile, Van der Brug (1994) claims that the Dutch ‘Siders’ are a less homogeneously working-class group than their British counterparts, although he gives no specific data on their socioeconomic backgrounds, beyond showing that their educational level is generally lower than that of their fathers, indicating a trend towards ‘downward mobility’ among football fans that has also been observed in other parts of Europe.

Van de Sande also claims that Dutch football fans “can be found in all socioeconomic classes”, although he adds that “the main part of the public is lower class, in so far as a lower class can be said to exist in our prosperous country!”.

From police data on arrests, Van de Sande finds, not surprisingly, that all offenders were male, 43% aged 16-18, 28% aged 19-21 and almost none over the age of 30. All Dutch researchers appear to have found that hooligans have experienced a problematic school career and lack of effective parental control (van der Brug and Meijs, 1988a, 1989; Van de Sande, 1987; Bakker et al, 1990, etc.). These factors are frequently cited as ‘causes’ of football hooliganism, rather than as characteristics of football hooligans.

4.3.5 Austria

Horak and his colleagues found that members of Austrian fan-clubs were generally young (average age 18.6 years, younger in the ‘more active’ fan-clubs) and belonged mainly to the working and lower-middle classes – although a high percentage (23%) were unemployed. An element of ‘downward mobility’ was also noted, with fans achieving lower standards of education and social status than their parents.

Whatever their ‘official’ social class, active fans followed “masculine-proletarian norms of behaviour” in which “physical violence is a standard means of solving conflicts, and…an important factor in the process of self-identification among the young.” Half of their interviewees had been in trouble with the police, mainly for vandalism but some for incidents involving physical violence – although the researchers point out that violence in this sub-culture is “more expressive-affective in nature than instrumentive” and that serious injuries are very rare.

19 J. P. van de Sande, 1987
20 R. Horak, W. Reiter and K. Stocker, 1987; R. Horak, 1992
When incidents did occur, according to Horak and his colleagues, they differed from the international norm in that clashes were not between rival groups of fans but between juvenile fans and other spectators. Hostilities were not based on rivalries between different clubs but on “antagonism between the inhabitants of small cities and a specific urban sub-culture”. Austrian fans are nonetheless highly loyal to their teams, and both ‘tough’ and ‘moderate’ fans indicated willingness to engage in violence ‘on behalf of’ their club. In line with other European nations, fans tended to cause more trouble at away-matches than at home games.

More recently, observers have noted an increasing involvement of neo-Nazi skinheads in Austrian football hooliganism. Although understandable fears tend to lead to exaggeration of this factor, and the numbers of skinheads in Austria is small, reports of alliances between skinheads and ‘hools’ (football hooligans) have contributed to concern about the threat to public order posed by this ‘combined force’.

4.3.6 Scandinavia

At conferences and in research papers on football fans, the Scandinavian countries tend to be lumped together under one heading. We have followed this tradition for convenience, and because there is a degree of cultural unity between the Nordic nations, but must emphasise that there are considerable differences in fan profiles and behaviour between Sweden, Denmark and Norway, which are outlined separately below.

In their paper presented to the 1996 ‘Fanatics’ conference in Manchester, Andersson reports that both Sweden and Denmark have problems with football hooliganism, while Norway does not. During the 1990s, both Sweden and Denmark have seen outbreaks of football-related violence. Norway has not experienced similar problems, with the exception of some incidents provoked by a group nicknamed ‘Ape Mountain’, supporters of the Oslo club Valerenga.21

4.3.7 Sweden

Most of the problems in Sweden in recent years have involved supporters of the three Stockholm clubs ALK (Black Army), Djurgarden (Blue Saints) and Hammarby (Bajen Fans).

The only public investigation into hooliganism, by the National Council for Crime Prevention in 1985, concluded that those responsible for violence and hooliganism were ‘troublemakers’, rather than ‘ordinary lads’, on the grounds that 60% of those arrested had criminal records. This research has since been criticised, however, for flawed methodology, particularly in terms of sample selection, sample size and questioning methods.

21 T. Andersson and A. Radman, 1996
Subsequent projects have focused on finding solutions to the problem of hooliganism, rather than finding out what it consists of, such that demographic data on fans is limited. As in other European countries, however, a significant current concern is that the fans involved in violence are getting younger. Ten years ago, 18-20 year-olds were most frequently involved in assaults and acts of violence, whereas today the statistics indicate an increase in the number of 15-17 year-olds involved in violent incidents.

Andersson and Radman report that around 25-30 ‘serious’ incidents occurred during the 1995 season – i.e. approximately one ‘serious’ incident per seven matches. Unlike most other writers on this subject, Andersson’s team take the trouble to specify what they mean by the term ‘serious’. Their definition is worth quoting in full, not merely out of gratitude but because it provides some insight into the behaviour patterns of Swedish supporters. Andersson defines ‘serious’ as:

“... any one of the following situations: groups of supporters in direct conflict with each other or the police or guards; attempts by supporter groups to carry out any of the above acts but which have been prevented by the police; and attacks or attempted attacks by the spectators on players or officials.”

Although the proportion of trouble accounted for by these different behaviours is not stated, it is interesting to note that attacks on officials and players are still frequent enough to warrant inclusion in the Swedish hooligan repertoire, while in many other European countries violence is now almost exclusively directed at opposing fans or at the police. It is also worth noting that in this report, and therefore perhaps in many others where the terms are not defined, ‘serious’ does not necessarily always mean ‘violent’.

Hooliganism in Sweden, as in the other Scandinavian countries (and indeed other countries throughout Europe) is a ‘club-level’ problem, and does not occur at international matches. Even at club level, however, it is important to get the scale of the problem into perspective. An investigation of the 3000 members of one of the main fan-clubs – Djurgarden’s ‘Blue Saints’ – reported that just 30 (1%) of these fans would ‘be prepared to start a fight’, with a further 20 (0.6%) willing to ‘join in a fight’. The remaining 2,950 declared themselves to be mainly interested in football. Even if the fans questioned were ‘down-playing’ their violent tendencies, these figures suggest at least that the majority of Swedish supporters do not see themselves as violent.

22 T. Andersson and A. Radman, 1996
These data may not be reliable, but the comments of a police officer lend support to the view that the problem of hooliganism in Sweden has been exaggerated: “I’m fed up with all this talk of hooligans,” he said “I don’t like the word. If you were to count the real troublemakers, those whom one can really call hooligans, then you would find three all told in Gothenburg.”

These uncertainties and disagreements about the scale, or even the existence, of a football-hooligan problem in Sweden have not prevented the authorities from taking action to tackle the problem. Measures adopted in 1996 have included registration and investigation of fans and a “22-point program” to prevent football-related violence, clarifying the responsibilities of clubs for the behaviour of all spectators the grounds, and for their members’ behaviour at away matches. Racist and other prejudiced slogans are banned, as are slogans insulting the opposing team or even ‘booing’ of the opposing team or players! Any aggressive or violent incidents incur serious fines and result in all of a club’s matches being graded as ‘high-risk’, and some clubs have brought in private security firms to keep order.

Despite these measures, the start of the 1996 season was marred by several violent incidents – although the evidence above suggests that only a very small minority of supporters engage in such behaviour.

4.3.8 Denmark

The successful rise of the Danish national football team since 1980 has been championed by its enthusiastic but peaceful supporters, the ‘Roligans’ (from ‘rolig’ meaning ‘peaceful’), who are seen as the antithesis of the typical English hooligan.23

The majority of ‘Roligans’ (42%) are in skilled or civil service jobs. The average age is 31 – considerably older than football fans in other European countries. Overall, around 15% of fans are women, but the organised Danish Roligan Association reports a 45% female membership.

The leading, fully-professional Danish football clubs, Brøndby and Copenhagen FC, attract the largest supporter groups. The Brøndby supporter club boasts 10,000 registered members, making it the largest in Scandinavia. Football is a family activity in Denmark. Not only are there large numbers of women in the stands, but many families come with young children and even infants.

Of all the Scandinavian fans, the ‘Roligans’ appear to have the closest ties to both the game itself and the clubs. Surveys indicate that between 80-85% of ‘Roligans’ have themselves played club football.

23 T. Andersson and A. Radmann, 1996
According to Eichberg\textsuperscript{24}, the secret of the Roligans good nature is that they have not forgotten that “Football is to do with laughter.” The serious patriotic associations of the game are caricatured in the Roligan displays: faces are painted with the country's red and white colours, which match the bright scarves and T-shirts, and “the whole is topped with the Klaphat, a grotesque red and white hat with movable cloth hands attached for applause.” Even the influence of excessive alcohol consumption, another trademark of the Roligan, seems only to further the festive cheerfulness and peaceful sociability of the fans. The carnival atmosphere often spills out into the streets where large groups of dressed-up liquored Roligans have been known to lead conga dances through towns.

Eichberg regards this behaviour as more than simply a manifestation of the “culture of laughter” but also as a form of social control. When individuals attempt right-wing outbursts such as shouting Sieg Heil and other such provocative remarks, they are “immediately calmed down by other Danes”. This control may also have a lot to do with the fact that right-wing political adherents are a weak minority among Roligans (12%): 47% define themselves as socialist, with women reporting an even higher percentage – 65%. Only 5% of the women claimed to support the right-wing Populist Progress Party.

Like most other European countries, Denmark experiences more problems internally, at club level, than at international matches. (In fact, hooliganism in the Scandinavian countries is confined almost exclusively to club-level games, behaviour at international matches being generally exemplary.) Despite the saintly reputation of the Roligans, Denmark has experienced a few outbreaks of violence at club matches during the 1990s, particularly at local Derbies in Copenhagen. Presumably not all Danish football supporters subscribe to the dominant Roligan culture. It must be said, however, that even problems at club level are described as ‘marginal’.

4.3.9 Norway

In 1994 Norway was at the top of the sporting world. The huge success of the winter Olympics in Lillehammer was crowned by the achievements of the national football team in the World Championships the following summer. Patriotic fervour was at an all-time high and expressed itself in colourful, but mostly non-violent support for the Drillos, the national team.

\textsuperscript{24} H. Eichberg, 1992
Norway has, for the most part, been free of football-related violence. The only exceptions to the ‘model fan’ image are the supporters of the Oslo club Vålerenga – the so-called ‘Ape Mountain’ – whose deviant exploits include robbing a hot-dog stand (somehow 41 people managed to get arrested following this incident in 1993); roughing-up, but not injuring, a linesman (1995); one violent attack on a rival female supporter (1995); and one assault on a policeman during a local derby. The most highly publicised incident involved the antics of just one fan who scaled the roof of a beer tent during the 1992 European championships in Malmö and was accused of starting a ‘riot’.

Apart from these incidents, which can hardly be said to constitute a serious problem, the behaviour of Norwegian supporters, at club level as well as internationally, is characterised by vociferous, but peaceful, enthusiasm. Even between arch-rivals such as the provincial clubs Rosenberg and Brand, there is little or no overt hostility. In a non-violent atmosphere, they compete fiercely with each other for the best songs, costumes, and beer-drinking parties.

Andersson and Radmann suggest that the conduct of Norwegian police may help to explain the largely peaceful behaviour of the fans. While the police have absolute responsibility for football crowds, “they never appear in large groups, or go armed with helmets and weapons when on duty at club matches.” This is in direct contrast to the approach of the Swedish police, who attend most matches equipped with the full regalia of shields, helmets, visors and weapons.

### 4.4 Conclusions

Despite the predominance of opinion and theory over fact in the available literature, it is possible to draw a few conclusions and make some predictions based on the empirical evidence.

1. First, it is clear that some form of disorderly behaviour has occurred in virtually every country in which football is played. Disorder of some kind would appear to be a near-universal and seemingly inevitable accompaniment to the game of football, and is unlikely to be completely eradicated.

2. But we cannot conclude from this that all disorder or violence associated with football is of the same nature, or influenced by the same causal factors, regardless of the form it takes or the culture in which it occurs. Nor can we assume that the same remedies will be equally effective in preventing or reducing football-related disorder in different cultures.

Among the academics engaged in the football debate, even the most vociferous and belligerent defenders of a particular explanatory theory have come to admit that universal explanations cannot accommodate all cross-cultural variations. In a moment of modesty, Eric Dunning suggests that with hindsight, his seminal work The Roots of Football
3 Dunning proposes the hypothesis that football-related disorder is:

“... contoured and fuelled, ceteris paribus, by the major ‘fault-lines’ of particular countries. In England, that means social class, in Glasgow and Northern Ireland, religious sectarianism, in Spain, the linguistic sub-nationalisms, and in Italy, the divisions between north and south.”

One might disagree with Dunning about the precise nature of the relevant ‘fault-lines’ in these countries, or perhaps argue that these examples are over-simplified, but the evidence suggests that his central point should be accepted.

4 Despite the fact that national characteristics reflecting different historical, social, political and cultural traditions have affected the nature and scale of football-related violence in different European countries, there are significant cross-national similarities in the ‘stages of development’ of the problem.

In most countries, there appears to have been an initial stage of sporadic violence inside the stadium, directed at officials such as referees or at players themselves.

This is followed by a second stage involving an increase in aggression between opposing groups of fans and between fans and police/security officers, still within the confines of the stadium, involving violent encounters during pitch-invasions and the creation of ‘territories’ which rival fans attempt to ‘capture’.

The third stage involves a significant increase in violence outside the stadium, including pitched battles between rival groups of fans in the streets; ‘ambushes’ at railway stations, in car parks and bus-terminals; acts of petty theft and vandalism and frequent clashes with the police. In this third stage, observers almost invariably notice an increasing detachment of hooliganism from the game of football, whereby participation in violence – or at least some form ritual warfare – outside the stadium appears to be an end (excuse the pun) in itself.

This is, of course, an over-simplification: there are overlaps between these stages and also some exceptions to this pattern. Yet most of the European countries currently experiencing problems with football fans have seen a pattern of development incorporating at least some elements of this
‘three-stage’ process, whatever other socio-historical-political-cultural influences may have been involved. While recognising the limitations of such a broad-brush, generic picture of the development of football hooliganism, we must also be aware of the dangers of becoming so bogged down in the details of cross-cultural differences that we fail to see the international patterns.

In summary, the evidence indicates a more-or-less universal pattern of development, which is nonetheless ‘contoured and fuelled’ by different socio-cultural-historical factors in different European countries, resulting in both recognisable similarities and important variations in the nature and scale of football-related disorder.

5 In most European countries, football-related violence is largely an ‘internal’ problem, with the majority of incidents occurring at club-level matches, while supporters of the national team abroad are generally well-behaved.

The English are an obvious exception to this rule, and rivalries between some other nations, such as the Dutch and German supporters, have led to violent conflicts. These incidents seem recently to have diminished, however, and clashes predicted by both the police and the media at the Euro 96 championships did not occur. Even the English fans failed to respond to tabloid-press calls for a re-play of World War Two.

Euro 96 may of course represent only a temporary cessation of hostilities between the main international rivals, but the pattern of violence between club-level enemies contrasting with relatively peaceful support of the national team seems fairly well-established in many European countries. This pattern is partly responsible for the still-prevalent assumption that only England has a serious problem of football violence – because the violence of English fans is highly visible on the international stage, while other nations’ hooligans confine themselves mainly to parochial warfare.

6 Football hooliganism is clearly not an exclusively ‘British Disease’. The British are, however, frequently blamed for ‘spreading’ the Disease. The Leuven University study concluded that:

“all the lines lead back to British hooligans. They are seen as the professionals. They are the great example to hooligans from all over the rest of Europe.” 26

26 K. Van Limbergen et al. 1987
The historical evidence, and the research findings on cross-national variations summarised in this section, suggest that although some football supporters in some European countries may regard the English hooligans as ‘role models’, others have quite deliberately adopted a very different – indeed opposite – style of behaviour. Those who have consciously rejected the English model include the Scottish ‘Tartan Army’, so the ‘disease’ can certainly no longer be called ‘British’.

Throughout Europe, we find that while some countries may exhibit some of the symptoms of the so-called ‘English Disease’ (the Danish Roligans drink a lot, for example, and the Italian ‘ultras’ fight), the manifestation of these symptoms is not sufficiently uniform to justify a confident diagnosis (the ‘Roligans’ do not fight, for example, and the toughest of the Italian fighters tend to avoid alcohol). Have the English hooligans somehow selectively infected the Italians with their bellicosity and the Danes with their drinking habits? Do the Norwegians, but not the Swedes, have some natural immunity to this disease? Has the Scottish ‘Tartan Army’ experienced a miracle-cure?

Clearly, the picture is rather more complex than the Leuven conclusions would suggest. The evidence indicates that different forms of football-culture, including ‘hooligan’ elements, have developed in different European countries. This development has certainly involved some cross-cultural influence, but the fact that British hooliganism had a ten-year head start on the rest of Europe does not imply that all subsequent ‘hooliganisms’ are mere imitations.

The Leuven researchers are right, however, to point out that the British, or more accurately the English, are widely regarded as the ‘market leaders’ in this field. English hooligans provide the benchmark against which the violent elements among other nations’ supporters judge their performance. It is no accident that these groups – and indeed any groups striving for a ‘fierce’ and powerful image, whether they are in fact violent or not – tend to give themselves English names and use English football-jargon in their slogans, chants and graffiti.

There are some recent indications, however, that the international influence of the belligerent English style may be on the wane, as self-proclaimed non-violent, fun-loving groups such as the Danish Roligans and Scotland’s ‘Tartan Army’ succeed in grabbing the headlines. A concerted pan-European media conspiracy to give blanket coverage to the ‘carnival’ groups, while ruthlessly cutting off the oxygen-of-publicity supply to the ‘hooligan’ groups, might help to encourage this new fashion.
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5 Media coverage of football hooliganism

Football hooliganism can be seen as something of an ‘easy target’ for the media. With journalists present at every match across the country, the chances of a story being missed are slim. TV cameras also mean that disturbances within stadiums are caught on video. Since the 1960s, in fact, journalists have been sent to football matches to report on crowd behaviour, rather than just the game. The British tabloid press in particular have an ‘enthusiastic’ approach to the reporting of soccer violence, with sensationalist headlines such as “Smash These Thugs!”, “Murder on a Soccer Train!” (Sun), “Mindless Morons” and “Savages! Animals!” (Daily Mirror). Whilst open condemnation of hooligans is the norm across the media, it has been argued that this sensationalist style of reporting presents football violence as far more of a concern than it actually is, elevating it to a major ‘social problem’. The problem of press sensationalism was recognised in the 1978 Report on Public Disorder and Sporting Events, carried out by the Sports Council and Social Science Research Council. It observed that:

“It must be considered remarkable, given the problems of contemporary Britain, that football hooliganism has received so much attention from the Press. The events are certainly dramatic, and frightening for the bystander, but the outcome in terms of people arrested and convicted, people hurt, or property destroyed is negligible compared with the number of people potentially involved.”

Furthermore, some critics argue that media coverage of hooliganism has actually contributed to the problem (See also Section 3). More recently, the popular press has been criticised for it’s pre-match reporting during the 1996 European Championships.

5.1 History Press boxes were first installed at football matches in the 1890s, although the reporting of football matches goes back considerably further than this. The study by Murphy, Dunning and Williams

1 P. Murphy et al. 1988
2 M. Melnick. 1986
3 P. Murphy, E. Dunning and J. Williams. 1988
(see also Section 3) shows that disorder was a regular occurrence at football matches before the First World War, and newspaper reports of trouble were common. However, the style of reporting was a long way away from the coverage which hooliganism receives today.

Most reports before the First World War were made in a restrained fashion. Little social comment was made and the articles were small and factual, often placed under a heading such as ‘Football Association Notes’.

“... Loughborough had much the best of matters and the Gainsborough goal survived several attacks in a remarkable manner, the end coming with the score: Loughborough, none Gainsborough, none

The referee’s decisions had caused considerable dissatisfaction, especially that disallowing a goal to Loughborough in the first half, and at the close of the game he met with a very unfavourable reception, a section of the crowd hustling him and it was stated that he was struck.”

It is hard to imagine a present day report of an incident such as this being written with such impartiality and lack of concern.

During the inter-war years, the style of reporting began to change. As newspapers gave more space to advertising, stories had to be considered more for their ‘newsworthiness’ than before. What is interesting to note about Murphy et al’s study here is that they argue that the press facilitated (consciously or not) the view that football crowds were becoming more orderly and well behaved by underplaying, or just not reporting, incidents which did occur. At the same time, however, a small amount of concern and condemnation began to creep in to reports.

This trend continued for a decade or so after the Second World War and it is this period which is often referred to as football’s hey-day: a time of large, enthusiastic, but well-behaved crowds. Murphy et al argue that this was not necessarily the case and that although incidents of disorder were on the decrease, those that did occur often went un-reported.

The roots of today’s style of reporting of football violence can be traced back to the mid 1950s. At a time when there was widespread public fear over rising juvenile crime and about youth violence in general, the press began to carry more and more stories of this nature and football matches were an obvious place to find them. Although many reports still attempted to down-play the problem, the groundwork was laid as articles began to frequently refer to a hooligan minority of fans.

4 P. Murphy et al. 1988
5 Leicester Daily Mercury, 3 April 1899
By the mid-1960s, with the World Cup to be held in England drawing closer, the press expressed dire warnings of how the hooligans could ruin the tournament. The World Cup passed without incident but the moral panic concerning hooliganism continued to increase.


During the 1980s, many of these demands were actually met by the British authorities, in the wake of tragedies such as the Heysel deaths in 1985, “Cage The Animals” turning out to be particularly prophetic. As these measures were largely short-sighted, they did not do much to quell the hooliganism, and may have in fact made efforts worse. As such, football hooliganism continued to feature heavily in the newspapers and mass media in general and still does today.

5.2 Theory

The main bodies of work we will consider here are that of Stuart Hall in the late 1970s and that of Patrick Murphy and his colleagues at Leicester in the late 1980s.

Stuart Hall in *The treatment of football hooliganism in the Press*, identifies what he calls the ‘amplification spiral’ whereby exaggerated coverage of a problem can have the effect of worsening it:

“If the official culture or society at large comes to believe that a phenomenon is threatening, and growing, it can be led to panic about it. This often precipitates the call for tough measures of control. This increased control creates a situation of confrontation, where more people than were originally involved in the deviant behaviour are drawn into it ... Next week’s ‘confrontation’ will then be bigger, more staged, so will the coverage, so will the public outcry, the pressure for yet more control...”

This spiral effect, Hall argues, has been particularly apparent in the coverage of football hooliganism since the mid 1960s. The press’ technique of “editing for impact” is central to Hall’s theory. The use of “graphic headlines, bold type-faces, warlike imagery and epithets...” serves to sensationalise and exaggerate the story.

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6  S. Hall, 1978
This approach is supported by a later study by Patrick Murphy and his colleagues\(^7\). They argue that the particular shape which football hooliganism has taken since the 1960s, i.e. “regular confrontations between named rival groups”, has arisen partly out of press coverage of incidents. In particular, the predictive style of reporting which often appeared in the tabloids such as “Scandal of Soccer’s Savages – Warming up for the new season” (Daily Mirror, 20 August 1973) and “Off – To a Riot” (People, 2 August 1970).

In 1967, a Chelsea fan appearing in court charged with carrying a razor said in his defence that he had “read in a local newspaper that the West Ham lot were going to cause trouble”. \(^8\)

This predictive style of reporting is most apparent when the English national side is involved in international tournaments. During the build up to the World Cup in Italy, 1990 the English Press gave out grave warnings of violence in Italy. The Sun quoted anonymous English fans as saying there was going to be “… a bloodbath – someone is going to get killed” (31 May 1990), while the Daily Mirror claimed Sardinians were arming themselves with knives for the visit of the English who were “ready to cause havoc” on the island (27 May 1990). This anticipation of trouble meant that media presence at the tournament was very substantial, and competition for a ‘story’ fierce, resulting in journalists picking up the smallest of incidents. John Williams\(^9\) also claims that journalists may have paid English fans to pose for photographs.

"By defining matchdays and football grounds as times and places in which fighting could be engaged in and aggressive forms of masculinity displayed, the media, especially the national tabloid press, played a part of some moment in stimulating and shaping the development of football hooliganism."

Furthermore, Murphy argues that the press have played a role in decisions over policy making to deal with football hooliganism, resulting in largely short-sighted measures which have in the main shifted violence from the terraces onto the streets and towns outside the football grounds.

\(^7\) P. Murphy, E. Dunning and J. Williams, 1988

\(^8\) P. Murphy et al. ibid

\(^9\) J. Williams, 1992
Evidently, social explanations of football violence do not make great headlines and it is rare that a report of football violence in the popular press will include such an insight, if it does it tends to be a short remark, buried away at the end of the article. Thus, as Hall points out, “If you lift social violence out of its social context, the only thing you are left with is – bloody heads.” In fact, the explanations offered to us by the popular press usually aim to dismiss the violence as irrational, stupid and ultimately animalistic – “RIOT! United’s Fans Are Animals” (Sunday People, 29 August 1975) and “SAVAGES! ANIMALS!” (Daily Mirror, 21 April 1975).

This has serious consequences, as Melnick points out:

“The mass media in general and the national press in particular can take major credit for the public’s view of the soccer hooligan as a cross between the Neanderthal Man and Conan the Barbarian.”

By labelling the actions of football hooligans like this, it is easy for the tabloid press to make calls for tougher action from the authorities. If the violence has no rationale or reason then what can be done but use force against it?

“Another idea might be to put these people in ‘hooligan compounds’ every Saturday afternoon ... They should be herded together preferably in a public place. That way they could be held up to ridicule and exposed for what they are – mindless morons with no respect for other people’s property or wellbeing. We should make sure we treat them like animals – for their behaviour proves that’s what they are.”

Contrasted with these calls for harsh punishments have been more blatant forms of glorification of hooliganism, most obviously in the publishing of ‘league tables of hooligan notoriety’:

“Today the Mirror reveals the end-of-term ‘arrest’ record of First Division Clubs’ supporters covering every league match played by 22 teams. The unique report compiled with the help of 17 police forces reflects the behaviour of both ‘home’ and ‘away’ fans at each ground. The record speaks for itself: Manchester United were bottom of the League of Shame by more than 100 arrests.”

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10 M. J. Melnick, 1986
11 Daily Mirror, 4 April 1977
12 Daily Mirror, 6 May 1974
League tables were published in several other newspapers, including the Daily Mail, during the mid 1970s. However, in 1984, when a report by a working group in the government’s Department of the Environment, entitled *Football Spectator Violence*, recommended that the police should compile a league table of the country’s most notorious hooligan groups to help combat the problem, many newspapers replied with disgust and outrage that this should be published (which it wasn’t going to be), arguing that doing so could incite hooligan competition. Importantly, as Murphy et al assert, this shows that the press recognise that publicity can influence football hooliganism.

Criticism has also been aimed at the tabloid press for the attitude it takes in its build-up to major international matches. Two days before England’s semi-final match against Germany in this year’s European Championships, the Mirror carried the front page headline “Achtung! Surrender. For you Fritz ze Euro 96 Championship is over” while the editorial, also on the front page, consisted of a parody of Neville Chamberlain’s 1939 announcement of the outbreak of war with Hitler: “Mirror Declares Football War on Germany”. Elsewhere, the war metaphors continued: “Let’s Blitz Fritz” (Sun) and “Herr We Go” (Daily Star).

Condemnation of the tabloids was widespread, but in fact they had done it before. Before England played the Federal Republic of Germany in the semi-final of the 1990 World Cup, The Sun printed the headline “We Beat Them In 45 ... Now The Battle of 90”

Following the disturbances across Britain after the match, in which a battle between English fans and police broke out in London’s Trafalgar Square and a Russian student was stabbed in Brighton, mistakenly being identified as a German, some critics were keen to point the finger at the xenophobia of the tabloid press in encouraging racist and violent action. A report produced by the National Heritage Select Committee, led by Labour MP Gerald Kaufman, concluded that the tabloid press coverage “may well have had it’s effect in stimulating the deplorable riots”.

Even without considering whether the disturbances that night constituted ‘deplorable riots’ or not, this claim is highly debatable. What is clear, however, is that certain double standards exist within the tabloid press. On the one hand they are keen to label the actions of hooligans as ‘moronic’ and ‘evil’ whilst at the same time they encourage the jingoistic and xenophobic views so prevalent within the national hooligan scene. A study by Blain and O’Donnell, involving 3,000 newspaper reports from 10 countries covering the 1990 World Cup claimed that “There is nothing elsewhere in Europe like the aggressiveness towards foreigners of the British popular press.”

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13 J. Williams, 1992
It is not just in the international context that one finds this aggressive style of reporting but also in general football journalism. Headlines such as “C-R-U-N-C-H”, “FOREST’S BLITZ”, “POWELL BLAST SHOCKS STOKE”, and “Doyle’s Karate Gets Him Chopped” were found in the sports pages of just one edition of the Sunday People. Stuart Hall claims that if football reporting is shrouded in violent, war metaphors and graphic imagery then one should not be surprised that this spills over on to the terraces.

“...the line between the sports reporter glorying in the battles on the pitch, and expressing his righteous moral indignation at the battle on the terraces is a very fine and wavery one indeed”.

5.3 The role of the media in other European countries

Studies of media reporting of football hooliganism elsewhere in Europe have been rather limited. This may be due to the more ‘benign’ reporting of fans in other countries or to the relative novelty of the football violence phenomenon in some cases. The most significant studies have been conducted in Italy and the Netherlands, with less substantial work in Denmark and Austria. Work on Scottish fans by Giulianotti, however, is also relevant in this section.

5.3.1 Italy

Alessandro dal Lago analyses the coverage of football hooliganism in the Italian media. He identifies two phases in reporting football matches by the press. Before the 1970s each match was covered at most by two articles. The attention of the reporters was more focused on the players than on the terraces, when violence occurred it was reported as a secondary event in the context of the article. The second phase comes from the mid 1970s. Now attention was focused on the ‘ends’ (the terraces behind the goals favoured by the Italian ultras) and outside the stadium. Football incidents were given the ‘honour’ of separate articles independent from the reports of football matches.

Dal Lago recognises the amplifying role which the media plays and claims that the ultras are aware of it to the extent that banners displayed in the ‘ends’ frequently include messages to journalists. For example in June 1989, a week after a Roma supporter had died and three Milan fans arrested, a banner displayed by the Milan ultras was directed at Biscardi, a presenter of a popular sports programme Il Processo del Lunedì (The Monday Trial). It read “Biscardi sei figlio di bastardi” (Biscardi you are a son of bastards).

Dal Lago states that widespread hatred exists on the part of both groups, with expressions such as ‘beasts’ and ‘stupid’ used by the ultras to describe the media and by the media to describe the ultras.

14 Sunday People. 3 April 1977
15 S. Hall. 1978:27
16 A. dal Lago. 1990
5.3.2 The Netherlands

A study by van der Brug and Meijs set out to see what the influence of the Dutch media coverage of hooliganism is on the hooligans themselves. A survey was conducted in which there were 53 respondents from different ‘sides’ (groups of fans so called after the section of the ground in which they are usually located) in Holland. Put to them were a series of statements to see whether they agreed / disagreed etc. Statements which featured the strongest levels of agreement among the respondents were “It is fun when the side is mentioned in the newspaper or on television”, “Side supporters think it is important that newspapers write about their side” and “When I read in the newspaper that there will be extra police, it makes the coming match more interesting”. 17

The authors conclude that:

“There is no doubt whatsoever that the media have some effect on football hooliganism.”

5.3.3 Scotland

We have seen earlier that the media has played a large part in the shaping of the present day view of football hooligans in England. It is interesting, therefore, to consider the example of Scottish fans and their transformation, in the public’s eyes, from British ‘hooligans’ to Scottish ‘fans’. Since 1981 the Scottish ‘Tartan Army’ has consciously sought to acquire an international reputation for boisterous friendliness to the host nation and opposing fans through ‘carnivalesque’ behaviour. (See also Sections 3 and 4) The media has played a very important role in this. By organising themselves into very large groups at matches abroad, the Scottish fans attract a great deal of media attention, but by displaying themselves as nothing more than friendly, albeit drunken, fans their press coverage is predominantly positive. The Scottish media has been behind this transformation, namely by representing English fans as hooligans and by underplaying any trouble which has occurred involving Scottish fans.

5.3.4 Denmark

A similar story exists in Denmark where the ‘Roligans’ (see section 4) have an impeccable reputation as the antithesis of the ‘English hooligan’. Peitersen and Skov identified the role that the media played in forming this reputation:

“The Danish popular press were an active force in support of the Danish roligans and the fantastic reputation that they have achieved in the international press ... the Danish popular press came to have a similar role to that played by the English popular press for the hooligans, but with reversed polarity. While the Danish press supported recognisable positive trends encompassing companionship, fantasy, humour and pride, the

17 H. van der Brug and J. Meijs. 1988
18 G. Finn and R. Giulianotti. 1996
19 B. Peitersen and H. B. Skov, 1990
English press helped to intensify and refine violence among English spectators by consciously focusing on and exaggerating the violence and the shame.”

5.3.5 Austria Roman Horak\(^\text{20}\) also claims that a spate of de-amplification of football violence in the Austrian press occurred in the mid to late 1980s. As a result, hooligans lost the coverage which they had previously thrived upon, and the number of incidents decreased.

5.4 Conclusion

It is evident that the media plays a very significant role in the public’s view of football hooliganism. By far the biggest problem lies in the sensationalist reporting of the British tabloid press. We have seen how the press has helped form the modern phenomenon of football hooliganism, how it has shaped public opinion of the problem, and how it may directly influence the actions of fans themselves.

There is considerable evidence to support the claim that football hooligans enjoy press coverage and positively attempt to obtain coverage of themselves and their group. In fact, a hooligan group’s notoriety and reputation stems largely from reports in the media. The following conversation between two Millwall supporters talking to each other in 1982, is somewhat revealing:

“C – keeps a scrapbook of press cuttings and everything, you should see it, got this great picture from when Millwall went to Chelsea. Great, this Chelsea fan photographed being led away from the shed, with blood pouring out of his white tee shirt. He’s clutching his guts like this (illustrates), got stabbed real bad.”

“You see that thing in the Sun on ‘Violent Britain’? No? Well I was in it. Well not directly like. I had this Tottenham geezer see. Sliced up his face with my blade – right mess.” \(^\text{21}\)

In Football hooliganism: The Wider Context, Roger Ingham recommended that the media should reduce their tendencies to:

“... sensationalise, inflate, exaggerate and amplify their stories”, advocating “more accurate reporting of events, more careful choice of descriptive terminology, greater efforts to place the events themselves in appropriate contexts”.

Ingham also called for the press to think before printing anticipations of disturbances, going so far as to recommend that the Press Council “play a more active role in attempting to ensure accurate and responsible reporting”.

\(^{20}\) R. Horak, 1990

\(^{21}\) J. Pratt and M. Salter, 1984
However, 18 years on from Ingham’s writings we are still faced with the same situation and it is one which looks unlikely to go away. As Melnick\textsuperscript{22} points out “... in the newspaper business, ‘bad news is good news’”. A glimmer of hope perhaps stems from the Scottish example talked about earlier, demonstrating that football fans can produce ‘good’ stories in the press, although it may be fair to say that many of the stories have only been deemed ‘newsworthy’ because of the emphasis on the contrast with English fans.

Horak’s claim is also encouraging, indicating that media de-amplification (i.e. playing down stories of football hooliganism) can lead to reductions in levels of violence. In this sense, therefore, Euro ’96 could prove to be a turning point in press coverage of football.

Apart from the disturbances in London following the England – Germany match, the European Championships provided almost nothing in the way of hooliganism stories for the press and, as such, stories concentrated on the English team, rather than the fans.

The role of the media was raised in a recent report to the European Parliament on football hooliganism by the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs. (See also Section 8) In this the committee recognises that:

“The media act as magnifiers – they magnify acts of violence and provoke further acts of violence. The media show social problems – the violence in and around football, xenophobia and the racism which is its expression – as if under a magnifying glass. What is nasty becomes nastier because it seems to appear anonymously.”

It then goes on to recommend that the media:

“... participate in the promotion of respect for fair play in sport, to help promote positive sporting values, to combat aggressive and chauvinistic behaviour and to avoid any sensationalism in treating information on violence at sporting events.”

Short of outright censorship, however, it is hard to imagine how legislation can reduce sensationalism and exaggeration in the media.

\textsuperscript{22} M. J. Melnick, 1986
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22 M. J. Melnick, 1986
Racism and football fans

6.1 Introduction  
Racism is a problem for football across Europe and is an important factor in the problem of football hooliganism itself. The actual extent of racism is virtually impossible to measure as detailed statistics in this context are almost non-existent. Nevertheless, acts of football disorder, especially on the international scene, have frequently been referred to as ‘racist’, or perpetrated by racist groups, and some clubs are now viewed as having an inherently racist support.

In this section the various forms of racism will be considered, with emphasis on the role of extreme right-wing groups, as these have frequently been reported to be involved in football-related violence. The various campaigns and schemes designed to combat racism will also be considered.

The first professional black player in Britain is believed to have been Arthur Wharton, who signed for Darlington FC in 1889. Nowadays, a black player is by no means unusual. In fact, around 25% of professional players are black. However, in the 1993/94 season Carling survey of Premier League fans, only 1% of fans described themselves as ‘non-white’. It is argued that this is due to a prevalence of racism amongst traditional soccer fans.

In an attempt to redress the problem, the Campaign for Racial Equality (CRE), the Football Supporters Association (FSA) and the Professional Footballers Association (PFA) have all launched initiatives to try and rid football grounds of racism and encourage more people from ethnic minorities to attend matches. Their techniques and levels of success will be discussed later, but let us start by examining the actual types of racism that exist in football stadiums.

6.2 Forms of Racism  
Racist chanting and abuse from the terraces was arguably at its worst in the 1970s and 1980s, when football players from around the world began to join the English league. Racist chanting in the terraces often took the form of members of the crowd making monkey noises at black players on the pitch. Other abuse has been more specific. For example, after the Deptford fire in 1981 when 13 black youths were burnt to death, a chant that could be heard at Millwall was:

“*We all agree*

*Niggers burn better than petrol*”
Anti-Semitic chants have also been heard. Tottenham Hotspur supporters have often been the target for this:

“Those yids from Tottenham
The gas man’s got them
Oh those yids from White Hart Lane”

Other chants are more closely linked to patriotism and as such the national team:

“Stand by the Union Jack
Send those niggers back
If you’re white, you’re alright
If you’re black, send ‘em back”

The 1991 Football (Offences) Act made racist chanting at football matches unlawful, but is largely inadequate as chanting is defined as the “repeated uttering of any words or sounds in concert with one or more others”. As a result an individual shouting racist abuse on his own can only be charged under the 1986 Public Order Act for using “obscene and foul language at football grounds”. This loophole has allowed several offenders to escape conviction for racism at football matches.

The level of influence that far-right groups have amongst football fans is a highly debatable issue but over the years they have been present in many football grounds across Britain. Garland and Rowe suggest that far-right groups have targeted football fans since at least the 1930s, when the British Union of Fascists tried to attract the young working class male supporters into their brigade of uniformed ‘stewards’. In the 1950s the White Defence League sold their newspaper Black and White News at football grounds in London.

It was the 1970s, however, that saw far-right groups rise to prominence as the problem of football hooliganism grew in the national conscience. The National Front (NF) was the most active group in the 1970s, giving regular coverage in its magazine Bulldog to football and encouraging hooligan groups to compete for the title of ‘most racist ground in Britain’. Copies of Bulldog were openly sold at many clubs and, at West Ham, club memorabilia was sold doctored with NF slogans. Chelsea, Leeds United, Millwall, Newcastle United and Arsenal, as well as West Ham United, were all seen as having strong fascist elements in the 1970s and 1980s. After the Heysel stadium tragedy when a wall collapsed killing 39 people fleeing from Liverpool fans, British National Party leaflets were found on the terraces.

1 J. Garland, and M. Rowe, 1996
It seems that in the 1990s, however, the problem is waning. It is now uncommon to see the open selling of far-right literature or memorabilia at football matches and an incident such as the John Barnes one would be unlikely to happen now. But this does not mean to say that the problem has gone away, especially amongst the support for the English national side. During the 1980s, far-right groups were often in attendance at England’s matches abroad. Williams and his colleagues\(^2\) identified a presence of NF members in the English support, especially amongst the Chelsea contingent, at the 1982 World Cup in Spain.

As recently as 1995, far-right groups have been involved in disturbances abroad, namely at the England vs. Republic of Ireland ‘friendly’ match at Lansdowne Road, Dublin when fights between rival fans caused the game to be abandoned after half an hour. Supporters of the British National Party (BNP) and a militant group called Combat 18 were said to have been involved after racist literature was found at the scene. Anti Republican chanting could clearly be heard at the match and some claim that the violence was actually orchestrated by an umbrella group called the National Socialist Alliance.

The attractions of football matches to far-right groups are obvious. Football grounds provide a useful platform for the groups to make their voices heard. From them their views can be directed into millions of homes. It also seems as if football grounds can be a means to recruit young support. As Dave Robins\(^3\) points out:

> "The hard-man, though, lives in a more dangerous and unchanging world. Permanently sensitised to ‘trouble’ in his environment, his paranoid fantasies about defending his ‘patch’ against outsiders make him ripe for manipulation by the politics of the extreme right”

Their actual influence amongst club support, however, is believed by many to be minimal, a view held by the National Football Intelligence Unit:\(^4\)

> "We are aware that certain right-wing parties have been looking at football hooligans because they see them as an organised group and try to recruit them for this purpose with, I have to say, fairly limited success ... It has been seen as an opportunity by many, but I don’t think it has been a dramatic success, there is no evidence for that.”

\(^2\) J. Williams et al, 1984
\(^3\) D. Robins, 1984
\(^4\) J. Garland, and M. Rowe, 1996
Some debate also exists as to whether right-wing groups deliberately target soccer fans as recruits or whether soccer fans are drawn into the groups because of the opportunities they offer for violence. Robins is drawn towards the former argument, citing the leafleting campaigns of the 1980s, while David Canter argues that the right-wing groups merely cash in on soccer violence, rather than instigate it. One would have to conclude that there are elements of truth in both theories.

### 6.3 Anti-racism initiatives

Recent years have seen a number of attempts by various groups and organisations to combat racism in football. These have come from the club level, supporter level and from organisational bodies such as the Campaign for Racial Equality (CRE), the Professional Footballers Association (PFA) and the Football Supporters Association (FSA).

In 1993 the CRE and PFA launched the *Let's Kick Racism Out of Football* campaign, “with the aim of highlighting anti-racist and equal opportunities messages within the context of football”.

It aimed to encourage clubs and supporters groups to launch their own campaigns to combat racism at their clubs. A ten point action plan was laid out for clubs:

1. Issue a statement saying that the club will not tolerate racism, and will take action against supporters who engage in racist abuse, racist chanting or intimidation.
2. Make public announcements condemning any racist chanting at matches, and warning supporters that the club will not hesitate to take action.
3. Make it a condition for season ticket holders that they do not take part in racist abuse, racist chanting or any other offensive behaviour.
4. Prevent the sale or distribution of racist literature in and around the ground on match-days.
5. Take disciplinary action against players who make racially abusive remarks at players, officials or supporters before, during or after matches.
6. Contact other clubs to make sure they understand the club’s policy on racism.
7. Make sure stewards and the police understand the problem and the club’s policy, and have a common strategy for removing or dealing with supporters who are abusive and breaking the law on football offences.
8. Remove all racist graffiti from the ground as a matter of urgency.

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5  D. Canter *et al.* 1989
6  J. Garland, and M. Rowe, 1996
9. Adopt an equal opportunities policy to cover employment and service provision.

10. Work with other groups and agencies – such as the police, the local authority, the PFA, the supporters, schools, etc. – to develop initiatives to raise awareness of the campaign and eliminate racist abuse and discrimination.

The campaign stated that:

“If football is to be played and enjoyed equally by everyone, whatever the colour of their skin, and wherever they come from, it is up to us all, each and every one of us, to refuse to tolerate racist attitudes, and to demand nothing less than the highest standards in every area of the game.”

A magazine, *Kick It!*, was produced with funding from the Football Trust and 110,000 copies of a fanzine, *United Colours of Football*, were given out free at grounds across the country on the opening day of the 1994/95 season.

Initial reaction to the scheme was not entirely positive. Some thought that it may only serve to bring negative publicity to the game, by highlighting the problem of racism in football. Others claimed that racism was not a problem at their ground and therefore they had no need for such a campaign. Despite this, the first season of the campaign had the support of all but one of the professional clubs and all professional authorities.

In a survey conducted by Garland and Rowe in December 1994, 49 fanzine editors from a wide range of clubs were asked to comment on levels of racism at their club. Many were skeptical about the success of *Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football*, with only 32% citing the campaign as a factor in the perceived decrease in racism at football matches in the last five years.

Garland and Rowe suggest that this lack of support may stem from mistaken expectations of the campaign. As mentioned earlier, the aim of the CRE and PFA was to encourage clubs to launch their own initiatives, rather than control the whole campaign themselves. In this sense it has been largely successful, as it prompted many clubs to launch their own campaigns.

The most ambitious of these have been Derby County’s scheme *Rams Against Racism* and Charlton Athletic’s *Red, White and Black at the Valley*. Derby County went so far as to dedicate a home match day in 1994 to the cause of combating racism after liaisons between club officials, the club’s Football and Community Development Officer and the Racial Equality Council. Anti-racist banners were displayed, campaign messages printed in the match day programme and players involved. Two-hundred and fifty free tickets were also given out to local children. A long term aim of the scheme was to encourage the local Asian community to attend more games as well as encouraging local Asian footballing talent.
Red, White and Black at the Valley was a leaflet launched by Charlton Athletic in conjunction with the police, the local Racial Equality Council, Greenwich Council and the supporters club. The aim was to present Charlton Athletic as being a club that people from all disadvantaged minorities could come and watch without fear of harassment from other supporters. After the leaflet had been distributed the club continued by producing posters and issuing statements in the programmes. Players also visited local schools and colleges.

Garland and Rowe point out that it is difficult to calculate how effective these schemes have been, although a drive by the police (acting on a tip-off from the club) was successful in removing racist fans from one end of the Valley ground.

The first fan-based group set up specifically to fight racism was Leeds Fans United Against Racism And Fascism (LFUARAF). This was formed in 1987 to combat the influence of far-right groups at Elland Road, especially the most visible displays of paper selling etc. The first step was to distribute anti-racist leaflets outside the ground, then in 1988 it contributed to Terror On Our Terraces, a report on the involvement of the far-right amongst the Leeds crowd. This prompted the club to recognise the problem and they issued an anti-racist statement signed by both management and players. Within a few months the number of far-right paper sellers decreased significantly and the campaign is still active today.

In Scotland, supporters have formed a national campaign to combat racism in football. SCARF (Supporters’ Campaign Against Racism in Football) was formed in 1991 in response to an increase in far-right activity at Scottish grounds, mainly involving the BNP. Most of the campaign consists of leafleting the worst affected grounds, Rangers and Hearts being two examples, but it has not been without its problems. As well as- one female campaigner being threatened and others abused, SCARF say that they have had a problem in getting clubs and officials to recognise that there is a problem at all.
Fanzines started in the mid 1980s and have offered an alternative, positive view of football fans in the post-Heysel era. Now almost every club has at least one fanzine and Garland and Rowe claim that these are almost exclusively anti-racist. Some are actually produced by anti-racist groups themselves such as *Marching Altogether* (LFUARAF) and *Filbo Fever* (Leicester City Foxes Against Racism). Other clubs whose fanzines actively support anti-racism campaigns include Everton, Celtic, Manchester United, Cardiff City, Leyton Orient and Chelsea. One criticism levelled at fanzines is that they are simply preaching to the converted as the fans who buy them will already be anti-racist. Nevertheless, fanzines have enjoyed increasing popularity over the last few years which should be recognised as a positive sign and the LFUARAF recognises this problem and for this purpose gives away *Marching Altogether* free at matches.

The CRE and PFA also believe that the ‘civilisation’ of football grounds – seating, family enclosures, executive boxes etc. – will encourage more blacks and Asians to attend football matches. They may be right but this has not occurred yet in England. Every football ground in the Premier League is now all-seater yet, as mentioned before, white people constitute 99% of the attendance.

### 6.4 The European dimension

Throughout Europe, racism figures prominently in football related violence. Neo-nazi and neo-fascist groups target football grounds in Europe in the same way as their English equivalents do here. Among the worst affected clubs are Lazio and AC Milan in Italy, Paris Saint-Germain in France, and Real Madrid and Espagnole in Spain.

In Italy, a Jewish player, Ronnie Rosenthal, was unable to play even one game for Udinese because of massive pressure from neo-fascist circles and Aaron Winter, a native of Suriname of Hindustani extraction was subject to attacks at Lazio involving cries of ‘Niggers and Jews Out’. More recently, Paul Ince, a black English player for Inter Milan, has expressed his anger at the way he has been treated by the Italian fans.

Germany has one of the worst reputations in Europe for far-right influence amongst its fans, with frequent displays of Hitler salutes, particularly at international matches. Professor Volker Rittner of the Sports Sociology Institute in Cologne, however, believes that these are no more than provocative displays designed to get the fans into the papers, but some reports of right-wing activity in Germany have been disturbing. In 1990 there were reports of skinheads barracking the small number of black players in the Bundesliga and in 1992 similar reports were made of neo-nazi groups in Germany using football matches as occasions to plan and organise attacks against local ethnic communities and East European refugees. An analysis of the political attitudes of German fans revealed that 20% feel close to neo-nazis. Whilst it is not clear how active these fans would be, this is nonetheless a disturbing figure.
Some European countries have initiated similar schemes to the British Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football campaign. The Netherlands uses the motto When Racism Wins, the Sport Loses which is displayed on posters at train stations and at tram and bus stops. Players in the Netherlands even went on strike in protest against racism. Players have also led the way in Italy by threatening to walk off the pitch if black players continued to be abused by racists. This resulted in a day of action in December 1992 when all players in the top two divisions displayed the slogan No Al Razzismo! (No To Racism). In Switzerland, footballers from the national team are involved in ‘street football’ competitions for young people, held in a different town each weekend.

A more general campaign is the All Different – All Equal campaign against racism, xenophobia and intolerance, organised by the Council of Europe. Football players from many countries have been involved, most notably in Sweden where the national team appeared in a short video, shown several times on national TV, to promote the campaign.

6.5 Conclusion

Although actual levels of racism are extremely hard to quantify and statistics thin on the ground, it seems apparent that the last decade has seen a reduction in the levels of racism at football matches in England. Garland and Rowe’s survey revealed that 84% of the fanzine editors who responded felt that levels of racism had decreased over the past five years, with over half of these claiming a significant decline. Only 6% felt that racism had increased during this time. Garland and Rowe also claim that this view was backed up by nearly all of the administrators, players and officials interviewed in addition to the survey.

The role of fan-based groups and the growth of fanzine culture were the two most cited reasons for the decline in racism, although this may not be surprising given that the respondents were all fanzine editors. Perhaps more important, therefore, is the fact that 57% believed that the increase in the number of black players was a major factor for the decrease in racism.

As mentioned earlier, only a third of the respondents felt that the campaigns by the CRE and the FSA were a factor. Nevertheless, all of the respondents were aware of the Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football Campaign and 44% felt that it had raised public awareness of the problem.

As Garland and Rowe point out, however, less public forms of racism may still be present and support for the national team seems still to have distinct racist factions to it, as last year’s Lansdowne Road disturbance indicated. In any case, the lack of support from ethnic minorities suggests that clubs, authorities and fans still need to go a long way in convincing people that they will not encounter racism at football grounds.
Racism in other parts of Europe does not look as if it is decreasing and in some parts may be increasing. In Germany, the neo-nazi and neo-fascist movements continue to increase their support and the Front National in France, led by Jean Marie Le Pen, holds public support across the board, football supporters being no exception.

The issue of racism in football has been raised this year in a report to the European Parliament on football hooliganism, drafted by the German Green Group MEP Claudia Roth and presented in April. (See also Section 8) The committee was said to be:

“... shocked at the racist demonstrations and attacks perpetrated on players who are black or Jewish or come from different national or ethnic backgrounds”

and

“... concerned at the ways in which extremist organisations deliberately exploit violence connected with sport including the manipulation and infiltration of hooligan groups”.

The report goes on to suggest that players should take an active role in combating racism by refusing to play if “violent, racist, xenophobic or anti-Semitic behaviour” occurs. It also calls for a Europe-wide ban on any racist or xenophobic symbols being displayed at football matches. Perhaps most importantly, the report calls for a European day of anti-racism and fair play in sport to be held throughout Europe in 1997 (the European Year Against Racism) and involving sports personalities to help promote the campaign.

According to the Labour MEP Glyn Ford (Kick It Again, 1995), UEFA has so-far not adopted any specific measures to combat racism in football. They argue that their ‘Fair Play’ scheme is adequate in tackling the problem. In this, behaviour both on and off the field is evaluated, and negative marks are given for racist chanting or the display of racist slogans. At the end of the season the three national associations with the best records are awarded an extra place in the UEFA Cup for one of their clubs. Whilst this may provide some sort of incentive for fans not to be racist, critics argue that this is not enough.

In an international context, the media, in particular the English tabloid press, it is argued, play a part in encouraging racism and xenophobia at football matches (see Section 5 for further explanation) and this was also recognised in the European Parliament report. In the report's explanatory statement the committee states that the media frequently present international matches as ‘warlike confrontations’ which thus give rise to jingoism and sometimes acts of violence. The committee recommends that the media should endeavour to bring the sporting aspect back into sport.
While one must recognise that the problem of racism is different in each country, a Europe-wide initiative to combat the problem must surely be welcomed.
7 Football violence and alcohol

Little research on football hooliganism has included a specific focus on the role of alcohol. Work by John Williams\(^1\) and Richard Giulianotti\(^2\) includes discussion of the possible ‘aggravating’ effects in the case of English and Scottish fans, but few empirical data are presented concerning consumption rates or specific effects of alcohol. For most researchers and theorists, the issue of alcohol is, at best, peripheral and in Italian work it is, as we might expect, not considered at all.

7.1 The ‘alcohol-violence connection’

This is in stark contrast to media coverage of football fan behaviour, particularly in the UK. Here ‘drunkenness’ is by far the most often reported cause of violent disorder, even in circumstances where there is no evidence of excessive drinking. In line with this populist view, most official enquiries into football hooliganism have dwelt on the ‘problem’ of alcohol and urged its restriction at football matches. Even government sponsored publications concerning Crime Prevention Initiatives include sweeping conclusions about the ‘dangers’ of alcohol consumption by football fans:

> “Some offences are alcohol-related by definition – drink-driving for example. But these are by no means the only ones where alcohol plays a large part. Public disorder, including football hooliganism and vandalism is particularly associated with it.”

Controls on the availability of alcohol at football matches have now existed for some time in Britain\(^3\) and the European Parliament has recently included a Europe-wide ban on alcohol in its recommendations. Much of the EP debate, however, was driven by British and German MEPs and it is clear that alcohol is seen as a significant factor in this context only by northern Europeans.

\(^{1}\) J. Williams et al., 1984

\(^{2}\) R. Giulianotti, 1994b

\(^{3}\) e.g. Football (Offences) Act 1991
Consideration of the association between drinking and football hooliganism lies within a much broader debate concerning the role of alcohol in the generation of violent and criminal behaviour. This issue has been reviewed at length in other publications and we will not dwell here on the complexities of the issue.\(^4\) It is clear, however, that the perceived alcohol-violence connection is primarily restricted to Northern European and Anglo Saxon cultures. Elsewhere in the world quite contrary perceptions exist. Where alcohol can be shown to have a direct impact on levels of aggression and anti-social behaviour, the effect is largely mediated by immediate social factors and more general, pervasive cultural expectations.

### 7.2 Culture and alcohol

The cultural nature of the relationship between alcohol and football is evident from a rare ‘natural experiment’ involving Aston Villa fans attending a European Cup Final against Bayern Munich in the Feyenoord Stadium in Rotterdam. This took place in 1982 at a time when concern about the drinking behaviour of English fans was at a peak. The bar at the back of the terraces occupied by Villa fans served lager which, unknown to them, was alcohol-free. (Bayern fans had access to ‘normal’ lager). John Williams comments on this ‘trick’ in *Hooligans Abroad*:

“... Villa supporters who made the endless trek back and forth to the bars, carrying six cartons with the aid of a specially designed cardboard tray, believed themselves to be en route to getting well and truly ‘steaming’... To get drunk in the Villa end that night, one would need to drink more than the ‘lager’ on sale to English fans. What officials later described as the ‘big con’ was in full swing. While fans in other sections of the ground were sinking the real thing, Villa fans were the subject of a non-alcoholic delusion.”\(^5\)

### 7.3 Ambivalence about alcohol

While most observers of this ‘con’ noted with interest the apparently ‘drunken’ behaviour of Villa fans, Williams is more ambivalent about the extent to which the effects of alcohol are psychologically mediated. He suggests, for example, that the drunkenness in some cases might have been ‘real’ and due to drinking prior to the game – a suggestion for which he offers no evidence. Elsewhere in Williams’ writing the ambivalence concerning alcohol is replaced with self-contradictory stances. Take, for example, his view expressed at a conference in 1989:

“We are regularly told that it is drink which releases the full force of this natural wickedness, and that curbs on drinking will bottle it up. Someone should inform the Danes and the Irish of these findings. Supporters from these countries were among the most drunken and the most friendly fans in West Germany. The message

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\(^4\) See, for example, P. Marsh and K. Fox, 1992; M. Sumner and H. Parker, 1995

\(^5\) J. Williams, 1984
might also reach UEFA who sanctioned a major brewer as the Championships’ sponsor!”

This dismissal of the relevance of alcohol by Williams is followed, three years later, by a non sequitur call for restrictions on the availability of alcohol to British fans abroad:

“We recommend that for the foreseeable future, and with the support of the continental authorities concerned, an alcohol ban should operate for all England matches on the continent.”

Other inconsistencies are evident in Williams’ work and it is, perhaps, ironic that he should make such recommendations given his insistence that football violence derives from deeply entrenched social factors within British society rather than from immediate situational or psychological processes. (See Section 3.7)

7.4 The roligans

The Danish fans, about whose ‘drunken but friendly’ behaviour Williams makes favourable comment, are an interesting example. The Danish ‘Roligans’ are fanatical football supporters who are renowned for their levels of beer consumption. They are also Northern European and might be expected, therefore, to be among those for whom group drinking sessions often end in belligerence and fighting. Their conduct, however, is quite different from that associated with English fans and, to a lesser extent with their German and Dutch contemporaries. The analysis provided by Eichberg of the Danish Sport Research Institute sums up their distinctiveness succinctly:

“The roligan displays a feature which links him with his counterpart, the hooligan: excessive alcohol consumption. English, Irish and Danish fans compete for the position of being the most drunk – yet fundamentally different behaviour patterns arise. Where the heavy drinking of English hooligans impels aggression and violence, the roligan is characterised by the absence of violence and companionable cheerfulness.”

The behaviour of Danish fans at Euro ‘96, has also been the subject of much favourable comment by the media and the police. Commenting on the amusing and good-natured antics of the Danes in Sheffield, Cathy Cassell and Jon Rea noted:

“Such characteristics endeared Sheffieldders towards them. No matter how much lager they consumed, and how badly the team performed, the atmosphere wherever they congregated was nothing short of a party. The city did well out of it ... Numerous pubs ran dry. The police and council officials expressed their amazement that such amounts of beer could be consumed by so many football supporters with no trouble at all.”

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6 J. Williams, 1992b
7 H. Eichberg, 1992:124
8 C. Cassell and J. Rea, 1996:26
The ‘surprise’ expressed by the police about the good-natured drunkenness of Danish fans is understandable given their assumptions about alcohol and hooliganism in the UK. We should note, however, that the police are less ready to blame drink than some newspaper reports have suggested. A study was conducted of the views of Police Commanders who were responsible for crowd control at all 92 English League clubs. They were asked “How serious an influence is heavy drinking in contributing to football-related disorder in your town?”. Concerning Home fans, only 11% saw it as being the ‘single most serious influence’, while a further 20% rated it as ‘serious’. Almost half of the Commanders felt that alcohol was an influence, but not a serious one, while the remainder felt that it was not an influence at all. Their views regarding visiting Away fans, however, were a little different. Here 18% felt that alcohol was the most significant influence while 35% rated it as serious.

These are, of course, views rather than empirical facts and based upon, we presume, observations that many fans in the UK, and away fans in particular, tend to consume alcohol prior to engaging in acts of hooliganism. Despite the implicit assumptions, however, this does not mean that acts of hooliganism would necessarily be less frequent if alcohol were less readily available, or likely to increase in frequency when drinking levels were higher.

Take, for example, the extensions to licensing hours in Manchester and elsewhere during Euro ‘96. At the time Commander John Purnell, head of policing for the championships, was concerned about such ‘liberalising’ of drinking: “History shows that a tiny minority will drink more than they can handle and, while under the influence of alcohol, will behave badly.” The Home Secretary, Michael Howard, also joined the debate, claiming that the magistrates and Licensing Justices in Manchester were acting “incongruously and inappropriately”.

The fears of Commander Purnell and Michael Howard were largely unfounded. There were very few reported incidences of trouble during the tournament. The only event of significance took place in London, where licenses had not been extended.

Increasing restrictions on the availability of alcohol at football matches may not only be inappropriate but possibly have negative side-effects. There is increasing evidence that such restrictions are already prompting some fans to substitute a variety of drugs for lager. John Williams has already noted an increase in the use of cannabis as a direct consequence of the potential penalties for being in possession of alcohol in a British football stadium. Others note the increased use of MDMA (ecstasy) in such contexts. Evidence of a more concrete kind concerning unanticipated effects of restrictions comes from a study in the United States, the implications of which are generalisable to other countries and settings. Boyes and Faith conducted a detailed study of the impact of a ban on alcohol at
(American) football games at Arizona State University. They hypothesised that such a ban would lead to ‘intertemporal’ substitution of the consumption of alcohol – i.e. fans would increase their consumption immediately prior to, and after leaving the football games. Such substitution, they argued could more more damaging than the effects which might arise from intoxication within the stadium and such negative consequences could be measured in, for example, increased numbers of fans driving before and after the match while over the legal BAC limit. The authors argued that there were three reasons to expect such a consequence:

“First, alcohol in the body does not dissipate quickly ... Thus the effects of increased drinking in the period prior to the regulated period may carry over into the regulated period. Second, the level of intoxication, during any period depends on the rate of consumption as well as the volume. Thus, even if there is not a one-for-one substitution of consumption from the restricted period to the adjacent unregulated periods, average intoxication taken over the adjacent and unregulated periods can increase. Third, studies indicate that the probability of having a traffic accident increases at an increasing level of intoxication. Thus, the social costs of drinking and driving in the unregulated periods may increase.”

Boyes and Faith examined police data concerning alcohol-related driving accidents, detected DWI (Driving while intoxicated) cases and other measures for the periods before and after the restrictions on alcohol in the stadium. They found significant increases of up to 40% in blood alcohol concentrations in drivers stopped by the police. This is despite an increase in the penalties for DWI and an increase in the legal driving age in the postban period.

The implications of this study are very relevant to restrictions on alcohol at British football stadiums. They also suggest that the recent proposals from European Parliament committees for a Europe-wide ban on alcohol at football matches may be misguided. If alcohol is a significant determinant of anti-social behaviour, directly or indirectly, the effects of intertemporal substitution of drinking, which alcohol bans are likely to generate, will tend to increase the likelihood of aggression both prior to and shortly after the games. Such behaviour, of course, is also likely to occur outside of the stadiums where, it is more difficult to police and control.

7.7 The case of the Scots

If total bans on alcohol at football games are inappropriate, for the reasons discussed above, alternative means need to be explored for modifying alcohol-related behaviour among football fans, and English fans in particular. This may seem an impossible prospect. The change in the behaviour of Scottish fans, however, is of interest in this context. We noted earlier in Section 3 that although Scottish fans are often ‘heavy’ consumers of alcohol, the belligerent

9 W.J. Boyes and R.L. Faith, 1993:596
behaviour which used to be associated with their drinking has changed quite substantially over the last ten to fifteen years. As Giulianotti \(^{10}\) has noted, the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act of 1980, which prohibits the possession of alcohol at, or in transit to, a football match, has done little to dent the degree to which alcohol is very much part of the football experience. Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that the ‘drunkenness’ of Scottish fans now presents far less of a threat to law and order than it might once have done.

This transformation of Scottish fan behaviour, according to Giulianotti, has come about through their desire to distance themselves from their English rivals and to present an image of themselves throughout Europe as the ‘friendly’ supporters. In pursuit of this aim the meaning of alcohol has been substantially altered and now, instead of being a precursor to aggression and fights, is the ‘liquid’ facilitation of positive social affect and good humour.

Although some ‘traditional’ drunken fighting remains among Scottish fan groups, the majority seem to have moved away from the English ‘hooligan’ model to one which is more characteristic of the Danish roligans. If this radical change of behaviour can occur among the Scots, without any apparent decline in their consumption levels, then we must assume that similar shifts are possible in English fan culture. While drinking among Dutch and German fans generally presents less of a problem, we might also anticipate the possibility of further change in these groups as well.

7.8 The new research direction?

In this context, the calls for further restrictions on alcohol at football matches throughout Europe, such as those recently proposed by the European Parliament, may be inappropriate and, in line with Boyes and Faith, counter-productive. We feel that it is more appropriate to direct attention towards the ways in which alcohol-related behaviours, rather than consumption levels, may be moderated among football fan groups. It is in this area, we believe, that research activity and policy development might be most profitably be directed.

\(^{10}\) R. Giulianotti, 1995
Football violence in Europe
8 Tackling football violence

8.1 Introduction  The United Kingdom is perceived by virtually all observers in Europe, and by football fans themselves, as having had the earliest and most most severe problems with football hooliganism. Certainly, it is the only nation to have received a blanket expulsion from all European Football competitions – a ban that was initially made for an indefinite period following the Heysel Stadium tragedy in which 39 Juventus fans died when a wall collapsed after clashes with Liverpool supporters.

It is perhaps because of this unenviable record that the United Kingdom has taken the lead in the development of control measures to deal with hooliganism. These measures are closely examined in the first part of this chapter, where we trace the various strategies adopted by the British police, as well as the legislative responses of the British government. As we shall see, the various strategies and responses have been primarily reactive and, increasingly, have been influenced (if not entirely led) by technological developments, such as the use of closed-circuit television and computer databases.

Such advances have certainly helped the flourishing collaboration between the member states of Europe in tackling hooliganism. The European Parliament, however, has become increasingly concerned about the use of such technology, particularly in relation to the issue of the free movement of individuals across member state boundaries.

Finally, the chapter focuses on some of the more proactive responses to football hooliganism. In particular, we look at the phenomenon of the ‘fan projects’, which originated in Germany in the seventies and which have been swiftly imitated by many other countries in Europe, including Belgium and The Netherlands.
8.2 Policing football hooliganism

The principal difficulty for the police in dealing with football hooliganism has been in differentiating between the hooligan and the ordinary football supporter. This difficulty led to the police developing a system whereby all fans were contained, both inside the ground and in travelling to the ground. At the same time, the second primary strategy of the police was the undercover operation: an attempt to ascertain who exactly the hooligans were.

8.2.1 The undercover operation

The English Football Association recommended that plain clothes officers be used in the domestic game as far back as the mid-sixties and requests for the police to infiltrate travelling supporters with plain clothes officers were also made by the Football Association in 1981. The belief of the police (torridly supported by the media) by the 1980s was that football hooligans had transformed themselves from an ill-organised mob into highly-organised forces with a complex network of hierarchies. Officers were given new identities and instructed to live the life of a hooligan and mingle with other hooligans. These tactics resulted in the launch of numerous early morning raids on the homes of suspected football hooligans from around March 1986. Armstrong and Hobbs detail a familiar pattern in the arrest and charging of suspects in these raids.

8.2.2 Hooligan gangs

The suspects would generally be part of an organised gang that had apparently caused mayhem throughout the country; they would have a ‘calling-card’ which would normally be displayed on or left beside their victim; they would have used an array of weaponry (which the police nearly always displayed to the media in the post-arrest briefing) and they would often possess incriminating literature (although on one occasion, this included a copy of an academic book on football hooligans entitled *Hooligans Abroad*).

8.2.3 Charges and convictions

On most occasions, individuals arrested in these raids were charged with conspiracy to cause affray or conspiracy to commit violence, with what they had said to the police and what the police had found in their homes being used as the primary evidence against them. Many of the raids resulted in high-profile trials and convictions. (e.g. The eighteen-week trial of four Chelsea fans which cost over £2 million and resulted in sentences including one of ten years). But many also failed in sometimes dramatic circumstances, with the reliability of evidence being intensely disputed and the behaviour of undercover officers severely condemned.

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8.2.4 Containment and escort

A common sight in the seventies (and for much of the eighties) was that of the police escorting visiting supporters from railway and coach stations to and from the ground. Fans were literally surrounded by police, some on horseback and others with police dogs. In contrast, the nineties has seen the use of the less confrontational tactic of posting officers at specified points en route to the ground.

This is, perhaps, more to do with the recent circumstances of away fans than with the police entirely changing their tactics. It has certainly been the case that travelling away support has dwindled, to the extent that the familiar en masse arrival of football fans at British Rail stations around the country on a Saturday lunchtime is, perhaps, a sight of the past.

8.2.5 Police criticism

The police, however, have still been heavily criticised in some quarters for an over-zealous approach in dealing with travelling supporters, such as conducting unnecessary searches of coaches for alcohol and even searching supporters’ belongings in their absence, though in a recent fan survey, only 20.7% of supporters disagreed with the use of police escorts, stressing their use as effective protection for away fans.

8.2.6 Inside the ground

The visiting (or ‘away’) fans were invariably herded into grounds via separate turnstiles and into areas where they were segregated from the home support. These isolationist operations were often emphasised by a line of police officers separating the home and away fans in a sort of “no man’s land” and by the high metal fences which surrounded these fan pens, an attempt to prevent fans from spilling onto the football pitch itself.

The police have also been commonly used at the turnstile. Traditionally, this has been a law-enforcement role, with the emphasis on preventing illegal entry into the ground, enforcing exclusion orders and searching supporters for weapons and other prohibited articles.

But they have also been used by clubs to enforce club policy and ground regulations, such as enforcing club bans and membership schemes and deterring fraud by turnstile operators. More recently, the role of the Steward has come to the fore at football grounds, which has partly relieved the responsibilities of the police in this area.

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3 R. Taylor, 1992
4 N. Middleham and J. Williams, 1993
5 P. Harrison, 1974
6 J. Williams et al, 1989
8.2.7 Police tactics at grounds

While the use of en masse containment alongside covert detective operations has been the basic pattern of policing football hooliganism, police tactics can vary considerably at individual football grounds, as indeed they do on other matters. Such tactics can depend on various factors including the prospective size of the crowd, the relative profile of the particular match, the reputation of the supporters involved and the priorities of the local force involved.7

The inconsistencies between different police forces in their approach to dealing with football supporters was highlighted in The Home Office Affairs Committee report, Policing Football Hooliganism (1991) which recognised that:

“... different police forces and, within police forces, the different police Commanders were inconsistent. A variety of witnesses complained of these inconsistencies. The FSA [Football Supporters Association] told us that ‘acceptable behaviour at one ground could be an arrestable offence at another’ ... [and] different Ground Commanders had different approaches to policing the same ground”.

8.2.8 The decline of the ‘away’ fan

In the Premier league in particular, demand for tickets has risen considerably while ground capacities have declined across the board due to the introduction of all-seater stadia. The expanding interest in football has also led to an increasing commercial interest in the game and, subsequently, an increase in corporate facilities to the detriment of the traditional fan. For example, 14,000 corporate guests were present at the England versus Scotland match during the Euro '96 championships8.

Thus, there is now less room for the away fans than ever before, with clubs obviously favouring their own home support above that of away fans. Six out of ten of the national sample of FA Premier League fans said that they would travel to more games if more tickets were made available to them.9

It could be suggested that policing at football grounds has been made easier by the decline of away support. However, the past tendency of fans towards en masse travelling when away from home has been replaced by a proclivity towards independent travel, which is, perhaps, more difficult to police. Group travel still occurs and the police regularly escort away fans in coaches, via specified rendezvous points. Indeed, the Traffic Commissioner has outlined specific guidelines to the police on dealing with the travel arrangements of fans, such as recommending that coaches should arrive at the ground no more than two hours before the designated kick-off time.

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8 When Saturday Comes, August 1996
9 J. Williams, 1995
8.2.9 The Steward

The nineties has also seen a shift away from using police to control fans inside the ground, with clubs relying more and more on Stewards, employed by the clubs themselves. This is certainly the principal reason why the ratio of police to fans has declined from 1:74 in 1985 to 1:132 in 1992. Indeed, Scarborough Football Club played most of their home games without a single police officer inside the ground. Other, more high-profile clubs, such as Aston Villa, Chelsea and Leicester City are increasingly relying on Stewards to police the stadium.

Police officers can only eject individuals from grounds if they are breaking the law, whereas Stewards can follow a particular club’s agenda and eject people for breaking club and ground rules. The Home Office report on policing football (1993) recommends that the police leave the task of ejecting supporters to the Stewards. But the ability of Stewards to deal with disorder inside grounds has been severely questioned, not least by the Channel Four programme Dispatches in October 1994. There is also evidence suggesting the disposition of Stewards towards the home fans and

“... on rare occasions stewards have provocatively celebrated home goals in front of the away fans and even attacked them”

8.2.10 Training of Stewards

There is no national standard for the training of Stewards in crowd control and spectator safety or, indeed, any legislative requirement that clubs should provide such training for Stewards. The Taylor Report highlighted the lack of training for Stewards and Garland and Rowe further suggest that Stewards do not have the traditional authority that the police possess.

“As crowd safety is increasingly handed over to football club Safety Officers, these [Police] skills will need to be passed on to avert future tragedies ... where the responsibility for public safety is handed over to Stewards, the police should ensure that adequate training and briefing has taken place.”

8.2.11 Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) and hand-held cameras

CCTV was introduced into football grounds around the middle of the 1980s and is now present in almost every Premier and football league ground. The effectiveness of such camera surveillance has also been improved by the introduction of all-seater stadia across the country. Certainly, the results of fan surveys suggest that the introduction of CCTV is, for the most part, welcomed by supporters. Indeed, the Home Office report (1993) states that

“...football supporters are probably more accustomed to being subjected to camera surveillance than most other groups in society.”

10 Home Office, 1993
11 J. Garland and M. Rowe 1996
12 P. Taylor, 1990
13 J. Garland and M. Rowe 1996
Another technological feature of police tactics at football grounds is the use of hand-held video cameras, with police filming supporters, primarily in a bid to deter violence, gather intelligence and monitor the efficacy of crowd control.¹⁴

8.2.12 The Photophone

A further technological advance was the ‘photophone’ system that allowed the police to exchange photographs of football hooligans from CCTV and other sources via telephone and computer links, allowing vital information to be readily available to the police on matchdays.

8.2.13 The Hoolivan

Advances in technology have also aided the police in both overt and covert surveillance operations. The Hoolivan was launched at the beginning of the season that followed the plethora of incidents in the spring of 1985.²⁵ This hi-tech item of machinery enabled police to maintain radio contact with all officers inside and outside the ground and to be linked with the CCTV cameras in and around the stadium.

The Hoolivan tended to be used at high-profile matches or when the police were concerned about a particular set of supporters. During Euro ’96, Greater Manchester police used a Hoolivan known as the ‘skyhawk’, which contained nine hydraulic cameras, each of which could be raised up to thirty feet in height.

8.2.14 1985: Bradford & Heysel

The events of the spring of 1985 proved to be a watershed, both for the image of English soccer as well as for governmental and police responses to football violence. At Bradford, 56 people were killed by a fire in the ground. Serious disorder occurred at the grounds of Birmingham City, Chelsea and Luton Town and, most significantly, Liverpool fans were seriously implicated in the deaths of 39 Italian fans prior to the European Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus at The Heysel Stadium in Brussels.

8.2.15 The Football Spectators Act (1989)

The Bradford fire and the subsequent report by Justice Popplewell in 1986 raised awareness of the vital issue of spectator safety at football grounds and, in particular, re-introduced the issue of identity cards for football fans. (Though in his final report, he recommended that membership schemes should not be made compulsory.) But it was not until four years later, in 1989, that the government responded to the disorderly incidents of 1985 with the introduction of the Football Spectators Act.

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¹⁵ The Sunday Times, August 1985
The Football Licensing Authority (FLA) was also established under the Football Spectators Act and it is responsible for awarding licences to premises that admit spectators to watch football matches. Though receiving its funding from central government, it retains an independent function and has considerable powers. Not least, it has the capacity to close a stadium.

The main proposals of the Act concerned the introduction of compulsory identity cards for spectators at every league, cup and international match played in England and Wales. Throughout the sixties and seventies, various clubs had experimented with their own membership schemes in an attempt to prevent ‘unwanted’ fans from entering their grounds.

The government and, in particular, the Prime Minister of the time, Margaret Thatcher, strenuously backed the use of identity cards and reciprocal membership schemes as the most effective way of enforcing exclusion orders at football grounds.

Indeed, even before the Football Spectators Act (1989) had been finalised, the Football League had agreed with the government to introduce membership schemes at all clubs, though clubs were slow to implement the recommendations, with only thirteen League clubs (out of ninety two) actually satisfying government requirements by the initial deadline date of August 1987. A survey of police views on membership schemes revealed that 40% did not favour them. In the event, legislation imposing compulsory identity cards was shelved in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster, when Justice Taylor condemned such schemes in his final report.

On the 15th April 1989, ninety-five Liverpool fans were crushed to death on the terraces at the Hillsborough Stadium during the F.A. Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. The subsequent report by Lord Justice Taylor was the ninth such inquiry into crowd safety and control at football matches in the United Kingdom.

Prior to the Hillsborough disaster, the techniques used in crowd control had become virtually synonymous with the control of football hooliganism, with the segregation of supporters, high perimeter fencing and a high-profile presence being among the primary tactics of the police and the clubs.

The interim report from Lord Taylor was published relatively swiftly after the tragedy, in August 1989. It contained forty-three separate recommendations which were designed to be immediately implemented by all football league clubs (N. B. the Premier League

16 J. Williams, E. Dunning and P. Murphy, 1988
17 J. Williams, E. Dunning and P. Murphy, 1989
had yet to be formed) by the beginning of the forthcoming season, 1989/90.

The principal recommendations of the interim report were:

- A review of the terrace capacities in all grounds, with an immediate 15% reduction in ground capacities
- Restrictions on the capacities of self-contained supporter pens
- The opening of perimeter fence gates
- A review of the Safety Certificates held by all Football League grounds
- The creation of locally-based, multi-agency groups to advise on ground safety
- Constant monitoring of crowd density by the police and Stewards

8.2.20 The final report

The final report was published in January 1990 and included praise from Lord Taylor regarding the response of clubs to the recommendations contained within the Interim report. The report emphasised the lack of communication between the fans and the football authorities, criticising, in particular, the lack of facilities for supporters at football grounds and the poor condition of football grounds. In total, the final report contained seventy-six recommendations, of which the main ones were:

- The conversion of all football league grounds to all-seater stadia by the end of the millennium
- The removal of spikes from perimeter fencing, which should be no more than 2.2 metres in height
- Ticket-touting to become a criminal offence
- The introduction of new laws to deal with offences inside football stadia, including racial abuse

8.2.21 All-seater stadia

The insistence of the report that football grounds become all-seater placed an unprecedented financial burden on even the richest football clubs in the football League. There were certainly severe critics of such a recommendation and censures were not only made on purely financial grounds. Simon Inglis argued that terraced grounds exist throughout the world and do not cause problems and that tragedies such as Hillsborough are more judiciously explained by an examination of the behaviour and control of spectators. In a survey of members of the Football Supporters’ Association, the

18 S. Inglis, 1990
19 J. Williams, E. Dunning and P. Murphy, 1989
majority of those surveyed were opposed to all-seater grounds. Lord Taylor admitted in the report that:

“There is no panacea which will achieve total safety and cure all problems of behaviour and crowd control. But I am satisfied that seating does more to achieve those objectives than any other measure.”

In March 1990, the government announced a cut in the rate of tax levied on the Football Pools, which meant that approximately £100 million (over a five-year period) would now be allocated towards ground redevelopment. In addition, the Football Trust announced (in October of the same year) that it would distribute £40 million over the same period and by the following January, the Trust had already allocated approximately £7 million towards various ground improvement projects. Pronouncements by both UEFA and FIFA at this time also indicated their unreserved support for all-seater stadia, with both organisations declaring their intention that all major football matches under their auspices would be played at all-seater grounds.

8.2.22 European cooperation

It is really only after 1985 (after the Heysel Stadium tragedy) that a concerted effort has been made to establish cross-border cooperation in Europe between both police forces and football authorities to combat football hooliganism.

The impact of the Heysel Stadium tragedy (where 39 Italian supporters were killed at the European Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool) was such that three major European bodies addressed the issue of football violence. Firstly, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Spectator Violence and misbehaviour at Sports Events, which proposed that measures should be taken to prevent and punish violent behaviour in sport. Secondly, the European Council called on all member countries to deal with violence in and around sports stadia and, finally, The European Parliament proposed a number of different measures to combat football hooliganism.

As recently as April 22nd 1996, the European Union issued guidelines on dealing with football hooliganism, many of which adopted United Kingdom proposals. These guidelines include using the EPI-centre system (secure E-mail) to enable the swift exchange of police intelligence information, the seizure of racist material intended for distribution abroad and the training of club stewards in crowd safety and control techniques. It was also proposed that police forces participate in member states’ relevant training courses to aid the exchange of information about the techniques that can be used to prevent hooliganism.

While Europe has been quick to adopt many strategies on hooliganism formulated in the United Kingdom, the European Parliament remain especially concerned about restrictions placed on the free movement of football supporters. The Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs commissioned a report on football hooliganism, which was drafted by the MEP, Claudia Roth and adopted by the European Parliament.

The report contained some criticism of police databases and the new information exchange networks, stressing that such networks had led to the arrest and expulsion of innocent people. In the United Kingdom, this was certainly viewed as an attack on the work of the National Criminal Intelligence Service Football Unit, in particular. Any information thus exchanged between member states

“... must be carried out in compliance with the criteria laid down by the Council of Europe for the protection of data of a personal nature”

The report, however, supported the British Home Secretary’s demands for increased cooperation between member states regarding the control of cross-border hooliganism. But it further stressed that nationality alone cannot be a basis on which to prevent access to sports stadia and that

“... only after a supporter has been convicted of an offence either of violence or an offence connected with football, can he/she legitimately be prevented from attending matches at home or abroad”

The report concludes by refuting the argument that restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of football supporters is either a viable or a suitable means of controlling football hooliganism.

The recent European Championships held in England in June, highlighted both the expanding level of cooperation between European police forces since Heysel and the increased sophistication of safety and security techniques that have developed to deal with the football hooligan.

The security campaign for Euro ’96 was organised by the National Crime Intelligence Service Football Unit. The NCIS Football Unit became fully operational in 1990 and consists of six full-time police officers led by a superintendent. By 1992, over six thousand names and photographs of individuals were held on computer files. Indeed, the information gathered by the Football Unit formed the basis of much of the evidence presented in the Home Affairs Committee reports (1990 and 1991).
The head of the Football Unit (Assistant Chief Constable Malcolm George seconded from the Greater Manchester police) was also in overall control of the police operation for Euro ’96. The Football Unit worked in conjunction with an ACPO (Association of Chief police Officers) steering group and a multi-agency working party. Pre-tournament estimates suggested over 10,000 police Officers from nearly a dozen different police forces were involved in policing Euro ‘96, at a cost of approximately £25 million. The Football Trust provided 75% of the funding required to update police technology for the tournament.

8.2.26 Police National Coordinating Centre

A police coordination centre was based at Scotland Yard in London for the duration of the competition and included police representatives from each of the sixteen countries taking part. In addition to this, a police Liaison Officer travelled with each team and with each national football association throughout their stay in the competition. In addition, four principal sub-groups were in operation throughout the competition.

8.2.27 Match Commander Group

The Match Commander Group comprised the head of policing at each of the eight Euro ’96 venues. The purpose of this group was to engender “a common police philosophy” between the different police Commanders.

8.2.28 Senior Investigating Officers Group

Teams of police officers were also assigned to deal with other crimes as well as football hooliganism. The Senior Investigating Officers Group was instigated to enable information to be exchanged on outbreaks of crimes such as shop-theft and pick-pocketing.

8.2.29 IT Group

The Information Technology Group was responsible for maintaining the various computer links between the National Coordinating Centre and the Match Commanders at the eight venues. Essentially, all the police forces in the United Kingdom were included in the computer link-up, enabling the movement of fans between venues to be monitored at all times through the exchange of information between the forces.

8.2.30 Press and Media Group

The task of the Press and Media Group was to avoid sensationalist reporting of any hooligan incidents by encouraging openness between the various police forces and the media. A more salient initiative of the group included issuing detailed advice packs to visiting supporters in four different languages.

8.2.31 EPI-Centre system and Photophone

Each of the eight venues in Euro ’96 housed a police Command Centre, complete with Intelligence coordinator. Intelligence could be passed between each of these centres via the EPI-Centre system. The EPI-centre system is an electronic mail system developed by
the Home Office Scientific Development Branch that enables large amounts of data to be transferred electronically at speed, and in a secure fashion. Ten ‘photophones’ were also provided. One for each of the Euro ’96 venues and one each for the coordination centre at New Scotland Yard and The British Transport police.

8.2.32 Hooligan Hotline

A ‘hooligan hotline’ number was also established whereby supporters could phone in and report incidents of hooliganism and perhaps even identify perpetrators. Although this scheme was promoted as being entirely new, similar schemes have been in existence since 1988, when the West Midlands police set up a 24-hour hotline.

An identical scheme was launched in 1990 before the World Cup Finals (even though these were taking place outside the United Kingdom, in Italy) in an attempt to deter disorder by English fans and, again, a purely domestic hotline was established at the beginning of the 1992/93 domestic season in August 1992. Two Premiership clubs (Manchester United and Leeds United) also have telephone hotlines for people to ring in with information on hooligans.

8.2.33 Spotters

The ‘Spotter’ system was also in operation at each venue. This is a system which is used throughout the season in the English Premier and Football Leagues, where a police liaison officer is attached to a particular club and has the responsibility of identifying and monitoring hooligans, usually travelling to away games and assisting the local force with the detection of hooligans.

During Euro ’96, this system was a primary example of cooperation between police from different European countries, with officers from each of the visiting countries providing spotters to work alongside the home country officers at the relevant stadia. (At a previous European championship in Germany in 1988, the British police sent spotters to aid their German counterparts in the detection of English hooligans).

8.3 The European Fan projects

While the United Kingdom has certainly taken the lead in the development of highly sophisticated techniques to prevent and monitor football hooligans, an enlightening movement from Europe has been the evolution of the ‘Fan projects’.

8.3.1 Germany

Germany were the first to introduce the fan projects, which began in Bremen in 1981, though detached youth workers in Munich had previously worked with football fans back in 1970. The projects were an attempt to take preventative measures against football hooliganism by detailing youth or social workers to work among football supporters.
The project workers established a link between football supporters and the football and police authorities, creating lines of communication that had previously not existed. Critics suggested that the project workers were simply informers working at the behest of the authorities, discovering information about hooligans and what plans they might have for particular matches.

The primary function of the fan projects is to turn supporters away from hooliganism “by means of concrete street-work activities ... to help the adolescent fan find his personal identity and to show various possibilities of coping with life”.

Löffelholz, Homann and Schwart detail a complex network of activities undertaken by the fan workers (alternatively known as “fan coaches”), including individual guidance to fans, intervention in critical situations (e.g. when arrested), educational and careers advice and recreational activities, such as organising travel to matches and producing fan magazines.

There are currently over twenty five fan projects in Germany. Each individual fan project is based around a particular club, from the highest echelons of the Bundesliga, through to the German Second Division and even the amateur football leagues, which attract a extremely high following in Germany.

Funding is mainly drawn from the individual clubs, who themselves obtain funds from a pool organised and funded by Deutscher Fussball Bund (the German equivalent of the Football Association). Finance is also available to projects from the local authorities and from ‘social sponsorship’ (as opposed to commercial sponsorship).

8.3.2 Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Fan-Projekte and Koodinationstelle Fanprojekte

The Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Fan-Projekte (Federal Study Group of Fan Projects) was formed in May 1989 and represents the fan projects on a national and international level. The group were responsible for fan project activities at the World Cup in Italy in 1990 and in the European championship finals in Sweden. The organisation of the projects was further cemented by the formation of the Koodinationstelle Fanprojekte (Federal Department Coordinating Fan-Projects) in August 1993, who coordinate the expanding network of projects and their various initiatives throughout Germany.

8.3.3 Euro ’96

Eight representatives from the Koodinationstelle Fanprojekte were at the recent Euro ’96 championships and were available at the Football Supporters’ Association fan embassy in Manchester where the German team was based for the majority of the tournament. The

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21 E. Hahn, 1987
22 M. Löffelholz, H. Homann and S. Schwart, 1992
German Euro ‘96 project printed eight thousand fan guides which provided a variety of information including arrangements for accommodation, entertainment and ticket allocations. The project workers were a vital link between the Euro ‘96 organisers and German fans, as well as between Deutscher Fussball Bund and the supporters.

8.3.4 The Netherlands

Similar (if not identical) fan projects are also functioning in The Netherlands. Learning from the German model, the Dutch fan projects began in 1986 following government-sponsored research on football hooliganism that indicated a need for a preventative approach to the problem.

Initially, the projects were financed by a three-year government grant, which was extended for a further five years to 1994. Since then, the financing for the projects has come under the auspices of individual clubs and city councils, who are responsible for the payment of the youth workers. Funding is also available from Koninklijke Nederlandsche Voetbalbond (the national football association), particularly for the projects organised around international matches and tournaments. (e.g. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Voetbalbond funded project workers at Euro ’96, who spent two weeks in England prior to the tournament on a reconnaissance mission on behalf of the KNAVE).

The emphasis within the Dutch fan projects is very much on a multi-agency approach, with project coordinators constantly liaising with the police, Football Clubs, local authorities and the various supporters’ organisations. At present there are eight major projects in existence and, like the German model, they are based around particular football clubs such as Ajax, Feyenoord, PSV Eindhoven and Utrecht.

As in Germany, the project workers (commonly known as fan coaches) attempt a similar sociopedagogical guidance to fans, helping them to obtain employment or places on educational courses. They also provide purely pragmatic advice, such as details of travel and ticket arrangements for games. However, the project workers also admit to relaying information to the police on the strategy of hooligans for particular matches.

8.3.5 Belgium

The Belgian fan projects officially began only three years ago in 1993, although some fan coaches have been sporadically working with football supporters since 1989. As with the German and Dutch examples, the Belgian project workers are qualified social and youth workers. François Goffe, one of the coordinators of the Belgian fan coaches commented:

“Our fan coaches are certainly not to be compared with the stewards prevalent in the English game. We work purely as social workers and we work with the fans every day of the week, not just on the day of a particular football match” (fieldwork interview).
In contrast to the German and Dutch models, however, the Belgian projects receive no financial help from Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de FA (the Belgian Football Association) or any of the football clubs. Neither do they receive monetary assistance from local authorities. Instead, financial assistance is obtained from central government funds only.

Eight fan coaching projects are currently in existence in Belgium and they liaise closely with the football clubs, police and the Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de FA on various matters, including security arrangements and ticket allocation. Because they do not receive any financial backing from these organisations, they remain independent and are often openly critical of individual clubs, the police and the football authorities.

8.3.6 Sweden

A number of other countries are following the lead from Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands by introducing similar fan projects or fan coaching. These include Switzerland and Sweden, where the Project Battre Lakter Kulture (‘Project for a better culture’) work alongside the Swedish Football Association in running a variety of anti-hooligan initiatives. As with German and Dutch models, the Swedish fan projects are based at football league clubs such as AIK Stockholm and Hammerbee FC.

8.4 New directions in tackling football hooliganism

This brief overview of approaches to tackling football violence reveals a distinct gulf between that of the British philosophy and the line taken in other European countries. While the German, Belgian and Dutch authorities, in particular, have engaged in proactive initiatives to reduce the problems, the British continue, in the main, to employ purely reactive strategies involving more intensive policing of football fans, sophisticated surveillance and intelligence measures and new legislation.

This reactive approach is also the line taken to some extent by the Italian authorities, and the police presence at certain games in their country can be intimidating in the extreme, with water cannon, tear gas and automatic weapons often in evidence. The recent Decreto Maroni, 1994, which followed the fatal stabbing of a Genoa fan, also introduced further restrictions on the movement of football fans and controls on their behaviour in the stadiums:

“The chief constable (questore) of the province in which the sporting events take place, can forbid people, who have been reported to the police for or convicted of taking part in violent incidents during or because of sporting events, or to people who in the same event have encouraged violence in such with symbols or posters/banners, access to places where sporting events are taking places, and can oblige the same people to report to the police during the days and hours in which the sporting events are taking place ... The person who infringes the above regulations will be punished with a minimum jail sentence of three months and a maximum of eighteen months. People who have ignored a caution can be arrested in flagrante.”
While the British and the Italian authorities favour the increased use of penal approaches, the trend must be towards tackling football violence at its roots. Despite the clear limitations of the fan coaching schemes being developed in the European mainland, they do provide a basis for a more satisfactory treatment of the problems than has existed since the late 1960s in Britain and from the early 1980s in many other countries. The German football clubs have also been much more willing to support and assist such schemes than their English and Scottish counterparts.

While a few British clubs (e.g. Watford, Oxford United, Millwall etc.) have introduced schemes to enable closer contact between fans and club officials, the large majority seem quite unwilling to take responsibility for the behaviour of their fans. Even those who have received government grants under the ‘Football in the Community’ scheme have largely instituted fairly token football coaching and school visit programmes.

While football hooliganism appears to be on the decline, at least in the UK, the problems that remain are unlikely to be eradicated simply through additional – and in some people’s view, oppressive – controls on the movement of fans, curbs on the availability of alcohol or similarly simplistic ‘solutions’ to a complex phenomenon.

In line with the views of many researchers in this area, and with the opinions of representatives of formal and informal fans’ groups throughout Europe, we see a continuing need for stronger involvement of the football clubs themselves in helping to re-direct and curb the occasionally disruptive and violent behaviour of a small minority of their fans. This might best be achieved through the increased establishment of local fans’ forums, through which supporters and club Directors would have a much stronger channel of communication. These, allied to the fan coaching schemes run by local authorities, might succeed in changing fan behaviour on the simple presumption that they are less likely to damage the reputation of a club in which they feel they have a genuine involvement.
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